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Preface 
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are signed, and how 
does the implementation of such agreements influence their effectiveness? These are the 
questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation and Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Commitments (IEC)." The IEC project is employing a variety of research 
methods; our core effort is devoted to 17 historical and comparative case studies. 
In this study Alexei Roginko reports on how Russia and the Baltic states--Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania--have implemented their international commitments to clean up the 
Baltic Sea. Russia, especially St. Petersburg, is a major source of water pollution that flows 
into the eastern Baltic. Other IEC studies on protection of the Baltic focus on Poland and 
Sweden. This is also one of several case studies in which IEC examines the effects of the 
transition to a market economy on compliance with international environmental 
commitments. 
An excerpt of this case study will appear in a book to be published by MIT Press in 
1997. That book will also present the research framework and integrated conclusions of the 
IEC project. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Countries which have emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union are now 
undergoing a painful process of transition to a democratic political system, more decentralized 
governance and a market economy. This process of economic and social transformation 
obviously affects the ways that these countries domestically implement their international 
environmental commitments. Many of these commitments have been adopted long before the 
current transition process had started and were initially implemented in a totally different 
economic and social situation. By tracing changes in implementation patterns over time we can 
identify what major modifications, if any, transition has brought into implementation picture, 
what was the impact of the former command-based Soviet regime on the implementation under 
transition, how has the transition changed the policies and regulatory activities of public 
authorities, affected the behavior of firms and individuals ("target groups") and the degree of 
compliance with international commitments. 
Further on, the new independent states, while facing roughly similar economic and 
environmental problems inherited from the Soviet Union, are following different transition 
paths, experiencing varying degrees of economic collapse and employing different instruments 
and institutional structures (with a varying degree of success) in the process of implementation 
of international environmental commitments and in environmental management in general. 
Thus, a cross-country comparison between the patterns and mechanisms of implementation for 
the same environmental regime under transition can bring about informed judgments 
concerning the relative effectiveness of various domestic implementation mechanisms. 
The above considerations explain the selection of the environmental regime for the 
current case study. The 1974 Helsinki Convention has been in force since 1980, i.e. during a 
reasonably long period of time to be able to look at evolutionary trends in implementation; 
moreover, the regime itself has progressed from technical and scientific cooperation to a 
"program strategy", linking environmental cooperation to economic reforms in the former 
Soviet republics and Poland. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, implementation processes 
in Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been following separate paths - with many 
commonalties, but different nevertheless, which provides ample opportunity for cross-country 
comparisons. However, due to limited data availability, the emphasis of the current study is 
mainly on implementation in Russia; wherever possible, comparisons with the Baltic states 
have been introduced. 
The paper is divided into four major sections. It starts by outlining major environmental 
issues the regime was intended to solve, the general framework of the regime in question*, its 
evolution over time, and primary national approaches to the regime. The major goal of this 
section is to evaluate the significance of the environmental problem covered by the 
international regime for the countries concerned, the importance of problem-solving at the 
* The regime under study includes not only the 1974 Helsinki convention itself, but also numerous non-binding 
recommendations produced by the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), the decisions of the 1988 and 1990 
Ministerial conferences, the Joint Comprehensive Programme adopted in 1992, and the provisions of the 
bilateral Russian-Finnish Action program for limiting water and marine pollution in the areas adjacent to 
Finnish-Russian border (1 992). The paper does not analyze the implementation of the new 1992 Helsinki 
Convention, since it has not yet entered into force. 
international level, and to assess national interests and approaches towards problem-solving 
and participation in the regime, especially their dynamics and changes in the period of 
transition. 
The subject of the next section is the implementation at state level: it is looking at 
changes over time in public policy and governmental actions aimed at compliance with the 
requirements of the regime and at channeling the behavior of different actors within national 
arena to implement the Baltic environmental agreements domestically. The paper explores 
national programs adopted for the implementation of Baltic pollution controls in Russia and 
the Baltic states, as well as the evolution and effectiveness of major normative, legal, 
regulatory, organizational and financial mechanisms used by a state to interact with target 
groups in the course of domestic implementation. In particular, the section attempts to trace 
how newly-emerged market-based instruments to implement environmental policy, like 
pollution charges and taxes, are used for the transmission of incentives from rules, policies and 
programs to actual changes in the behavior of targets. Another emphasis of this section is on 
the impact of decentralization of authority, the uncertainty in the division of rights and 
responsibilities between regulatory subjects brought about by the transition, upon the 
translation of international commitments into domestic actions. Finally, the section explores in 
depth the importance of mobilization of domestic and international financial resources for 
implementing the Baltic pollution controls, and especially the role of external resource 
transfers, including the analysis of some reasons why the efficacy of such transfers is mixed. 
The third section is looking at the behavior of major societal groups involved in the 
implementation of Baltic environmental accords - industry, courts, and environmental NGOs. 
It shows how the dispersion of actors, resulting from privatization of enterprises, has affected 
implementation; what impact did the public (federal and local) regulatory policies have upon 
the behavior of a key target group - defense industry; what was the role of legal and court 
action in the enforcement of new market-based, rapidly changing laws and regulations in the 
period of transition; and, finally, how important were public pressure and public participation 
for the implementation of the regime both in Russia and in the Baltic states. 
The aim of the fourth section is to assess and evaluate the results of execution of 
national policies and programs on the implementation of the Baltic environmental regime in 
terms of a degree of compliance with the regime requirements (target attainment) and the 
consequences of the target groups' response for the physical problem at hand (problem 
solving). The section attempts to explain the dynamics and cross-country variance of national 
compliance both in Russia and in the Baltic states from the viewpoint of factors endogenous to 
the regime (public policies, resource transfers) and exogenous to it (economic collapse). 
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the study and outlines major 
trends in the domestic implementation of the Baltic environmental accords. Statistical annexes 
and graphs provide additional information on the status and costs of implementation and on the 
dynamics of pollution loads. 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK: INTERNATIONAL REGIME AND NATIONAL 
INTERESTS 
1.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
1.1.1.  Environmental setting 
The Baltic Sea, with a surface area of about 400,000 km2 and a volume of 21,000 km3, 
is one of the largest brackish water areas of the world. The Baltic Sea is a very specific 
ecosystem because of its relatively high brackishness and almost permanent stratification 
(Leppakoski, 1980). The shallow, narrow Danish Straits allow only a very slow water 
exchange between the Baltic and North Sea. As a result, water in the Baltic Sea has an 
extremely long residence time, in the order of 35 to 40 years, leading to accumulation of 
discharged pollutants in water, sediments and biota (Voigt, 1983). The risk of oxygen 
depletion, hydrogen-sulfide formation and benthic death is greatly exacerbated by 
over-fertilization (Nordic Council, 1989). In sum, the Baltic is now one of the most severely 
polluted areas of the world, and serious adverse effects of currently discharged pollutants into 
the ecosystem may be felt several generations from now (Rijsberman et al., 1990). 
Eutrophication and oxygen depletion in bottom layers are most vexing current problems. 
The Baltic Sea is surrounded by nine countries: Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, and Denmark. The land area of the Baltic drainage basin 
is 1.7 million km2, containing a population of about 75 million people, almost one-hundredth of 
the world population producing about one-tenth of the global GDP (Table 1). Sweden and the 
former Soviet republics occupy over 60% of the basin's land area, but Poland's alone share of 
population is over 50%. While there is great disparity among the countries in size, greater 
convergence is apparent in levels of economic development, with strong similarities among the 
western democracies at a much higher level than the post-socialist states (Table 2). At the 
same time, more than five-fold gap in GDP per capita between the Nordic countries and 
Germany, on the one hand, and the former communist countries of the region, on the other 
hand, both results in serious environmental problems and creates impediments for their 
effective resolution by joint actions. 
A significant portion of pollution is transported into the Baltic through the atmosphere - 
about 50% of total nutrient loads are input this way. Other major sources include industrial and 
municipal waste, the pulp and paper industry and agricultural runoff Poland is the largest 
single polluter in the entire catchment area. Degradation of the Baltic Sea is currently 
occurring primarily from: 
poor treatment of municipal and industrial waste entering mainly from the Gulfs of Finland 
and Riga, and the Gdansk Bay; 
old pulp and paper mills using outdated sulfite-based technology and characterized by 
heavy discharges into water of organic substances or substantial emissions of SOz, or both 
(Karelia, new Baltic states and Poland); 
destruction of solid and hazardous wastes without proper incineration (Russia and the 
countries of Eastern Europe); 
inputs of nitrogen (30 to 35 per cent of the total load) and phosphorus (about 10 per cent 
of the total load) with agricultural non-point pollution (Denmark, Sweden, Eastern 
European countries) (HELCOM, 1992). 
Table 1 
Land area and population distribution in the Baltic Region by country 
Soztr~es and notes: 
I .  Total arca from the World factbook 1995LJ.S. Government. 
2. Drainage basin arca and population from HELCOM, 1993a and Appendix 2.2 of Wesing, 1989. 
* Figures rcfer to land area, from Appendix 2.2 of Wesing, 1989. 
** Total figure includes also portions of territories of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Norway, Belarus and Ukraine (over 
92,200 h2) 
Table 2 
Economic and population data for Baltic member countries 
Soztrce: The World Factbook 1995 N . S .  Government 
* Ofiicial Ilussian data for 1994. 
1.1.2. Regime description 
The 19 74 Helsinki Convention 
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 
(the Helsinki Convention) was adopted in Helsinki on 22 March 1974. It was signed by all 
seven (at that time) Baltic states - Denmark, Finland, German DR, FR Germany, Poland, 
Sweden, and the USSR.' The Convention finally entered into force after the last (West 
German) ratification on 3 May 1980. The current Baltic states signatory to the Helsinki 
Convention are: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Norway also drain into the 
Baltic Sea, but they are not members to the Convention. The 1974 Convention became the first 
comprehensive regional marine environment protection agreement to address all sources of 
marine pollution, including the land-based ones.2 
The 1974 Helsinki Convention sets an ambitious goal: 
"The Contracting Parties shall individually or jointly take all appropriate legislative, administrative, 
or other relevant measures in order to prevent and abate pollution and to protect and enhance the 
marine environment of the Baltic Sea area". 
The Convention's Annex I11 also lists the goals which the Contracting parties shall 
endeavor to attain, and the criteria and measures they should apply, with regard to the 
prevention of land-based pollution. These include, e.g. appropriate treatment of municipal 
sewage, minimization of the polluting load of industrial wastes, employment of low-waste 
technologies, re-circulation and re-use of water etc. No intermediate objectives or timetables 
are provided, however, neither by the Convention nor by its Annexes for the attainment of 
these goals. 
Similar to many other marine pollution control agreements, the Convention 
distinguishes, with reference to pollution from land-based sources, between hazardous and 
noxious substances. Hazardous substances (listed in Annex I to the Convention) are essentially 
banned. The list of hazardous substances currently includes DDT and its derivatives, PCB's and 
PCT's (polychlorinated terphenyls). With respect to noxious substances listed in Annex I1 
(heavy metals, phenols, halogenated hydrocarbons, persistent pesticides, radioactive materials, 
oil and petrochemical wastes, etc.), the parties should require prior special permits (issued by 
national authorities) if they are to be introduced in significant quantities (waterborne) into the 
marine environment. 
The Convention has established a permanent working body, the Baltic Marine 
Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM), comprising representation from all state 
parties and served by a small secretariat. In fact, HELCOM is the organizational nucleus of the 
environmental protection regime in the Baltic (Broadus et al., 1993). The Commission meets 
once a year in Helsinki. Each member country has one vote, and decisions of the Commission 
must be reached unanimously at all stages. The Commission's meetings are attended mostly by 
high-ranking officials from the national ministries concerned (nowadays the Ministries of 
Sweden and the USSR have blocked the EC's becoming a member of the Convention (Haas, 1993) 
However, almost all the recommendations accepted by the parties to the Convention in the first five years 
after its entry into force, dealt primarily with pollution from ships. 
Environment), and take place at the ministerial level only in exceptional circumstances. The 
preparatory work for the Commission's decisions and recommendations is done by the four 
major Committees of the HELCOM3, their subcommittees, and ad hoc working groups or 
experts' groups which report to the committee in question. 
The major "product" of the HELCOM activity are recommendations related to various 
aspects of monitoring, organization of research programs, as well as the prevention, control 
and abatement of pollution. The total number of recommendations issued since 1980 has 
exceeded 160; about one-third of their total number pertain to the problems of control and 
prevention of vessel-source pollution, 18 recommendations - to monitoring and reporting, and 
63 - to the control of land-based pollution (see Table 3).4 The greatest part of the latter 
(80%) have been adopted after 1990, which is indicative of the growing awareness of this 
major source of pollution. Examples of most important HELCOM recommendations for land- 
based sources are shown in Annex 1. Some of the recommendations adopted contain specific 
targets and timetables for their achievement, but, since none of them are amended to the text of 
the Convention, they are not considered legally binding, i.e. the Convention operates on a 
"voluntary" basis. However, since all of the recommendations are adopted by unanimous vote, 
they are considered to be at least "morally binding" (Rijsberman et al. 1990).5 
Table 3 
Subjects addressed in HELCOM recommendations and their implementation, 1980-1996 
Source: HELCOM 199 la; HELCOM World Wide Web home page 
Subject 
Monitoring and reporting 
Measures urban & industry 
Measures agriculture 
Guidelines and requirements 
for reception facilities / 
shipping 
Combating oil and other spills 
Other 
TOTAL 
The Environment Committee deals with technical questions of environmental quality and oversees monitoring 
and data collection programs; Technological Committee formulates measures and standards for pollution 
control from a variety of land-based sources. Maritime Committee is responsible for the prevention of 
operational pollution from vessels and related maritime safety issues, and the Combating Committee is 
responsible for the prevention and combating accidental pollution caused by spills of oil and other harmful 
substances. 
Several recommendations have flowed between the North Sea and the Baltic, brokered by Denmark, Germany 
and Sweden which are parties to both regimes. With only minor phrasing changes, arrangements for offshore 
installations, mercury and cadmium emissions, and dumping practices for dredging spoils were initially 
adopted in the North Sea and subsequently adopted by HELCOM. Standards for oil emissions from refineries 
were first adopted by HELCOM and then transferred to PARCOM (Haas, 1993: 15 1). 
Number of 
recommendations 
18 
4 9 
14 
50 
18 
15 
164 
It is only the provisions of the Helsinki Convention itself that contain legally binding obligations for the 
states-parties. The HELCOM recommendations include mainly technological or environmental norms and 
standards which are used as "general guiding principles" for the implementation at the domestic level. "The 
purpose [ . . . I  of adopting a recommendation is to submit a certain question for the Contracting Parties for study 
and implementation, if accepted" (Doc. HELCOM 61INF.9, cited by Hjorth, 1992). 
Recommendations reported as fully implemented by 
HELCOM 
Number 
11 
1 
1 
29 
10 
3 
5 5 
Per cent 
6 1 
2 
7 
5 8 
56 
20 
34 
The fact that all the HELCOM recommendations are adopted unanimously implies, at 
least in theory, that a recommendation adopted by the Commission will be implemented in all 
countries. In practice, however, there can be (and usually there are) considerable delays before 
recommendations are implemented (if at Besides, many of the recommendations are 
vague, and for that reason it is not an easy task to determine whether or not they have been 
implemented (Hjorth, 1992: 2 16). 
As can be seen from Table 3, the highest percentage of the recommendations 
implemented falls under the category of either operational vessel-source pollution prevention 
or combating oil or other spills at sea. This is explainable by the fact that these 
recommendations for the most part actually implemented the IMO standards or recommended 
measures, which were already agreed upon internationally and the countries were obliged to 
implement them domestically anyway, mainly in the framework of MARPOL 73/78 
Convention. Implementation of recommendations on pollution monitoring, surveillance and 
reporting also fares relatively well, for it has been comparatively easy to achieve. Prevention of 
pollution from land-based sources laggs far behind, since it is obviously the most complex type 
of pollution to handle; in addition, the Helsinki Convention itself provides less detailed 
regulations concerning land-based pollution than for other fields. The only two 
recommendations (out of total of 63) on this subject reported as implemented were No. 312 
(1 982) on the elimination of discharges of DDT and No. 411 (1 983) adding PCTts to the "black 
list" of the Convention. 
This can hardly be considered as a success, moreover so that DDT has already been 
previously classified as a banned substance in the Annex I (Broadus et al., 1993). On the other 
hand, the situation may not be so hopeless, since HELCOM considers a recommendation "filly 
implemented" only if the member countries have reported it as such. Therefore, in order to 
understand the real state of affairs with HELCOM's recommendations implementation, one has 
to look at country implementation reports the review of which has been provided by the 
Secretariat at the meeting of the Commission in 1988.7 However, due to incompatibility in time 
frames and recommendations' classification, it is difficult to estimate which countries were 
more successfil in implementing a specific type of recommendations.8 
Regime institutional change 
During the twenty years of its existence, the Baltic environmental protection regime has 
demonstrated its capability for adjustment over time. List (1990) describes the Baltic Sea 
protection regime as an evolutionary one, implying new organizational set-ups, new 
procedures and, above all, new rules. 
To deal with the problems of implementation delays in the countries under transition, the HELCOM has 
endorsed in 1993 a differentiated approach in formulating the implementation timetables, i.e. offering to these 
countries extended implementation time limits to bring the discharges and emissions from existing enterprises 
in conformity with HELCOM Recommendations. However, no exemptions were made for new enterprises 
(IIELCO,blNews, March 1993, No. 2, p. 4). 
DOC. HELCOM 91311, analyzed by Hjorth (1992). 
In any case, during the period of 1980-1988 the Soviet Union has reported 14 out of the total of 18 land- 
based-oriented recommendations as "implemented", but these were mainly brief implementation reports 
(Hjorth, 1992: 247). 
The common feature of almost all rules in the regime established by the Helsinki 
Convention is their technical nature. Foreseeing rapid changes in the underlying technical 
knowledge, the parties to the Convention wanted to keep adoption and adaptation of rules 
relatively easy. This was achieved by placing the technicalities to be regulated right from the 
start into annexes (and appendices thereto) to the Convention. These annexes, in turn, could be 
changed by a facilitated procedure not involving national parliaments. In addition, the whole 
recommendation system is itself a device for evolution in the regulative field. 
The organization of HELCOM has also progressed over time. Since at the time of the 
Convention development there was no model of a body comprehensively dealing with the 
pollution of a sea area, the actors had to learn by doing, drawing only on the general 
knowledge about the international institution-building. Organizational differentiation has 
therefore occurred over the years, leading also to changes in procedures. 
One of the major procedural innovations was the granting in 1988 of observer status 
not only, as had been practiced since 1980, to relevant intergovernmental organizations, but 
also to NGOs. Greenpeace International was the first to benefit from this procedural reform 
which reflects increased awareness on the part of the state actors of the importance of public 
involvement in marine pollution matters (List, 1990). Besides, representatives of other 
international NGO's (World Wide Fund for Nature, Coalition Clean Baltic etc.) are invited at 
Working Groups' meetings when appropriate and decided so by HELCOM (HELCOM, 1991). 
However, a more significant procedural change with far-reaching consequences has 
been the introduction ofMinisteria1 Conferences, the first of which took place in March 1988, 
borrowing a lesson from the North Sea regime. It was hoped that the influence of HELCOM 
on the domestic implementation would be enhanced and the political weight of the resolutions 
increased. The HELCOM recommendations carried too little authority and have not caused 
sufficient changes in the behavior of the member states. The "Declaration on the protection of 
the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area" adopted at the ministerial level during the ninth 
meeting of HELCOM in 1988 called for a reduction of total discharges of listed pollutants 
(heavy metals, toxic chemicals and nutrients) in the order of 50 per cent as soon as possible, 
but not later than 1995 (HELCOM, 1988). However, the Declaration have provided neither for 
the measurement of the discharges' reduction nor for their distribution among the countries 
involved, nor even for the reference year; that, according to the experts' judgment, made its 
implementation highly debatable (Broadus et al., 1993).' The rather vague goal of 50% 
emissions reduction proposed in 1988 was somewhat clarified by the addition of a reference 
year, 1987, in the Ronneby Declaration of 1990, thus placing it on a par with the goals adopted 
by the North Sea Conference. Moreover, according to the Ronneby Declaration, biological 
treatment for nutrient removal should be installed not later than in the year 2000 (Baltic Sea 
Environment Conference, 1990). 
According to Fitzmaurice (1992), the 1988 Declaration was meant to be merely a political act which would be 
non-binding. It was not even officially published in the Eastern European member states, probably because they 
would havc been in any case unable to act in accordance with its provisions. Moreover, the Declaration was not 
rcgistered under Article 102 of the UN. Charter. It was believed that its non-binding nature would guarantee a 
more sincere approach in determining generally the needs of the Baltic Sea and compliance with the 
Dcclaration. 
The introduction of Ministerial Conferences has had several positive effects for the 
hnctioning of the regional marine pollution control regime. First, it allowed the Helsinki 
Commission to reduce the disadvantages of adoption of measures by consensus - the 
so-called "least common denominator" phenomenon. The publicity surrounding the ministerial 
meetings (in conjunction with increased environmental awareness at home) has made it more 
difficult for "laggard" countries (East European states, and to a certain extent Finland) to say 
no, because ministers were encountering new accountability at home. Moreover, environmental 
ministers in laggard countries could make stronger commitments at international meetings than 
they could otherwise get passed domestically, where they would be suppressed by their 
domestically stronger colleagues in other ministries (Haas, 1993: 173). 
Second, the meetings of Ministers spearheaded a hndamental shift in approach: from a 
reactive approach based on assumptions of assimilative capacity to a proactive approach based 
on the principle of precautionary action. The 1988 Ministerial Declaration introduced the 
concept of "Best Available Technology"; the Ronneby Declaration of 1990 introduced the 
concept of "Best Environmental Practice" and the principle of precautionary action (Broadus et 
al., 1993). 
By all means the most potentially significant regime change was the adoption of a new 
and revised legal instrument - the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, adopted in April 1992, which, upon eventually entering 
into force, will supersede the current agreement. l o  The new Convention contains major 
expansions in purpose (to prevent and eliminate pollution rather than just control or minimize 
it), in scope (such as inclusion of internal waters and the whole of the Baltic Sea catchment 
area), and in regulatory aggressiveness - such as invoking the precautionary and polluter pays 
principles, and shifting to a uniform regime for all substances by requiring the use of best 
available technology (BAT) and best environmental practices (BEP). New provisions for 
notification and for dealing with non-compliance have also been introduced. However, since 
the implementation of the new provisions will not be required until several years from now, 
they are not hrther analyzed in the current paper. 
The Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme 
In the late 1980s, HELCOM members have arrived to a joint conclusion on the 
expediency of cost-sharing on an international basis and using environmental investments hnds 
where they can produce maximum environmental efficiency with minimal costs, namely in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where little pollution control has been done in 
the past." Since the Nordic countries had already much higher costs of removal per unit of 
emissions' reduction, their total domestic expenditures for water pollution control have greatly 
lo As of June 1996, the new 1992 Convention has been ratified by six states (Estonia, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, and Sweden) and the European Community. The ratification process is progressing, but three 
ratifications are still missing (HELCOM News, June 1996, No. 3: 3). In Russia, as has been explained by the 
Russian Environment Minister V. Danilov-Danilyan, the ratification process has been delayed because of the 
temporary halt in parliamentary activities; necessary ratification documents are being prepared by Minpriroda 
in cooperation with other ministries and organizations for consideration by the Parliament (HELCOM, 1994: 
78). 
' It costs increasingly more per unit to remove the remaining pollution: per unit of pollutant it becomes 16 
times more economical to remove the first 80% of the pollution load as compared to the last 20%. 
exceeded those of the CEE countries, with about equal (or even lower) overall environmental 
effectiveness. That is why, the HELCOM experts assumed, high investment efficiency in the 
post-communist countries of the region would have more positive effects on the state of the 
Baltic. This approach was hrther developed in several HELCOM recommendations, and 
represented an important starting point for the elaboration of the new action program for the 
protection of the Baltic environment. 
The 1990 Ministerial Conference in Ronneby (Sweden) has adopted the Baltic Sea 
Declaration which called for the elaboration of a Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action 
Programme (JCP), with the aim "to restore the Baltic Sea to a sound ecological balance" 
(Baltic Sea Environment Conference, 1990), and established an ad hoc high level Task Force. l 2  
To provide a basis for the concrete Action program and to outline priority fields of action, 
seven pre-feasibility studies financed by national governments through multilateral banks 
(acting as executing agencies), have been carried out. l 3  Since strict priorities were essential to 
use the available hnding with maximum cost-effectiveness, the pre-feasibility studies were 
designed to guide the investments by linking costs to the expected decreases in pollution. The 
findings indicated that there were 132 pollution "hot spots" of which 47 have been given 
"priority" designation.14 Of the 132 "hot spots", 95 were located in the formerly centrally 
planned economies in the eastern and southern portions of the Baltic basin (HELCOM, 1992; 
HELCOM, 1993b), including 60 hot spots, or 44 per cent of the total, in the republics of the 
former USSR (see Annex 2)15. As has been acknowledged by Russia at the 1993 Gdansk 
Conference, pulp and paper mills, municipalities, management of hazardous wastes and 
agricultural activities in the St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad provinces contribute up to about 50 
percent of anthropogenic load entering the Baltic Sea from the Russian territory and form a 
major part of the entire pollution load (HELCOM, 1993d: 39). 
On the basis of pre-feasibility studies, supplemented by concrete national plans 
submitted by member states, the Task Force elaborated a proposal for the Action Programme. 
A draft JCP was submitted to the Diplomatic Conference, held at ministerial level at April 1992 
in Helsinki. The Conference has endorsed the strategic approach and principles reflected in 
draft JCP and called for the establishment of a HELCOM Programme Implementation Task 
l 2  In addition to the seven Baltic states, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and the EEC, the representatives of five 
international financial institutions (IFI) also participated in the Ronneby Conference. The latter included 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Nordic 
Investment Bank (NIB), the World Bank and Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO). 
l 3  These studies addressed environmental issues, sources and magnitude of pollution loads, and options for 
pollution control and improved environmental management in especially polluted regions throughout the Baltic 
Sea catchment area - the Gulf of Finland, the Gulf of Riga and the Daugava river basin, Lithuanian coast and 
the Neman river basin, the Kaliningrad region, eastern Poland, the OderIOdra river basin, and the North 
German Baltic coast. Special studies were also made of agricultural runoff, coastal wetlands, and the impact of 
the emissions into the atmosphere (HELCOM, 1993b). 
l 4  In the course of 1994-1996, eleven hot spots in Finland, Sweden and Germany (nine pulp and paper mills 
and two municipal) have been removed from the list, since the construction of water treatment facilities there 
has been completed and they complied with all HELCOM standards (HELCOM News, 1996, No. 3: 9). 
l 5  The percentage of "priority" hot spots designated in FSU is even higher: 26 of their total number, or 55 per 
cent, are located in the former Soviet republics. 
Force (HELCOM PITF)16 - to initiate, coordinate and facilitate the implementation of the 
Program. The HELCOM PITF was established and it finalized the JCP by the end of 1992. 
The JCP approach has several novel features. First, the countries have developed 
concrete nationalplans which forced them to scrutinize the wide range of activities with an 
impact on the Baltic Sea environment. As a result, much was learnt about the scope and 
distribution of the environmental problems and their causes. Second, the Programme is a joint 
one, i.e. priorities for its implementation are, as far as possible, set for  he catchment area as a 
whole and not only within a national context. Third, the Program, to the extent possible, is 
spelled in such terms so as to form the basis for consideration by the new actors - 
development banks as well as by other financing agencies, including those involved in bilateral 
assistance programs, regarding the financing of investments and other activities contained in 
the JCP (HELCOM, 1991 b; HELCOMNews 1994, No. 2: 3). 
The JCP is supposed to strengthen the environmental management framework in each 
country, including environmental policy and legislation as well as a system of economic 
incentives. It will also give better possibilities to finance environmental investments. It helps all 
countries and institutions to focus these efforts and resources in a more effective way. At the 
same time, simultaneous and overlapping work can be avoided through the transparency 
created by the program (HELCOM, 1993d: 20). 
The underlying strategy on which the Program is based consists of actions by each 
concerned government to carry out needed policy and regulatory reforms, capacity building, 
and investments to control pollution from point and non-point sources, safely dispose of or 
reduce generation of waste, and conserve ecologically sensitive and economically valuable 
areas. The success of the environmental strategy will depend on a series of national 
interventions that must compete with other national priority areas for allocation of human and 
financial resources, especially in the former centrally planned economies of the Baltic Sea 
region. The ultimate goal should be to comply with the environmental standards of the 
European Union or, where applicable, with other stricter standards (HELCOM, 1992; 
HELCOM, 1993~) .  
The May 1996 Baltic States Summit Meeting held in Visby (Sweden) has recommended 
that HELCOM should update and strengthen the JCP, as well as increase the pace of its 
implementation. Furthermore, the JCP should become an important element in the elaboration 
of Agenda 21 for the Baltic Sea Region. It has been emphasized that special attention should 
be given to water supply and the treatment of waste water in the St. Petersburg, Pskov and 
Kaliningrad areas, and the Vistula and Odra river basins. HELCOM has been called to develop 
an action program for phasing out discharges, emissions and losses of hazardous substances, 
including persistent organic pollutants (HELCOMNews, June 1996, No. 3: 3). 
To sum up, the Baltic Sea environmental protection regime has started by adopting the 
"technical-scientific" strategy, which was common for most contemporary international 
organizations in the field, and had three major tasks: research and information, formulation of 
l 6  In addition to the signatories of the Convention, other countries of the Baltic Sea catchment area also 
participate in the Task Force, together with international financial institutions and a number of environmental 
NGOs, namcly, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Coalition Clean Baltic (CCB), Union of the Baltic Citics 
(UBC), and International Council for Local Environmental Activities (ICLEI). 
principles for emission limitations, and specification of rules and procedures. In the bipolar 
security system which then existed in Europe, this strategy hnctioned well in the sense that 
cooperation was primarily technical and uncontroversial to the member states' security 
concerns. The regime has been evolving under the impact of a better scientific understanding of 
the problem, enhanced by public concern and publicized by the media: it has progressed from 
limiting emissions of substances included into the black and grey lists to identifying best 
available technologies for across-the-board cuts of those and more emissions from a variety of 
industrial branches or sectors (see Haas, 1993). 
With the massive political changes occurring in Europe and the opening up of totally 
new conditions for cooperation by providing a context for East-West hnding and technology 
transfer, a new "program strategy" has largely replaced the previous one, with its central 
characteristics being a strong economic component, linkage of environmental cooperation to 
economic reforms, the emphasis on long-term planning, and high-level political involvement. 
Overarching, action-oriented political programs are now applied to guide the activities of 
HELCOM, and their scope has been expanded by linking them to regional cooperation in other 
areas, such as industrial development, energy, transportation and agriculture. The number of 
actors involved has also increased dramatically with the inclusion of new member countries, 
international financial institutions, local-level authorities, private businesses and independent 
professional experts. The adoption of JCP has signaled a dramatic departure, in fact a regime 
change, from the form of cooperation characteristic of the 1980s (see Hjorth, 1992; Nilson, 
1994; Ringius, 1995). 
1.1.3. Importance of the problem for the country 
For the former Soviet Union as a whole, environmental problems in the Baltic area 
were most probably of secondary importance, as long as pollution produced by heavy industry 
and municipalities had not noticeably affected its economic interests, particularly fishing17 and 
recreation. Compared to other Baltic littoral countries, the percentage of the USSR total land 
area within the Baltic drainage basin was relatively insignificant (2.5%), with only 4 per cent of 
the country's total population inhabiting this area (Broadus et al., 1993: 49). 
For today's Russia, which has lost most of the FSU Baltic coastline, these probably 
would have been of even lesser significance, if it were not for a strong transboundary impact of 
pollution generated particularly by St. Petersburg and a perceived need to demonstrate 
compliance with international obligations. Some observers have noted that in Russia still 
certain environmental problems were regarded as "first class" ones because they, for one 
reason or another, have attracted the attention of the West. Thus the significance of a problem 
l 7  Although the Baltic Sea is comparatively unproductive (especially the eastern portions with the lowest 
salinity levels), there are commercially valuable fish stocks available for harvesting. In 1989, the Baltic 
republics produced an estimated 12.2 per cent of all Soviet fish and other ocean products (Yastrebova, 1990). 
The situation. however, started to change as the deterioration of the state of the Baltic environment began to 
detrimentally affect fishing. Pollution, together with overfishing, has most severely affected the state of cod 
stocks in the sea; a declining trend in salmon stocks has also been evident. In the eastern part of the Gulf of 
Riga, the concentration of heavy metals in fish tissues has been approaching maximum permissible 
concentrations (MF'C), which could jeopardize commercial fishing in the area (Gosudarstvennyi doklad 1993, 
No. 23). In addition, numerous beach closures at Baltic resorts due to high pollution levels have been reported 
in the late 1980s. 
is determined primarily by the response it causes abroad, and to a much lesser extent - 
domestically (see e.g. Minin, 1996). 
The industrial (and polluting) potential concentrated in the Russian part of the Baltic 
catchment area is immense, with St. Petersburg alone being the heart of the Russian military- 
industrial complex, but lacking neither up-to-date municipal nor industrial water treatment for 
its more than 500 enterprises discharging waste waters to the Neva river through about 400 
outfalls (Gosudarstvennyi Doklad, 1995, No. 3 1/95: 4).18 Suffice it to say that according to the 
results of the Second Baltic Sea Pollution Load Compilation undertaken by HELCOM, 
Russian municipal sources (primarily those of St. Petersburg) in 1990 accounted for 74% of 
the total BOD, (organic matter), 70% of nitrogen, and 85% of phosphorus load on the Gulf of 
Finland (HELCOM, 1993a: 68). l 9  In addition, the Neva river, itself only 74 kilometers long, 
collects water from a highly industrialized area little smaller than the area of Italy, 
encompassing the Leningrad, and parts of Novgorod, Pskov and Vologda provinces 
(Tsvetkov, 1990), accounting for 62% of BOD,, 70% of phosphorus and 46% of nitrogen 
brought by rivers into the Gulf of Finland (HELCOM, 1993a: 64). 
The newly independent Baltic republics obviously have a much higher "stake" in the 
Baltic Sea environment compared to the former USSR or Russia. Apart from peat and forest 
lands, their most valuable natural resources are fish from the Baltic Sea and coastal recreational 
resources, both under severe threat from pollution.20 Moreover, public concern for the 
environment has been greatly enhanced by the fact that most environmental problems in these 
republics have been perceived as the result of economic mismanagement by Moscow under 
USSR, together with the expansion of heavy industry and political monopoly of the state 
resulting in ineffective environmental policies (see Eckerberg, 1994). 
Estonia is noted for its especially high air pollution, due to the concentration of power 
plants in the northeastern part of the country, which account for three quarters of Estonia's 
total air pollution load. In fact, the emission of 140 kg per capita of sulhr dioxide in Estonia is 
probably the highest in the world, compared, for example, with 5 1 kg in Lithuania, 23 kg in 
Latvia, 30 kg in Finland and 12 kg in Sweden (UNCEDIEstonia, 1992: 26). Also, agriculture is 
cited as the major source of water pollution, due largely to mismanagement of manure and 
fertilizer runoff into the rivers. The point-source load of Estonia is equivalent to about 35% of 
the total BOD,, 30% of the total nitrogen and about 10% of the total phosphorus load on the 
Gulf of Finland, and the city of Tallinn with its pulp and paper mills is responsible for about a 
third of these figures (HELCOM, 1993b: 39). Other major pollution sources are related mainly 
l 8  In 1990, about 60% of municipal wastewaters of St. Petersburg were treated biologically, and the remaining 
part has been discharged into the Gulf of Finland without any treatment. Industries in St. Petersburg purify 
about 60% of their wastewaters chemically, only 1% biologically, 9% mechanically, and 30% are not treated 
before discharging (HELCOM 1993a: 67, 71). 
l9  With respect to industrial discharges, the corresponding Russian figures are much lower. It is explainable by 
the fact that in Finland, as a rule, the industries are situated outside the municipalities and have their own 
wastewater treatment plants, while in Russia and Estonia most of the industrial enterprises have their own local 
pre-treatment facilities which are connected to the municipal sewerage systems ((HELCOM, 1993a: 70). 
20 This observation is confirmed by interviews with Latvian environmental officials conducted by the 
Environmental Center for Administration and Technology in Riga: the results of the interviews clearly show 
that in the majority of cases water protection issues, and especially the protection of the Baltic Sea, have the 
highest priority among all the environmental problems in the country (ECAT, 1995). 
to oil shale and phosphorite mining and refining in north-eastern Estonia, causing leakage of 
heavy metals and phenols into the rivers, and through them to the Gulf of Finland (Hiltunen, 
1994: 19). 
The capacity to purifjr industrial and urban wastewater is very limited: only 3 1 per cent 
of sewage water was treated in 1991 according to current standards, whereas 57 per cent was 
insufficiently treated and 11 per cent remained untreated (Eckerberg, 1994: 448). Many smaller 
cities and towns apparently have no water treatment at all. The Narva municipal treatment 
plant, designed to handle 70,000 cubic meters per day of waste, is actually processing up to 
120,000 (Mazanov, 1991). Treatment plants in Tallinn operate at ten times the design capacity 
(In Order.. ., 199 1). 
In Latvia, the situation is equally bleak. Reports indicate that swimming has been 
banned at most seaside resorts, and the fishing industry was threatened. The public water 
supply in Riga, a city of about 1 million and, up until 1991, one without a wastewater 
treatment plant, is so contaminated that serious hepatitis outbreaks have occurred. Many of the 
industrial wastes flowing into the Lielupe River and ultimately the Gulf of Riga originate in 
Olaine, a center for chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturing. Ventspils, a major cargo 
transfer port, is another contributor to environmental degradation. Its oil and petroleum 
product export facility and associated port facilities create a significant pollution problem 
through unintended discharge of ammonia, petroleum, and potash (Canfield, 1993). About 
45% of the waste water is inadequately treated or not treated at all, and about 30% of Latvian 
municipalities lack treatment plants (REC Bulletin, 1995, Vol. 5, No. 3). 
In Lithuania, Kaunas, with a population of one-half million, has no primary sewage 
treatment plant; all industrial and residential waste enters the Neman and Neris rivers and is 
carried to Kursiu Lagoon and into the Baltic. The percentage of wastewater treated in 
accordance with the existing standards is the lowest among the three Baltic states - 75% 
(UNCEDILithuania, 1992: 75). Beaches on Lithuania's Baltic coast were also closed to 
swimming during the summer of 1989 because of health risk concerns. The Klaipeda 
Petroleum Products Export Facility has been a source of increasing contamination of ground 
and harbor water through oil spills and improper ballast water-cleaning systems. In the case of 
Mazeikiai Petroleum Processing Plant, waste discharge from the water cleaning system, which 
is piped to the Baltic, has been dumped on the shoreline rather than carried 3 kilometers to sea 
as intended (The Ecological Situation ..., 1989). 
1.2. MAJOR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND APPROACHES TO THE AGREEMENT 
Both at the stages of regime formation and its initial implementation, an important role 
in determining the Soviet position in Baltic environmental cooperation has been played by 
security interests, which generally overruled environmental interests in the hierarchy of Soviet 
foreign policy goals. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies were very distrusthl 
towards any provisions or formulations that could imply limitation of their sovereignty 
(Fiillenbach 1977: 230). That can probably explain the fact that practically the only binding 
obligations included into Convention referred to pollution from ships and that implementation 
of the Convention through the 1980s also mainly dealt with this issue, while the control of 
land-based pollution sources was virtually non-existent. 
Similarly, the Soviet Union can be clearly held responsible for several important 
drawbacks of the Convention. One of them is the exclusion of internal waters from its sphere 
of application, because of the country's over-sensitivity to sovereignty issues. This fact cannot 
be proved with absolute certainty, because the full proceedings of negotiations have never been 
made public, but many analysts and observers point to this very reason.21 Clearly, the exclusion 
of internal waters hindered the control over implementation by the Helsinki Commission, since 
most of the land-based pollution sources discharge pollutants into internal waters. 
The same "strict negative sovereignty" (Hjorth, 1992) approach has also resulted in 
differing interpretations of the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Convention ("Principles and 
obligations concerning land-based pollution"), which stated that the Parties should take 
appropriate measures to control and minimize the land-based pollution of the marine 
environment of the Baltic Sea. As a rule, Western countries understood it as meaning that 
these measures had to be applied to the discharges. At the same time, several scientists and 
administrators in the former Soviet Union held the opinion that minimization should be applied 
to the border of the territorial waters. It is obvious that pollution load discharged into the 
coastal zone is being reduced when transported through the territorial waters (see Laane, 
1995). However, there existed no ways or technical methods to measure and hence to control 
the pollution load transported through the border, which effectively eliminated any possibilities 
for the implementation of domestic obligations, since any information both on the volume of 
the discharges and the environmental quality has been classified ("for official use only"). 
Another limitation of the Convention, the fact that the Parties implement its provisions 
"without prejudice to the sovereign rights in regard to their territorial sea" within its territorial 
sea through its national authorities (Article 4(3)), can also be traced to the Soviet obsession 
with security issues. In fact, the provisions regarding national control in the territorial sea and 
non-application of the Convention to the military vessels were introduced by the Soviet 
delegation and adopted on its initiative (Lindpere, 1983: 36). 
The same line of reasoning can probably serve as an explanation for the voting system 
adopted for the HELCOM meetings: the Western and neutral coastal states had preferred a 
system in which a proposal would be accepted by a two-third majority, instead of the 
unanimity that was finally introduced into the 1974 Convention (Fiillenbach, 1977: 230).22 The 
vehement opposition of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European member states to the EC 
membership in the Helsinki Convention was probably also based on strategic considerations. 
An extra member to the Convention could change the power balance between the three 
socialist states, three Western states, of which two were EC members, and one "neutral" party 
within the Soviet area of influence, Finland (Van der Weij, 1993: 28). 
There are indications that the fear of improper use of the control functions by 
HELCOM, such as espionage, played a significant role in the Soviet concern about any sign of 
interference into its domestic affairs (Fiillenbach, 1977: 230). It seems quite plausible that the 
21 A Soviet decision-maker on the Baltic sea issues from Minvodkhoz, A. Izvolsky, cited by Van der Weij 
(1993), stated that the exclusion of internal waters was caused by Soviet fears for effects on security and the 
closedness of the Soviet Union. This point of view is indirectly corroborated by H. Lindpere (1983: 36), who 
writes: "Indeed, the USSR could not agree to such a proposal [to include internal waters into the Convention's 
area], since it could have resulted in the interference into the states' internal affairs". 
22 In the Gdansk Convention on the Living Resources of the Baltic Sea a two-third majority approach had 
been accepted by all parties. This is probably related to the fact that the issues within the Gdansk Convention 
were less sensitive and had little to do with the sovereignty of the parties (Van der Weij, 1993: 28) 
Soviet military had a vested interest in the limitation of foreign observers to enter the Soviet 
territory. They were probably also unwilling to give much insight to foreign states into the 
exact emission figures, fearing that this knowledge could lead to information on Soviet military 
industries. It is even more plausible, however, that the protection of the so-called "security 
interests" has been quite often used as a disguise to classify (and hence to conceal from both 
domestic and international public) any environmental data, in order to cover the inadequacy of 
domestic pollution abatement efforts. 
Still, the idea that the Soviet military had an important role to play in the discussion of 
the contents of the Helsinki Convention is supported by many developments from the fifties up 
to the first half of the seventies. The Soviet Eastern European allies had proposed to turn the 
Baltic into a "sea of peace" as far back as 1957 and reiterated it several times afterwards. 
According to List (1990: 108), 
"... the Soviet Union in particular, but the other Eastern states as well, could see international 
environmental protection of the Baltic as a continuation, in other fields, of the policy of "The Baltic 
- A Sea of Peace". . . Although this policy originally was directed towards a different goal, namely 
ending NATO military presence in the area, it was not difficult to integrate the new task of 
environmental cooperation into this perspective." 
That implies, in particular, that the Soviet policy-makers may have not regarded 
environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea area as a new field of foreign policy, but rather 
just integrated it into their general security policies (Van der Weij, 1993: 32), or at least closely 
linked environmental cooperation to security in its narrow definition, emphasizing the general 
political advantages of cooperation in terms of peacehl coexistence. Environmental 
cooperation in the Baltic was viewed as a means of maintaining good relations with the West, 
but was never considered as binding the USSR to any obligations (Hjorth, 1992: 153-154). 
In the early years ofperestroika, the Soviet approaches and rhetoric have not changed 
much. Even in 1988, the Soviet Union was still reluctant to admit the existence of severe 
environmental problems in the Baltic area and to accept a more action-oriented strategy 
towards the issue; neither there were any hints in the Soviet delegation's statements that the 
USSR has not been able to cope with his own problems for financial or technological reasons 
(Hjorth 1992: 155). 
However, by the end of the Gorbachev period, the major factor limiting the Soviet 
efforts towards the Baltic environmental improvement obviously became the financial one. 
Doguzhiyev, the then vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, under whose authority the 
State Committee on Nature Protection (Goskompriroda) fell, said in an interview that the 
Soviet Union was technically, scientifically, and morally ready to participate in the measures 
proposed at Ronneby, but that the financing of the measures forced the Soviet Union to re- 
orient its priorities (Doguzhiyev, 1990). In fact, that represented a thinly disguised 
acknowledgment that few financial resources can and will be allocated to environmental 
protection measures to improve the ecological situation of the Baltic Sea (see Van der Weij, 
1993: 102). 
Still, with the advent ofperestroika, one progressive change in the Soviet approach 
towards the Baltic regime became evident: the Soviet Union had given up its position of 
strongly defending its national sovereignty, which had major consequences for the overall 
regime transformation. On the other hand, during the Gorbachev period, the priority of Baltic 
environmental cooperation in the overall Soviet (and later Russian) foreign environmental 
policy has obviously decreased, particularly with the Baltic republics acquiring independence. 
AAer the Ronneby conference, in 1990 and 199 1, the Soviet Union did not attend many 
subcommittee meetings and was not very active within HELCOM23; neither did it take any 
initiatives on international measures to protect the Baltic Sea from pollution. Harald Velner, 
the prominent Estonian scientist, who held many positions at HELCOM, has not received any 
instructions from Moscow during this period, which was quite unusual since he was still 
officially representing the Soviet Union (Van der Weij, 1993: 102). 
For the former Soviet Baltic republics, however, the HELCOM activities played an 
important role in the process of their international recognition. This platform gave the Baltic 
republics some of their first possibilities to participate in international fora as independent 
entities. This was made possible by a progressive attitude of the Nordic countries, especially of 
Denmark and Sweden, which took several preparatory measures for future r e ~ o g n i t i o n . ~ ~  
2. STATE LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION 
2.1. NATIONAL PROGRAMS 
As reported by the first Soviet national Report on the state of the environment for 
1988, a program based on 1988 Ministerial Declaration was set up for the Baltic Sea region for 
the period up to 1996, encompassing about 500 of the most significant land-based sources of 
marine pollution and requiring an investment of 1.2 billion rubles.25 Furthermore, in order to 
implement the Ministerial Declaration, treatment plants for municipal sewage were supposed to 
be provided for the main cities in the period of 1992-1993 (Gosudarstvennyi doklad, 1990: 
167). These measures were contained in Goskompriroda Decree No. 4, adopted in January 
1990, almost two years later (Van der Weij, 1993: 106). The 1989 Report says that in 
connection to the 1988 Declaration the Soviet ministries responsible for its implementation 
have made corrections to the corresponding plans (Gosudarstvennyi doklad, 1991 : 233). 
The above program has been incorporated within the larger State Environment 
Protection Program for 1991 -1 995, which had a special chapter on the Baltic region. Its 
relation to 1988 Ministerial Declaration can be clearly traced in the goal set which called for at 
23 This compares unfavorably with the period of 1982-87, when the Soviet participation at HELCOM and 
Committee meetings was above average; during that period, the USSR had a total of 81 representations 
compared to e.g. 79 for FRG, 75 for Denmark, 66 for Poland and 43 for GDR (see Hjorth, 1992: 229-230). The 
same is true with respect to the number of initiatives presented at HELCOM and its commissions: the USSR 
has presented 192 initiatives compared to 108 presented by FRG, 96 by Denmark, 59 by Poland and 28 - by 
GDR (Hjorth, 1992: 236). 
24 After the Ronneby Conference, independent Baltic advisors were for the first time included into the work of 
HELCOM, specifically into that of the ad hoc High Level Task Force. Before that, the Baltic representatives 
had always participated as members of the Soviet delegation. True, through the status of experts the Baltic 
republics could receive information directly from HELCOM rather than through Moscow. At the same time, 
sending independent representatives to the Task Force was motivated mainly by political reasons. The rather 
inexperienced experts could contribute little to the activities of HELCOM or to the Baltic republics' 
environmental policy, which was not perceived as a high priority until real independence had been achieved. 
The fact that Baltic politicians could participate as independent experts was hoped to be a first step in the 
process of receiving recognition (Van der Weij, 1993: 105). 
25 Kolbasov (1990) cites a figure of 1.5 billion rubles 
least 50% reduction of organic compounds, nutrients and heavy metals loads into the Baltic 
compared to 1985 level (Gnatovskaya, 1991). However, with the deterioration of economic 
situation and the ensuing disintegration of the Union, this program has never been adopted. 
In 1992, pursuant to signing of the framework bilateral agreement on environmental 
cooperation between Finland and Russia, a bilateral Action program for limiting water and 
marine pollution in the areas adjacent to Finnish-Russian border has been developed26, and the 
corresponding domestic implementation program based on the federal government Resolution 
No. 332 (May 20, 1992) has been adopted. The reduction targets of the program, which 
concerned industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste water treatment, were based on 
HELCOM requirements and included the following agreed measures: 
90% removal of BOD and total-P for communities larger than 10,000 inhabitants, no 
later than 1995; 
introduction of biological, chemical or bio-chemical waste water treatment from 
practically all pulp and paper mills by 1996; 
50% reduction in discharges, as compared to 1987, from chemical, metallurgical, food, 
mining and other industries being comparable sources of pollution by 1995; 
50% reduction in organic load from agriculture by 1996 as compared to 1987; 
an approximate 50% reduction in the phosphorus load from cattle farms by 1995 as 
compared to 1987 (BSEP, Vol. 2: 8). 
For the city of St. Petersburg these measures would involve a 50-68% reduction of 
pollution load from the municipal WWTPs, the elimination of untreated water discharges by 
1996 as well as for toxic waste utilization measures. To achieve these, the building or 
renovation of the four areal WWTPs in addition to improvements in the surface finishing plants 
and the sewerage system in St. Petersburg were envisaged (Hiltunen, 1994: 38, 54; Sorokin 
1993a, 140-141). 
In 1993, a draft National Action Plan for realization of UNCED decisions has been 
adopted in Russia (Natsionalnyi plan, 1993), containing a separate section (5.2.2) specially 
devoted to the Baltic Sea. The plan envisaged the development of a Federal program for 
environmental protection measures in the Baltic Sea basin, based on the provisions of JCP, the 
1974 and 1992 HELCOM Conventions, the 1990 Ronneby Declaration and the 1992 bilateral 
Soviet-Finnish agreement. The major provisions of the proposed program, as outlined in the 
Action plan, were the following: 
to eliminate disposal of untreated and inadequately treated waste waters in order to achieve 
a 50 per cent reduction in the emissions of organic substances, nitrogen, phosphorus and 
heavy metals by 1995; 
to complete by 1994 the construction of water treatment plants and sewerage networks in 
St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Petrozavodsk, Pskov and other cities in order to achieve full 
biological water treatment. To start the construction of urban stormwater systems 
26 'Action programme on the reduction of pollution and the implementation of the protection of marine 
environment in the Baltic Sea and in other areas close to the common borders of the Republic of Finland and 
the Russian Federation'. 
connected to treatment plants, the construction of tertiary water treatment plants with 
water re-use and recycling; 
to complete by 1995 environmental protection programs in the forest and pulp-and-paper 
industries in Karelia, Leningrad and Kaliningrad provinces, providing for elimination of 
untreated waste water discharges and the reduction of atmospheric emissions; 
to develop and to introduce on a stage-by-stage basis environmentally safe agricultural 
methods, preventing negative impact upon water protection zones and the entry of 
livestock, fertilizer and pesticide run-off into water bodies; 
to develop methods of airborne and shipborne remote sensing control of the state of the 
marine environment to ensure rapid identification of pollution sources and undertaking 
pollution control measures; 
to take part in the establishment of a unified international system of control over the state 
of the Baltic Sea waters, in the development and execution of a joint program for 
ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea; 
to develop and introduce by 1995 on a stage-by-stage basis a system of environmental 
regulations for the Ladoga lake basin, taking into account natural and economic specifics of 
the region and international environmental quality standards. 
As can be seen from the above, all these plans and programs adopted, following a 
tradition prevailing during the communist period, at best represented merely un-coordinated 
listings of investment needs for a number of specific projects, with specification of principles, 
scopes and priorities, as well as cost-benefit analysis and finding sources, totally missing. In 
fact, the above mentioned National Action Plan included 149 (!) "priority measures and 
directions for environmental rehabilitation", and it has been estimated that domestic resources 
could at best cover one-tenth of the required investment needs for its implementation 
(Maksimov, 1995). Currently, a new Russian federal program of JCP implementation based on 
the above provisions (required primarily to ensure a continuous fbnding process from the 
federal budget) is under development in Minpriroda, due to be adopted by the federal 
government in 1996. 
In the Baltic states, no specific programs for implementation of JCP or the Helsinki 
Convention have yet been developed. A partial exception is Estonia, where a national plan for 
the protection of the Baltic Sea was adopted in 1991, shortly after independence; however, this 
plan was modeled after its Russian predecessors and lacked the specific priorities and fbnding 
sources (BSEP, 1994, vol. 2: 17). Also, Estonian bilateral cooperation with Finland is based on 
Action Programme on Limiting Water pollution, signed in 1993. The reduction targets in this 
agreements are somewhat less ambitious than the ones in a similar agreement with Russia 
(Hiltunen, 1994: 39). Still, in all three Baltic states national environmental strategies or 
programs, including short and medium-term action plans, are in various stages of drafting or 
development, usually with foreign (EU PHARE) assistance (see BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2). 
2.2. NORMATIVE AND LEGAL MECHANISMS 
The only normative governmental document adopted in the former Soviet Union 
following the signature of the Helsinki Convention was the Council of Ministers' Resolution 
No. 567 "On measures to strengthen the protection of the Baltic Sea basin from pollution" 
(July 1976).27 The Resolution envisaged a set of measures (meant for the implementation by 
the corresponding Union ministries) dealing primarily with combating vessel-source pollution 
in the Baltic (which the Soviet Union had to implement anyway in the framework of the 
MARPOL 73 C ~ n v e n t i o n ) ~ ~ ,  as well as stated that by 1985 the discharge of untreated 
industrial and municipal sewage into the rivers and other water reservoirs of the Baltic Sea 
basin had to be completely eliminated. It did not mention, however, to what extent the water 
had to be cleaned. Enterprises that discharged sewage into the municipal sewerage systems of 
cities had to eliminate these discharges by 1980. In 1981 the goal of total elimination was 
underlined by the 26th Communist Party Congress, and was integrated within the adopted 
"Guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR for 198 1-1 985" (the 
eleventh five-year plan) (Efremov, 1982: 12- 13). 
In addition, in accordance with the then existing practice, all the Republics of the 
former Union located within the Baltic Sea catchment area, have adopted similar resolutions 
encompassing a wider set of enterprises and cities, where construction of land-based pollution 
abatement facilities was planned, financed from the Republican budgets. 
The provisions of the 1974 Convention were reflected in a number of subsidiary 
normative documents adopted after the Convention entry into f0rce.2~ No specific legal 
documents directly implementing the 1974 Helsinki Convention into domestic environmental 
legislation have been adopted neither in the Soviet Union nor in Russia. This is moreover true 
with regard to the Baltic countries which existed as independent states only since 1991, and 
where the whole of institutional and legislative framework is just evolving, with many 
environmental laws still being at various stages of draRing (see BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2).30 
2.3. REGULATORY MECHANISMS 
Historically, two major types of strategies for water pollution control have been known 
to be used in the world practice. The first kind of strategy is based on the control of the 
environment which receives discharged pollutants; the second one is oriented towards the 
control of pollution sources. Quite oRen, combinations of the two approaches are employed. 
Correspondingly, in the first case environmental quality standards are applicable, and emission 
(or technological) standards are used in the second case. The use of environmental quality 
standards has the advantage of minimizing environmental protection costs, because it is based 
on the self-purification (or accumulative) capacity of the receiving environment, and 
27 Sobranie Postanovleniy Pravitelstva SSSR, 1976, No. 16, art. 8 1, pp. 290-296. 
28 The outfitting of tankers and other vessels with oily water separators, garbage containers, etc., as well as the 
construction of port reception facilities for oily wastes from ships. Pursuant to the Resolution adoption, a 
Regional scheme of environmental protection and rational use of natural resources in the Baltic coastal zone 
was developed. 
29 Regulations concerning intake of industrial wastewaters into municipal sewerage systems (1984), Instruction 
on the order of concordance and issuing of permits for special water-uses (1984), Manual on the prevention of 
pollution from ships (1979, 1986), Regulations concerning the prevention of pollution from ships (1984), 
Regulations concerning protection of coastal waters from pollution (1984), Regulations concerning the issuance 
of permits for dumping of wastes and other materials into the sea, registration of their characteristics and 
quantities, determining the place, time and method of dumping (1983) (Ministry of Ecology, 1992). 
30 It is only in Lithuania that a Law on special measures to control pollution of the Baltic Sea is currently being 
drafted (Stec, 1995). 
technological capacities for minimizing pollution loads are not used to a full extent. The second 
type of strategy, on the other hand, minimizes pollution loads proceeding from economic and 
technological capabilities. 
In the 1960s the Soviet Union, in an attempt to reduce expenditures for waste water 
treatment, has chosen the strategy of utilizing the self-purification capacity of the water 
environment.31 This strategy served as a basis for building several deep-sea sewage outfalls for 
the cities of Tallinn, Kohtla-Jarve, etc. (Laane, 1992: 6). Moreover, this strategy was legalized 
by the USSR Water Code of 1970, according to which a discharge of waste waters was 
permitted, provided that the concentration of pollutants at a control cite did not exceed 
maximum permissible concentrations (NIPC) established for sanitary protection of the water 
bodies.32 Thus, the volumes of pollutants permitted to be discharged were calculated on the 
basis of MPCs, taking into account the effects of dilution, mixing and self-purification. 
However, in spite of the growing body of knowledge of these processes, and the use of 
contemporary theories of water treatment systems management, the state of the water 
environment in the USSR, including the Baltic basin, has continued to deteriorate. 
One of the reasons was the difficulty of controlling the environmental quality standards 
in water bodies, which was both technically complicated and economically expensive. First, the 
standards were too numerous, and the resources for environmental monitoring were limited. 
Further, for the majority of pollutants having established MPCs (currently totaling 1345), 
reliable analytical control methods were absent. The MPC-based system did not take into 
account synergistic and/or cumulative effects of pollutants and therefore tended to under- or 
overestimate the cumulative impact of contaminants. Finally, the rates of developing new 
MPCs were clearly lagging behind the introduction of new chemical new substances (see 
Laane, 1992: 61-62). In an attempt to rectifL the situation, the system of "maximum 
permissible discharges" (MPD) for pollution sources has been introduced to complement the 
MPC-based system, and a manual for calculating MPDs for water environment has been 
published in 1982. This, however, has not changed the overall Soviet water pollution control 
system, and it is still based on environmental quality standards. 
On the other hand, all other Baltic countries, except the Soviet Union and Poland, used 
the emission or technological standards which lead directly to the control of discharges from 
industries and municipal treatment plants (see Laane, 1992: 7-10). Needless to say, these 
differences introduced significant difficulties into the work of HELCOM both at the regime 
formation and particularly at the implementation phase. 
31 It has been based on the hypothesis of a limitless accumulative capacity of the world's oceans to accumulate, 
dilute and purify anthropogenic wastes, first developed by the US. scientists (see e.g. Bascom 1974) and further 
elaborated in the USSR (see e.g. Velner et al. 1965). This theory, however, has not proved to be practically 
feasible in the longer perspective: the smaller was the water body, the sooner its purification capacity became 
exhausted. In this situation, the only viable option was to reduce pollution loads to an economically justified 
minimum. This fact has forced most industrialized countries, including the USA, to switch in the 1980s from a 
"release and dilute" strategy to a pollution prevention strategy based on the emission or technological (BAT, 
etc.) standards. 
32 This provision provided a basis for developing "Rules on the protection of surface waters against pollution 
by sewage" of May 16 1974 and "Rules of sanitary protection of marine coastal waters" of December 3 1, 1974, 
replaced in 1988 correspondingly by "Sanitary rules and norms for the protection of surface waters from 
pollution" (No. 4360-88) and "Sanitary rules and norms for the protection of marine waters from pollution in 
the places of water consumption by population" (No. 463 1-88). 
Article 6(2) of the 1974 Helsinki Convention requires that 
"the Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to control and strictly limit pollution by 
noxious substances and materials in accordance with Annex I1 of the present Convention. To this end 
they shall, inter alia, as appropriate cooperate in the development and adoption of specific 
programmes, guidelines, standards or regulations concerning discharges, environmental quality, and 
products containing such substances and materials and their use."33 
Hence, one of the main problems which had to be resolved in the course of HELCOM work 
was how to reconcile the standards or regulations for discharges (emission standards) with 
environmental quality standards, since the establishment of unified water quality standards for 
all the Baltic Sea littoral countries was obviously impossible, because of significant differences 
existing in national regulatory mechanisms. 
In 1978, a special Working Group on Criteria and Standards (WGS) was established 
within the HELCOM framework. WGS has been working for ten years, from 1978 to 1988, 
and in the course of this period representatives of the member countries have been trying 
without any apparent results to find the connecting links between the two different systems of 
environmental standards, after which WGS finally gave up, and the current HELCOM practical 
work is directed towards working out unified emission standards (Laane, 1994). At the same 
time, several recommendations on limiting discharges from specific industries and 
municipalities, all establishing the emission standards, have been adopted by the HELCOM, 
usually under a pressure from Sweden, Finland and Germany.34 There are no examples of 
environmental quality standards adopted by the HELCOM. In the Soviet Union, the 
implementation of the recommendations adopted naturally encountered serious obstacles 
because, according to the existing rules, the emissions were calculated on the basis of water 
quality parameters, but not on the basis of technical capabilities (Laane, 1995).35 
Further, Article 6(6) of the Convention required that the Contracting Parties adopted 
common criteria for issuing permits for discharges (i.e. emission standards). The discussions on 
this subject within WGS also lasted for a long time without any apparent success - for the 
reasons much the same as cited above. It was only in 1984 and in 1985, that the compromise 
approaches were developed and the first criteria for issuing discharge permits for oil refineries 
were adopted. Implementation of the agreed common criteria, however, was a totally different 
matter. In the West, where environmental legislation was mostly based on pollution prevention 
33 The obligation to cooperate in the field of environmental quality standards has been introduced into the text 
of the Helsinki Convention under a strong pressure from the Soviet Union (Laane, 1994). 
34 The most important of these recommendations were: # 511, regarding limitation of oil in stormwater 
systems; # 512 and 612, concerning restriction of discharges from oil refineries; # 613, concerning measures 
aimed at the reduction of mercury from chloralkali industry; and # 912, concerning measures aimed at the 
reduction of discharges from urban areas by using more effective methods in wastewater treatment (Laane, 
1995). 
35 One more problem related to incompatible environmental standards systems concerned the interpretation of 
Article 6(3), which required that Annex I1 substances should not be introduced into the marine environment in 
signrJicant quantities without a prior special permit. Western countries understood the term "significant 
quantities" as the amount of pollutants over a certain limit emission value; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
deemed it as meaning the amount of pollutants which causes the rise of its concentration in the water body 
exceeding the water quality standards. Again, these disagreements can be traced to the Soviets obsession with 
security issues: the aim was to conceal the real pollution loads, since the pollutants' concentration in the marine 
cm~ironmcnt is a function of several factors (see Laane, 1995). 
principle, and water pollution control - on the use of emission or technological standards, 
arising problems were related mostly to numerical values of these standards. In the Soviet 
Union, on the other hand, where legislation was based on environmental quality standards, 
implementation of fixed emission standards was impossible without changing the existing rules. 
The latter, however, have not been changed for political and economic reasons, and domestic 
implementation of HELCOM-developed emission and technological standards remained scarce 
at best.36 
In the newly independent Baltic states, some movement away from the old Soviet 
system of environmental standards can currently be observed. Since March 1990, the 
Lithuanian government, for example, has announced its intention to upgrade environmental 
standards to the levels recommended by the European Union, and in January 1991 new 
regulations "On the Procedure for Determining Environmental Pollution Standards and the 
Issuance of Permits for the Utilization of Natural Resources" were enacted. They are generally 
based on international agreements, whereby two types of standards are distinguished: the 
maximum permissible emissions (MPE) and the temporary permissible ones (TPE). The latter 
have been still considered necessary due to the current difficulties in meeting the international 
obligations (UNCEDILithuania, 1992: 107). In Latvia, the new system of environmental 
standards is expected to be developed in connection with the ongoing institution building 
project financed by PHARE (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 32). 
The new 1992 Helsinki Convention overcomes the problems of discordant systems of 
environmental standards by adopting, following the worldwide changes in environmental 
protection strategies, a significantly different approach to hndamental principles and 
obligations. To limit the pollution load into the Baltic, the new Convention stresses the need to 
use "precautionary principle" based on "best available technology" or "best environmental 
practices". It remains to be seen, however, how these principles would be implemented in 
practice. 
2.3. ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISMS 
In the USSR, the department responsible for the national implementation of the 
domestic obligations under HELCOM was the Ministry for Land Reclamation and Water 
Management (Minvodkhoz). In 197 1, the Interdepartmental Council on the Protection of the 
Baltic Sea against Pollution was established under the authority ofMinvodkhoz. It assumed a 
coordinatory role in research and construction projects and prepared recommendations on the 
implementation of the Helsinki Convention (mainly with regard to vessels' equipment). In 
January 1976, the Council was succeeded by the Interdepartmental Commission on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, which became responsible for 
formulating the Soviet position within the HELCOM, for issuing proposals and 
recommendations on pollution prevention and mitigation measures with respect to the Helsinki 
Convention requirements and the coordination of the activities of the Union ministries and 
agencies (as well as the Republican Councils of Ministers in the region) involved (Nekrasova, 
1984: 74-76). In theory, the Commission had the right to control the implementation of the 
3"hc HELCOM recommendations were translated into Russian and distributed to local cnvironmental 
protection authorities with a remark "To take into account" (Laane, 1995). 
1974 Convention by the Soviet ministries and agencies, but in practice this right has hardly 
been ever used. 
The Commission, however, was carrying out environmental impact assessments of 
large-scale industrial projects with possible adverse environmental effects in the area, such as 
the construction of ferry link in Klaipeda, phosphates mining in Estonia, etc. In the latter case 
the Commission's recommendations prevented the beginning of mining operations, while the 
project of ferry link has been modified in accordance with the recommendations (Ministry of 
Ecology 1992). An important decision has been taken to stop exploratory drilling for oil and 
gas on the continental shelf in the ecologically vulnerable area - the Kursiu Lagoon off the 
Lithuanian coast (HELCOM 1994: 76). In many cases the Commission produced 
recommendations concerning the introduction of up-to-date, mostly imported, technologies, 
but these, as a rule, were not complied with due to the lack of hard currency resources and the 
general inadequacy of the economic mechanism in the former USSR (Ministry of Ecology 
1992). Overall, major efforts of the Commission prior to 1985 have been focused on the 
provision of environmental equipment for vessels operating in the Baltic, on the establishment 
of services for combating oil spills at sea and the installation of port reception facilities for oil 
residues and wastes from ships (HELCOM 1994: 76). 
In 1988, the newly established Goskompriroda took over most ofMinvodkhoz 
responsibilities. Currently, apart from the Ministry of Environment (Minpriroda), the 
Goskompriroda successor, three other agencies are participating in HELCOM activities - 
Federal service of hydrometeorology and environmental monitoring (Rosgidromet), Committee 
on fisheries (Roskomrybolovstvo) and the Department of marine transportation of the Ministry 
of t ran~port .3~ According to the national UNCED report, the responsibility lies in the hands of 
"ministries, departments, and the organs of local self-government" (Natsionalny doklad, 1991: 
233), which is obviously an extremely dispersed and unclear model of the division of 
responsibilities, especially taking into account the fact that only federal agencies responsible for 
water use and protection are currently numbering at least seven.38 
It is nevertheless apparent that transformation has brought about a major shift of 
responsibilities to implement the Convention to a local level. A large degree of decentralization 
of authority has obviously occurred - both in Russia and in the Baltic states. In practice, in 
Russia today not only federal bodies, but local environmental protection committees, 
subordinated to Minpriroda (e.g. the Committee on Ecology and Natural Resources for St. 
Petersburg and the Leningrad Province - Lenkomekologiya), as well as local/municipal 
authorities bear a great deal of responsibility for implementing the agreement. However, this 
transfer of responsibilities has not been usually accompanied by a corresponding transfer of 
resources, implementation competence, and the establishment of the appropriate local 
infrastructure. Currently, responsibility for environmental management is divided between the 
subjects of Federation (province, okrug) and the Federation itself, which still concentrates the 
majority of management and control bodies with the only reason for their existence being to 
" In practice, however, financial constraints have recently reduced Russian participation in HELCOM sessions 
to a minimum of 2-3 persons. 
" Apart from Minpriroda and Rosgidromet, these include Roskomvod (a successor to Minvodkhoz), 
Roskomnedra (State Committee on the Earth's Interior), Minselkhozprod (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Products), and Goskomsanepidndzor (State Committee on Sanitary and Epidemiological 
Inspection). 
justify the existence of the controllers themselves. The situation is exacerbated by an extremely 
unclear division of responsibilities between the local structural subdivisions of federal 
environmental and resource use bodies and the local/municipal authorities (see Bratashov, 
1996). 
Since the drainage basin of the Neva River and the Lake of Ladoga includes the 
territories of eleven provinces (oblast) of North-Western Russia, the state of the environment 
in the Gulf of Finland depends on the environmental protection activities in each of them. Due 
to "sovereignization" of Federation subjects, permanent re-organizations within the Federal 
Ministry, the lack of horizontal structures, and the absence of any attempts to establish such 
structures "from the top", Lenkomekologiya has attempted to assume a coordinative role in 
this field. With the support of Minpriroda, it has established a Coordination council of 
representatives of eleven North-Western provinces, hnctioning on the principle of consensus 
(Frolov, 1995: 6-7). Specialized working groups have been set up to coordinate the activities 
of inspection, analytical and expert assessment services. Proceeding from the basin 
management principle, the Lenkomekologiya has concluded bilateral agreements on 
coordinated actions with the North-Western regional committees on geology, fisheries and 
hydrometeorology, the Neva-Ladoga basin water management association, the Specialized 
marine inspection service, and other organizations and services (Frolov, 1994). 
However, much less horizontal coordination is observed between the two seemingly 
obvious partners, the two Federation subjects sharing the common environment - the city of 
St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Province39 - primarily because of the issues concerning the 
distribution of hnding for environmental protection. The conhsion in environmental 
administration within the region is exacerbated by a fierce struggle for power and jurisdiction 
between the two subjects of Federation, the outcome of which is still unclear.40 
Lenkomekologiya is supposed to service both subjects, and thus often finds itself in a 
precarious position.41 
The vertical connections between various levels of government regarding program 
implementation seem to be very loose, which impairs the transmission of regulatory signals 
between them. The officials at Lenkomekologiya have repeatedly complained that the flow of 
information is predominantly one-way, i.e., bottom-top, and the federal ministry sends them 
back mostly orders and instructions. HELCOM documents and recommendations also reach 
St. Petersburg mostly via Moscow, and with great delays (Kulibaba, 1995). It is 
understandable, too, since the department of regional programs within the Ministry which is 
39 The Leningrad Province has even established its own Ministry for Environmental Protection and Ecology, 
with a staff of 15 people. 
40 In September 1995, the St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoli Sobchak introduced a draft law to the city council 
which would incorporate the major suburban towns of St. Petersburg (Pushkin, Pavlovsk, Petergof, Kronshtadt, 
Lomonosov, and Kolpino) into the city, making them administrative districts of St. Petersburg and placing 
them under control of the Mayor's office (Whitmore, 1995). In January 1996, the city council has adopted a 
resolution on the unification of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Province into a single federation subject. 
However, it is not clear which of the subjects would 'swallow' another one: the Governor of Leningrad Province 
is vehemently opposing unification, deeming it possible on one condition , namely that St. Pctcrsburg would 
fall under the jurisdiction of the Province (Pipiya, 1996b). 
41 In practice, Lenkomekologiya primarily takes care of environmental protection insidc the city, despite its 
responsibilities for both the city and the province (Hiltunen, 1994: 81). 
responsible for overseeing the HELCOM activities has, apart from it, about 60 other programs 
within its mandate. 
The situation is well illustrated by the monitoring issue. Still, in Russia every agency 
concerned with natural resource use has its own environmental monitoring system; however, 
by law all of them are required to regularly submit all monitoring data to the Federal 
Monitoring Center (under the Federal ministry) for processing and generalization, but not to 
the regional committees. This mechanism functions well from top to bottom, but appears not 
to work at all in the opposite direction: the ministry produces only generalized data, and thus 
the regional authorities are lacking the comprehensive view of the local environmental 
situation. In order to rectify this state of affairs, the St. Petersburg environmental authorities 
have established in 1994 a comprehensive regional monitoring system, which includes an 
Analytical and Information Center within Lenkomekologiya which is supposed to supply all the 
relevant information to the Federal Center, the St. Petersburg authorities, and to all 
participants of the system (Lenkomekologiya, 1994). It remains to be seen how it will function 
in practice. 
Following independence, the Baltic countries had to reconsider completely their 
institutional structure for environmental protection. In all the three countries the old executive 
departments have been eventually transformed into Ministries of Environment, similar to many 
European countries, taking responsibilities for the overall management and control of 
environmental pollution and natural resources, including forestry and fisheries42. 
Compared to the Soviet period, decentralization of environmental management has 
occurred in all the three countries, too. Regional environmental protection departments (19 in 
Estonia, 9 in Latvia and 8 in Lithuania) are entrusted with issuance and enforcement of 
discharge and natural resource use permits, while in Estonia their functions include planning 
and management (in cooperation with the ministry) as well. However, coordination problems, 
a lack of a clear line of authority and of well-defined roles and responsibilities detrimentally 
affect the local environmental bodies' performance. For example, in Lithuania the Republican 
Hygiene Center is responsible for the enforcement of drinking and recreational water 
standards, but the coordination between the local environmental agencies and the former is 
hampered by the fact that the agencies are organized on the basis of eight regions, while the 
hygiene centers are organized on the basis of 44 municipalities and eight cities (BSEP, 1994, 
Vol. 2: 42). In Estonia, the quality of environmental boards in different counties and 
municipalities is reported to vary significantly: the boards in major cities have professional staff 
resources, but the rural areas are weakly staffed. More comprehensive environmental 
42 In Lalvia and Lithuania, the environmental protection bodies were initially placed under the authority of 
their respective parliaments. This way, it was hoped, environmental control could become stronger than under 
the generally more Moscow-oriented government. It was felt that environmental concerns would otherwise be 
lost amid economic priorities and a yet to be reformed Soviet bureaucracy. The objective was to elevate these 
environmental authorities to ministerial rank once the privatization process has been completed (Eckerberg 
1994: 464). In Latvia, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development was established by 
merging the Environmental Protection Committee and the Ministry of Architecture and Building in 1993. In 
Lithuania, the Environmental Protection Department had a remarkable "veto power" over government 
decisions on environmental protection grounds. But this proved impossible to use and after much debate the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection was established. Now the Ministry can have a voice in government 
decisions, thus "strengthening the preventive function." Whether the voice in deliberations will have a net 
positive effect over the veto threat remains to be seen (Stec, 1995). 
management occurs only in a few municipalities, such as Tallinn and Narva (Eckerberg, 1994: 
465).43 
In Lithuania, the ownership of municipal water and waste infrastructure has been 
recently (1 995) transferred from the government to municipal water companies which have 
been established. In Estonia, the municipalities are to become shareholders in a new company 
AS Eesti Veevark (Estonian Water Works) registered in 1993 (at present, about 60% of the 
municipalities have joined it) (SEPA, 1996: 14). However, there still exists a problem as to 
what belongs to whom: all infrastructure is state property, but the responsibility for physical 
planning, operating, maintaining and building WWTPs and water supply utilities rests with the 
municipalities, which forces them to raise user charges and spend tax money on rather big 
investments (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 42). In principle, the municipal water companies are self- 
financed, but, as in Russia, in reality they have to rely on subsidies from local and central 
government for their investment. 
In Estonia and Latvia, all the major activities directed towards implementation of JCP 
with respect to priorities and time schedules are presently related to the PHARE program and 
PHARE Management Units (PMU) in Tallinn and Riga correspondingly. The Estonian 
representative at HELCOM PITF is the head of the PMU ofice which functions as an 
administrative unit within the Bureau of international relations, Ministry of Environment 
(BSEP 1994, Vol. 2: 14). This arrangement facilitates significantly planning and coordination 
of JCP implementation in these countries. 
Following the declarations of independence of the Baltic republics in the spring of 1990 
and the establishment of their own national environmental protection bodies, an attempt has 
been made to compensate for the loss of inter-republican coordination by establishing the 
Baltic Sea Eastern Region Environment Commission (which included also the Ukraine and 
Belarus). However, the Commission never really functioned, since one of its major goals was 
to receive an official observer status within HELCOM. This became no longer necessary since 
as independent states all former Baltic republics could become full members, which was 
realized in early 1992 (Van der Weij, 1993: 104). 
Still, there is a growing appreciation of the need for a closer cooperation in the 
protection of the environment and in coordination of their scarce resources in the issue field 
among the newly independent Baltic states. It has been evident in the emergence of a plethora 
of new bilateral agreements between the FSU and CEE states on environmental cooperation - 
between Russia and Lithuania on Kaliningrad (1991), between Latvia and Estonia (1994), 
between Lithuania and Belarus (1995), between Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania (1995), between 
Estonia and Poland (1995) and recently (January 1996) between Estonia and Russia - which 
include, but not limited to, the issues of Baltic environmental protection. 
43 It should be noted that all initiatives aimed at strengthening local governments and the development of 
municipal services in the context of decentralization are actively supported by the international financial 
institutions. The World Bank is preparing the US$20 million Municipal Services Development Project in 
Latvia aimed at financing the priority investments in municipal services and technical assistance to munici- 
palities (ECN, 1995, Vol. 3, No. 6). With the support from UNDP, the World Bank has established the Baltic 
Utilities Initiative which organized Water Supply and Sewerage Utilities Partnership Workshop, where the 
need for autonomous and self-sufficient public utilities has been emphasized. 
2.4. FINANCIAL MECHANISMS 
2.4.1. Financial requirements for implemen tation 
The needs for investments in water pollution control in the Baltic region necessary to 
implement the JCP are immense and will dwarf the available hnding. The expenditures for the 
132 "hot spots" identified (including both point and non-point sources of pollution) are 
estimated to be some 10 billion ECU, including about 6.5 billion ECU for the 47 "priority" hot 
spots. The post-socialist countries of the region account for over 80% of the total investment 
needs: here, the investments required to rectifi the environmental situation at "hot spots" are 
estimated at about 8.5 billion ECU. In Russia alone, total investments needs for the 
implementation of JCP have been assessed by HELCOM at approximately 1.5 billion ECU; of 
these, about 50% should come from the local sources (HELCOM, 1992). As can be seen from 
Table 4, the single country with the largest investment requirements is Poland: it accounts for 
4 1 per cent of the total estimated investment needs. However, the needs of all the former 
republics of the USSR, taken together, exceed even Poland's figure. Of these, Estonia comes 
first44, with almost 16 percent, and Russia second, with 14 percent of the total investment 
needs (see Annex 2). 
Table 4 
Baltic JCP: Summary of preliminary estimated investment costs for hot spots by country 
Source: HELCOM 1993b 
Country 
Swcdcn 
Finland 
Russia (St. Petersburg Region) 
Russia (Kaliningrad Region) 
Russia, total 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Belarus 
Ukraine 
FSU, total 
Poland 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia 
Germany 
Denmark 
Estimated Total 
Although the Program implementation focuses largely on "hot spots", the 
implementation of the other JCP elements will also call for substantial financial resources. A 
summary of the preliminary cost estimates by the program elements, for all countries of the 
Baltic Sea catchment area, including both external and local sources of financing, is provided in 
Table 5.45 
44 However, over two thirds of Estonia's estimated investment needs are required for the reconstruction of oil 
and shale power plants at Narva to reduce the atmospheric emissions of dust and SO,. 
Costs, million ECU 
45 1 .O 
424.7 
1,077.8 
3 19.2 
1,397.0 
1,555.0 
427.3 
512.0 
3 1.0 (incomplete) 
214.0 
4,136.3 
4,043.0 
113.6 
360.0 
312.5 
9,841.1 
45 It should be noted that the funding for elements concerning policies, laws, regulations, institutional 
strengthening and human resource development, applied research, public awareness and environmental 
education are anticipated to be provided primarily by national and local governments, and only in some cases 
by foreign grants (HELCOM, 1993a). 
Pcrccnt of total 
4.6 
4.3 
11.0 
3.2 
14.2 
15.8 
4.3 
5.2 
0.3 
2.2 
42.0 
4 1.1 
1.2 
3.7 
3.2 
100.0 
The JCP is expected to be implemented in a phased manner over a period of at least 
twenty years, in order to keep pace with the gradually increasing capacity to mobilize financial 
resources and to pay for the recurrent costs of environmental management in the transforming 
economies. At the first phase (1993-1997), with a total cost of about 5 billion ECU, the efforts 
will be concentrated on creating policy environment and institutional arrangements, on limited 
investments in the highest priority projects, including mainly rehabilitation and expansion of the 
existing municipal and industrial wastewater plants in Poland and the republics of the former 
USSR, and on promoting private investment and initiative through incentive schemes. 
Reducing water pollution from 29 "hot spots" at this stage is expected to contribute to 
decreasing the overall annual pollution load by 300,000 tons in BOD5, by 33,500 tons in 
nitrogen, and by 8,200 tons - in total phosphorus (HELCOM 1992; HELCOM 1993~) .  
Table 5 
Summary of estimated costs by JCP programme element 
Source: HELCOM 1993c 
The second phase of the JCP, with a total investment estimate of some 13 billion ECU, 
would be focused on developing specific investment projects for each of the remaining "hot 
spots", bearing in mind the attainment of the expected environmental and economic effects. 
The on-cite control over the JCP implementation is supposed to be carried out by groups of 
independent international experts, which should serve the purpose of improving domestic 
compliance. 
Element 
1 .  Policies, Laws and Regulations 
2. Institutional Strcngthening and Human Resources 
Development 
3. Investment Activities 
A. Point Source Pollution 
- Immediate Support and Warning Systems 
- Municipal Wastewater Treatment 
- Combined Municipal and Industrial 
Wastewater Treatment 
- I'ulp and Paper Industry Environmental 
Control 
- Environmental Control at Other Industries 
- Solid and Hazardous Wastes Management 
- Air Quality Management 
B. Non-Point Source Pollution (Agricultural 
Runoff, Livestock Operations, Rural Settlements) 
4. Management Programs for Coastal Lagoons and 
Wetlands 
5. Applied Research 
6. Public Awareness and Environmental Education 
TOTAL 
Phase I, millions 
ECU 
(1993-1997) 
5 
70 
50 
1,000 
1,600 
400 
300 
200 
460 
800 
100 
10 
5 
5,000 
Phase 11, millions 
ECU 
(1998-2012) 
5 
140 
2,000 
4,000 
1,000 
1,000 
800 
1,200 
2,700 
120 
20 
15 
13,000 
Total, millions 
ECU 
( 1  993-2012) 
10 
210 
50 
3,000 
5,600 
1,400 
1,300 
1,000 
1,660 
3,500 
220 
30 
20 
18,000 
The detailed cost structure of JCP implementation developed by HELCOM cannot, 
however, be regarded as a final one, and is subject to change. In fact, the 1994 status report on 
the priority hot spots financed by Denmark provided substantially different estimated costs of 
attaining the HELCOM discharge standards compared to 1991 pre-feasibility studies: in some 
cases the estimates have been reduced to reflect the lower local cost level, while at other hot 
spots increased cost estimates were attributed to the inclusion of additional work or access to 
more detailed studies of the problem (BSEP 1994, Vol. 1: 14). In St. Petersburg, for instance, 
the necessary environmental investments were considerably higher than estimated in 1991192 
due to the complexity of a complete extension and upgrading of the waste water treatment and 
especially collection scheme (BSEP 1994, Vol. 3). In some cases, poor expert advice from 
Western banks leading to excessive investment costs estimates has also been quoted 
(HELCOM 1993d: 186-1 87). 
Some observers have also criticized the existing imbalance between the proposed 
investment activities for point and non-point sources and their respective contribution of 
pollutants to the Baltic Sea. The total estimated costs of JCP are distributed as follows: 78% to 
investment activities for point source pollution, 19% for investment activities for non-point 
sources, and 3% for the other five components of the program. It has been therefore suggested 
that the financing of activities that address non-point sources should be increased, since there 
was a real danger that the environmental benefits achieved by huge investments in WWTPs will 
be canceled out and negated by increased nitrogen loads from the agricultural and 
transportation sectors of the Eastern Baltic countries (HELCOM 1993d: 64, 67). 
2.4.2. Financing Baltic environmental protection programs in the FSU republics 
Even at the stage of JCP development, it has been widely understood that the 
availability and the quantity of funds, both local and foreign, is the main if not the only 
stumbling block to its speedy implementation. However, the experience of the past few years 
has clearly demonstrated that there is a constellation of factors that limit the mobilization, flow, 
and suitability of funds, and the capacity to effectively utilize them. Nearly every one of these 
factors or constraints is influenced directly or indirectly by the major economic and political 
reforms taking place in the post-communist countries of the region, as well as by the increasing 
competition for resources in potential donor countries caused by recession and persistently 
slow growth that limits the availability of financial assistance and private investment for 
financial improvements (see HELCOM 1993c: 2 1). 
Domestic resources 
As far as the actual amount of funds spent on Baltic environmental protection in the 
former USSR is concerned, the estimates are few and their reliability is questionable. 
According to one estimate made by the Russian Ministry of Ecology in 1992, overall Soviet 
expenses for this purpose have totaled 2.5 billion rubles by mid-1980s; of these, about one 
billion rubles were spent for pollution prevention from vessels and construction of port 
reception facilities, while capital investments into land-based facilities represented about 1.5 
billion. However, more exact data on the expenses incurred cannot be provided because of the 
"imperfect system of calculation of capital investments in different industry branches" (Ministry 
of Ecology, 1992). Still, since the costs of construction of sewage treatment projects are much 
higher because of the volumes of polluted water involved, it can be safely assumed that most 
energy in the Soviet Union, as far as the implementation of the Helsinki Convention was 
concerned, was spent on hlfilling the obligations dealing primary with ship-based pollution 
(Van der Weij, 1993 : 36). 
In Russia, with a transition to a market economy, the character of financing 
environmental programs has undergone radical changes, caused by major macroeconomic 
transformations and shifts in governmental financial and investment policies. Measures aimed 
at reducing the budget deficit prevented the use of budget sources for environmental financing. 
Federal budget hnds were available only for the financing of some measures included into the 
state programs, like Chernobyl program, or into branch programs on protection and restoration 
of land, forestry and fish resources. Federal budget hnds were also used for financing the 
activities of environmental ministries and agencies - Minpriroda, Rosgidromet, Roskomzem, 
Roskomvod, et c. 
Since 1992, own hnds of enterprises and organizations became the major source of 
financing capital investments. However, high inflation rates and lack of hnds have prevented 
adequate allocation of resources for enterprises' development and reconstruction, and 
moreover for environmental measures. At the same time, the decline of investment activity in 
environmental sphere has been somewhat less rapid than in the whole of the economy. This can 
be accounted for by the stimulating impact of the introduced system of pollution charges, the 
active use of inclusion of sums spent on environmental investments into such payments, and by 
the increased responsibility of local authorities for the state of the environment 
(Gosudarstvennyi Doklad 1995, No. 15/96: 4). 
Until 1993, no hnds have been appropriated from the federal budget for JCP 
implementation in Russia. The difision of implementation responsibilities, has not been, until 
recently, supported by the flow of hnds from the federal to the local levels. However, the 
allocation of 5.2 billion rubles in 1993 and some 20 billion rubles (about $10 m)46 in 1994 has 
allowed to complete the construction of the second phase of the Northern WWTP in St. 
Petersburg, extending its daily capacity from 0.6 million to 1.25 million cub. m (corresponding 
to additional treatment for about 1 million inhabitants), where almost a third of the whole city 
waste water load would eventually be treated.47 The overall expenditures for its construction 
amounted to about $77 m. The 1995 federal budget has allocated some $16 m for the 
upgrading of water treatment and sewerage systems in the whole of St. Petersburg area, 
including $13 m for dealing with the JPC hot spots (Frolov, 1994; HELCOM PITF, 1995b). 
The 1994 Hot Spot Review cites the figures of about ECU 30 million in investments already 
made during 199 1 - 1994 into St. Petersburg priority hot spots48, and ECU 200 million as the 
plannedlforecasted investment volume for St. Petersburg. However, no matter how large these 
46 Hereinafter, when providing dollar equivalents of ruble figures, the following approximate mid-year 
exchange rates for the corresponding years are used: 50 rubles/$ for 199 1, 150 rubles/$ for 1992, 1,000 rubles/$ 
for 1993, 2,000 rubles/$ for 1994, 4,500 rubles/$ for 1995 and 5,000 rubles/$ for 1996. 
47 It has been initially planned to put the Northern WWTP in operation prior to the construction of the dam in 
the Gulf of Finland, but in the early 1980s, due to the lack of financing, its construction has been frozen. 
However, even its full-sized operation will not ensure the final solution of wastewater treatment problem in St. 
Petersburg: currently, about 1.3 million cubic meters of untreated waste water still flow into the Neva river 
daily. To resolve this problem, financing of a similar complex on the other bank of the Gulf of Finland should 
be increased (Pozdniakov 1994; ZM, 1995, No. 2: 1; TEN, May 1-15, 1996, Vol. 2, No. 9). 
48 The latest available source cites the figures of investments already made into renovation of water supply and 
water treatment infrastructure in St. Petersburg at ECU 80 M (SEPA, 1996: 18). 
investments seem to be by Russian standards, they are still a far cry from the assessed 
investment needs to meet the HELCOM standards at four priority hot spots in the St. 
Petersburg area, which constitute about ECU 1,600 m (with ECU 540 m required only for 
sewers in St. Petersburg) as a minimum (BSEP, 1994, vol. 1: 5; see also Annex 2). 
Apart from the federal budget, the domestic financial resources for the JCP 
implementation in the St. Petersburg area (namely, its municipal and "agricultural" parts) 
originate from the city of St. Petersburg, State Environmental Fund and the State Enterprise 
Vodokanal (St. Petersburg municipal water and sewerage works).@ Since federal funds 
constitute only a small portion of the financing required, St. Petersburg has to regularly 
increase allocations from its own budget. The share of financing from the Federal 
environmental fund, although having increased somewhat, still remains very low - 1% of the 
total Russian environmental spending in 1992 and 2.4% in 1994 (Gosudarstvennyi Doklad 
1995, No. 15/96: 4).s0 The major burden, especially for capital investment programs, has to be 
carried by the local budgets and own enterprises' funds. 
Vodokanal, which has previously been dependent on funding from the City Council, is 
currently being partly financed by state subsidies, and partly by user fees; however, the latter 
part is increasing and it is expected that in the nearest future it will reach 100 per cent. In 
theory, the development of autonomous, self-financed water utilities should result in their more 
efficient operation, reduction of industrial and domestic water consumption and water losses; 
in addition, not only would this provide funds to recover operation and maintenance costs, but 
it may also determine the positive cash flow of the entire abatement projects, including their 
construction phase (see Stottmann, 1993). This, however, involves the increase of user fees to 
adequate levels, which in reality turns out to be more difficult than expected. In the past, 
industries in St. Petersburg, as elsewhere in Russia, have had to pay higher tariffs for their 
waste waters which represented almost half of all city sewage by volume. However, because 
production and corresponding sewage volumes have fallen drastically during the last five years, 
sewage from those industries today accounts only for 12 percent of all waste, and moreover, 
the tariffs are now too expensive for most enterprises to pay. That forced Vodokanal to 
eliminate, starting from March 1, 1996, the higher tariffs for industries (TEN, 1996, Vol. 2, 
No. 3), compensating this loss at the same time by an increase of user fees for domestic 
consumers by 30 per cent (Pipiya, 1996a). Predictably, that would bring about increased 
difficulties with fee collection and would hardly contribute to the attainment of Vodokanars 
financial self-sufficiency. 
Compared to St. Petersburg, the situation is even more grave in Kaliningrad area, 
where, apart from a primitive mechanical treatment, WWTPs are virtually non-existent. The 
beginning of construction of the Kaliningrad combined water treatment facilities, which are 
now completed by about 50 per cent, dates back to 1976; by 1994, none of the 45 facilities 
under construction have been put into operation (ZM, 1993, No.17: 3). In 1994, out of the 
total sum of 25 billion rubles (1994 prices) supposed to have been allocated for the completion 
49 Vodokanal of St. Petersburg is the largest water supply and sewerage enterprise in Russia, incorporating 18 
subordinate departments with more than seven thousand employees (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 6) .  
However, one of the largest programs financed from the Federal environmental fund has been initiated in St. 
Petersburg: in 1993, 542.5 million rubles have been spent on the development and construction of a prototype 
environmental patrol vessel to be operated in the Gulf of Finland. In 1994, 2017 million rubles were 
appropriated for this purpose (Federalnyi Ekologicheskiy Fond, 1994). 
of WWTP in Kaliningrad, actual disbursements from centralized hnding sources provided only 
2 billion. In addition, the general standard of the completed works, particularly of those from 
the previous construction periods, is so poor that it is doubthl whether these can ever be used 
effectively. Moreover, no investments have been planned, either from domestic or international 
sources (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 7: 15; see also Annex 2). 
The most significant innovation infinancial mechanisms introduced in the course of 
transformation in Russia was the system of pollution charges. All pollution charges paid by 
enterprises are supposed to go to environmental funds of various levels - 10% to the federal 
fund, and 90% - to the regional and local funds, divided in proportion of 30:60 between the 
two. However, not only the federal environmental fund was "consolidated" into federal budget 
both in 1994 and 1995, but the attempts to use earmarked resources from the environmental 
funds for purposes other than environmental protection at local levels are widespread. In 
theory, environmental hnds are independent of regional authorities; in practice, they are quite 
often subordinate to regional administrations. As a result, financial resources frequently do not 
reach the hnds, being spent for other purposes, and even if they eventually do, they are by that 
time devalued by inflation (see Golub and Strukova, 1995; Ledov and Zhukov, 1995). 
Pollution charges are based on federal normatives of emissions and discharges, 
established for 198 polluting substances by Minpriroda. Above-limit pollution discharges are 
charged at a five-fold rate compared to within-limit discharges and are paid directly from the 
after-tax profit of a polluting firm. In practice, payments for the above-limit discharges account 
for about 80 per cent of the total sum (Fomin, 1995). At the same time, the system allows for a 
large degree of flexibility. Local authorities are empowered to increase or to reduce payments 
depending on the local environmental situation. In particular, for polluting firms located in the 
environmental disaster zones or in the areas covered by international environmental 
agreements, payments may be increased twice. However, it is only very recently (April 1996) 
that pollution charges in St. Petersburg have been increased by 100 percent. The decision was 
motivated by the necessity to increase revenues for city environmental construction projects 
(TEN, May 1-15, 1996, Vol. 2, No. 9). On the other hand, sums spent by enterprises for such 
priority environmental protection purposes can be deducted from pollution charges; in the 
Baltic Sea drainage basin the latter include water protection measures aimed at reducing the 
emissions of phosphorus, nitrogen, oil, heavy metals and other pollutants determined by 
HELCOM (Mamin, 1993). 
However, this very flexibility has substantially decreased the effectiveness of this 
system. Local authorities more often than not used their right to reduce the amount of 
payments, usually limiting them to 7-10% of after-tax profits of a firm in order to prevent its 
going out of business, which produced little stimulating effect. To overcome this deficiency, a 
special resolution of the government passed in August 1992 provided that if pollution 
payments are equal to or exceed the amount of after-tax profits of an enterprise, local 
environmental control bodies and executive authorities are empowered to suspend or terminate 
the activities of an enterprise. The low efficiency, if not total inapplicability, of this measure 
was easily predictable (Kozeltsev, 1993). In addition, pollution charges normatives, despite 
their periodic adjustments, have been permanently lagging behind inflation (Mamin, 1993). In 
fact, if calculated in constant prices, the normative charges established for 1993 were several 
times lower compared to those in 1991 (Yablokov, 1993). As a result, the pollution charges, 
which account for just 0.1% of the consolidated federal budget revenues, are most often too 
low to play an important role in stimulating rational environmental management. This 
drawback is being gradually rectified, however: in 1994, all charges have been increased by a 
factor of ten compared to basic charges, while the coefficient applied has been raised to 17 for 
1995, and to 35 in 1996 (Gosudarstvennyi doklad 1995, No. 13/96: 1 1). 
Still, despite its many deficiencies, the application of the "polluter pays" principle in 
Russia has clearly had a discernible effect on the behavior of polluting enterprises: today they 
have to take environmental standards into account when formulating production policies 
(Kozeltsev, 1993). An approximate sum of pollution payments in 1993 for an average-size 
pulp and paper mill amounted to no less than 1 billion rubles (about $lm), a sizable figure by 
Russian standards (Danilov-Danilyan, 1993). Even the defense industry, despite substantial 
economic hardships, has been forced to react promptly to the application of pollution charges. 
The huge Kirovskiy Zavod association in St. Petersburg which has been compelled to pay 2.5 
billion rubles (about $1.3 m) for the above-normative discharges in 199451, had to complete 
the construction of its water treatment facilities (with a daily capacity of 88.5 thousand cubic 
meters) in 1995 within half a year after a 20-year long construction period (Sokornova, 1995). 
At the same time, the attempts to evade payments of pollution charges are widespread: during 
1992 alone, arbitration courts in Russia have considered almost 6,000 claims to this effect and 
recovered 2.8 billion rubles (about $19 m) (Danilov-Danilyan, 1 993)52. 
Similar to Russia, in the newly independent Baltic states the domestic economic 
situation is still too weak to allow for significant national investments into environmental 
infrastructure projects. As a result, the majority of the "hot spot" projects have experienced 
serious delays or have not even started. Even in Lithuania, where the construction of WWTPs 
at priority "hot spots" has been treated as a matter of state importance, and the 1993 and 1994 
state budgets have allocated 3 per cent of the total government expenditures (about ECU 
30M) for this purpose, they are at best able to cover only a few per cent of the total 
(HELCOM estimated) investments, and the need for additional financing is still evident. 
Moreover, these finds are being allocated on a "drip feed", year-by-year basis, and there is 
uncertainty as to whether and when finding will become available to complete unfinished long- 
term projects. This "stop-go" basis for project implementation has been raising overall costs; 
the municipalities also seem to receive less than the amount allocated to them (HELCOM, 
1993d: 29-30; HELCOM, 1994: 70; BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 45). The situation is even less 
encouraging both in Latvia and Estonia, where the assigned state budgets for 1994 have 
allocated approximately ECU 0.77 M for the priority hot spots (out of the total environmental 
budget of ECU 2.2 miliion), which is even farther from national as well as international 
estimates of necessary investments (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 1 : 7). Moreover, environmental outlays 
tend to decline, rather than increase, over time: in 1995, Latvia has spent about $ 36M, or 45 
per cent less on environmental protection compared to 1994 (TEN, April 1996, Vol. 2, No. 8). 
In general, state budgets are currently playing a minor role in financing environmental 
activities in the Baltic countries: they are at best at best sufficient to pay only the running costs 
of the central and regional administration. The actual finds available, based on a sample from 
51 An immense sum of pollution charges in this case is explained by the fact that, in accordance with 
Resolution No. 459 of the St. Petersburg Mayor's Office (June 18, 1993), charges for the above-normative 
discharges, once registered by Lenkomekologiya, are levied for the period of the whole quarter (three months) 
52 Many enterprises are also attempting to delay payments as long as possible: e.g., Kirovskiy Zavod in St. 
Petersburg has paid its pollution charges for the second half of 1991 (172 thousand rubles ) only in mid-1992, 
thus reducing their real value approximately three-fold -from about $3400 to $1 150 (Sorokin, 1993a: 151). 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are well below 1 ECU per capita (HELCOM 1993c: 36). The 
environmental hnds, however, are significantly more important as the sources of financing 
compared to Russia, and this importance is increasing, since they represent virtually the only 
available (apart from the external assistance) source of hnds for environmental investments 
(Eckerberg, 1994: 463).53 The environmental hnds were built on the principle that all natural 
resources are the property of a state, and their use is therefore subject to fee. 
Consequently, economic incentives to implement environmental policy were introduced 
in all three countries. Taxes are levied, both on each ton of a polluting substance (the rate of 
which depends on the type of a pollutant), and on the use of state-owned natural resources 
(Eckerberg 1994: 463).54 In Estonia, the system of pollution taxes, based on the 1990 law "On 
the system of Charges and Taxes in Nature Management", bears great similarity to the one 
employed in Russia. Pollution taxes are based on the amounts of a certain pollutant emitted to 
air, water and waste; taxes are hrther elevated by penalties if the permitted discharge levels are 
exceeded. Enterprises investing in environmental protection can obtain a tax reduction. If they 
reduce pollution by at least 25 per cent, they are relieved of taxes by 1.5 times the value of 
investments. The taxes are shared (50150) between the state and regional budgets. Before 
1991, the taxes amounted to about 1.2 million rubles annually, but in 1991 have increased to 
56 million rubles due to the enlarged resource and pollution tax rates (UNCEDlEstonia 1992: 
36; BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 18). 
The pollution taxes in Lithuania, in accordance with the "Law on pollution fees", are 
directly related to environmental standards. The funds obtained are used for environmental 
financing and amount to about 0.6 per cent of Lithuanian national income, or 1.2 per cent of 
the total budget expenditures. 70 per cent of the collected fees go to the municipalities and 30 
per cent to the State Environmental Fund. Due to the limited resources, financial support for 
environmental protection projects in Lithuania is channeled primarily to constructing 
wastewater treatment plants, which is considered a national priority (UNCED/Lithuania 1992: 
112). In order to raise finding for the five JCP "hot spots", a decree was passed in 1992 
stating that the municipalities building WWTPs would subtract a specific amount from their 
"tax fees" in order to cover their construction costs. However, the municipalities tended to 
spend the saved money on more "urgent" needs (e.g. schools, salaries, etc.). Also, discharge 
permits in Lithuania set a uniform fee for over-the-limit pollution which is not adjusted to 
decreased discharges, thereby eliminating incentives to reduce pollution. Like in Russia, the 
effectiveness of the economic incentives system remains questionable as long as the tax rates 
are fixed and do not follow inflation rate; moreover, the size of pollution charges in various 
regions depends on the polluters' ability to pay.55 Until now, there has been little evidence that 
53 ~ s t o n i a  was the first of the three countries to establish an Environmental Fund as far back as in 1983. The 
State Environmental Protection Fund in Lithuania was created in 1988 (Eckerberg, 1994: 461). 
54 In Latvia, although taxes on natural resources and pollution are implemented in accordance with the new 
Law on natural resources taxation, the extent to which polluter pays principle and realistic user charges are 
applied is not clear. It has been reported, however, that a fee for water consumption and sewerage for the 
population of Riga was increased from 3.5 to 15 santims per cubic meter, while the fee for enterprises remains 
at 25 santims per cubic meter (HELCOM PITF, 199%: 8). 
" Presently, the inhabitants of Kaunas pay the lowest rates since the city has no waste water treatment 
facilities. Every municipality also has problems in collecting the fees. In 1993, Kaunas was capable of 
collecting only 12.5 Litas out of 20 million owed. Overall, only about 50 per cent of the expected income is 
collected (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 46-47). 
pollution taxes in Lithuania have actually had an impact on reducing emissions (BSEP, 1994, 
Vol. 2: 44-45; Eckerberg 1994: 464). 
Still, despite the obvious inadequacy of domestic resources, several investment projects 
at hot spots in the three Baltic countries have taken place since 1991, and some have even 
significantly progressed. Among them are Haapsalu-Matsalu project and Tallinn WWTP in 
Estonia, Liepaja project in Latvia, as well as WWTPs in Kaunas, Vilnius and Klaipeda 
(Lithuania) (see Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 1995). Overall, during 199 1-94 more than ECU 1 1 million 
have been invested in abatement projects in the three Baltic countries, financed mostly from 
local sources. This figure, however, should be compared to an additional investment of ECU 
335 million required if the HELCOM recommendations are to be made in fill, with ECU 100 
M needed for sewers in Riga alone (see Annex 2). Of these, planned investments amount to 
approximately ECU 130 million, of which almost ECU 50 million have been pledged from 
international sources with a very significant grant element (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 1 : 6-7). The need 
for a very significant external finding is moreover essential for Russia, where the imbalance 
between the investments required and already incurred is much greater. 
External resources 
The practice of JCP implementation in the post-communist countries of the Baltic since 
1991 has demonstrated that due to the present constraints on the availability of local financing 
and the need for foreign exchange to find the priority activities, the use of external financial 
resources for finding the JCP will remain at least no less important than local finding both in 
the short and medium-term. The principal external sources currently available include bilateral 
donors providing grants and concessional finding, loans provided by international financial 
institutions (IFI) and commercial banks, direct investments by foreign companies, and export 
credit guarantees. 
Grant and concessional funding from the Commission of the European Communities 
(CEC) and bilateral donors has become in recent years a major source of support for 
environmental activities. At the early stage of JCP implementation, grant resources are of 
extraordinary value because they do not have to be repaid by the recipient; hence they 
represent the scarcest and the most important source of financing. These finding programs 
have largely focused on the provision of technical assistance and consultant studies, 
institutional strengthening and human resources development, and support for the acquisition 
and installation of monitoring systems and other specialized environmental equipment. In some 
cases, finding has been provided for small-scale demonstration projects or support for joint- 
venture investments in environmental technologies. 
The Conlrnission of the Europeatz Communities has served a key role in the G-24 
process through coordination of economic assistance to the post-socialist countries, and 
through technical assistance in support of environmental management under the PHARE and 
LIFE programs. Under these programs, the CEC has committed 1 million ECU to Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania for 199256, and through the LIFE program support has been provided to 
establish two environmental centers for administration and technology (ECAT), one in St. 
Petersburg and one in Riga. Both projects are designed as twinning arrangements between the 
56 These figures are, however, dwarfed when compared to 75 million ECU provided by CEC to Poland's 
environmental sector in the same year. 
municipalities of St. Petersburg-Hamburg and Riga-Bremen with EC co-financing (HELCOM 
1993d: 56)57. PHARE grants are used for the co-financing (along with bilateral grants and 
loans from IFI) of the support of full-scale reconstruction of Tallinn WWTP, the preparation of 
the Haapsalu and Maatsalu Bays project (Estonia), three projects in Lithuania (Kaunas, Vilnius 
and Palanga WWTPs), as well as the Daugavpils project and a number of feasibility studies in 
Latvia.58 The CEC programs require that goods and services, other than those from local 
sources, be obtained from the EC member countries (see SEPA, 1996: 14- 16; BSEP, 1994, 
Vol. 2). The main focus of the PHARE program has been technical assistance, but during the 
last years its investment component has been growing. As regards EU assistance to Russia, it is 
distributed primarily through TACIS program; however, as distinguished from PHARE, 
environmental issues have not received a high priority in TACIS, and therefore only very few 
environmental EU-assisted projects (mainly related to energy issues) have been implemented in 
Russia (Berg, 1995: 1 1). 
As recent practice has demonstrated, bilateral donors' grant or concessional funding 
from within the region, provided by Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden 
represents today the most real source of financing for JCP projects' implementation, 
particularly at its earlier stages.59 In 199 1 - 1992, about 37% ($1 OM) of the total Finnish 
assistance to Russia and 40% ($8M) of the assistance to the Baltic states were allocated to the 
field of the environment. Of the finances reserved for environmental cooperation, 45% were 
allocated for assistance to the Baltic states and the rest to Russia (Hiltunen, 1994: 41). In 
1993, Sweden dedicated about $37 million to measures within the JCP framework. The largest 
support within this program ($16 million) was provided to investments in wastewater 
treatment plants in Estonia, Latvia or L i t h ~ a n i a . ~ ~  Sweden has also expressed its readiness to 
contribute about $7.4 million to a joint, voluntary trust fund, primarily for project preparation, 
but also for co-financing of investments and other projects (HELCOM 1993d: 44). Denmark in 
1994 has allocated ECU 13.4 million for assistance to Central and East European countries in 
the four sector programs related to the environment; by the year 2002 this figure is expected to 
grow up to 0.25% of Danish GNP (HELCOM 1994: 56). In 1992 and 1993 Germany has 
allocated about $24 million each year for 150 consulting projects in the field of environmental 
57 In March 1996, ECAT project in St. Petersburg has been terminated, and the new project in Kaliningrad has 
been started. However, the Russian part of the ECAT team in St. Petersburg has been officially transferred from 
its founders in Hamburg to the environmental administration of the Mayor's office. The city will now provide 
the main supervision over the center. ECAT has been successful in implementing many environmental projects 
and programs in 1993-1 995, including supplying equipment for recovering spilled oil, aiding firms in reducing 
toxic waste, and a wide range of public awareness programs. (TEN, Mar. 16-3 1, 1996, Vol. 2, No. 6). 
58 PHARE environmental budgets in Latvia for 1992 and 1993 amounted to ECU 1.1 and 1.6 million, 
respectively, and the one in Lithuania has been increased in 1994 to ECU 1.6 million (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2) 
59 To cite an example, all the pre-feasibility studies conducted to date have been financed from grant funds 
provided by Nordic governments. By the end of 1992, the Finnish government has spent $ 0 . 6  million; the 
governments of Denmark and Sweden, $ 0.8 million and $ 1.2 million respectively; and the expenditures of the 
Nordic Project Fund have been on the order of $0 .4  million (Broadus et al., 1993). In 1993, the Danish 
environmental minister S. Auken has announced that Denmark will provide almost $ 5 million to the Action 
plan to be used for feasibility studies (HELCOM, 1993d: 16). 
60 In addition, $3.7 million was allocated to the agricultural sector in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Russia for training and demonstration; $2.4 million - to measures to solve the problem of sludge dewatering 
and aeration of the sewage treatment process in Warsaw; $1.9 million - to institutional strengthening in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia (HELCOM, 1993d: 44). 
protection and nature conservation in Central and Eastern European countries (HELCOM 
1994: 67). 
As regards bilateral environmental assistance to the Baltic countries and North-Western 
Russia, there exists a certain "geographical division of labor" between the Nordic donor 
countries, built upon a long-term history of Nordic environmental cooperation. Although 
virtually every Nordic country is present in all of the FSU republics under study, Finnish aid is 
primarily concentrated in Estonia, Karelia, St. Petersburg and the Leningrad province, the 
Norwegian assistance is centered on the Kola peninsula, Sweden is most active in Latvia and 
Denmark - in Lithuania (Hiltunen, 1996: 98; Berg, 1995). Among the Baltic states, Estonia 
ranks first by volume of environmental assistance: it has received more international 
environmental support than Latvia or Lithuania (if the support to nuclear safety at Ignalina 
nuclear power plant is excluded) (Berg, 1995: 19). Overall, there is twice as much foreign 
investment in Estonia (particularly from Finland) as in Latvia and Lithuania combined 
(Eriksson, 1992: 53). The choice of recipient countries or regions is explained in some cases 
primarily by their geographic "upstream" or "upwind" location (Finland, Norway and Sweden), 
while in other cases other variables, such as types of projects, political situation, the influences 
of pressure groups (immigrants from the region), investment needs and, most often, an interest 
of domestic companies in transferring equipment or knowledge linked to such investments play 
a major role (see Berg, 1995: 47-49). 
In Estonia, since 199 1 Finnish support has been given to 44 different environmental 
projects; of these, two priority hot spots have received most of the Finnish attention: WWTP 
renovation project in Tallinn, where its first phase has been entirely supported by Finland ($5 
M), and the reduction of emissions from the oil shale power stations in Narva, one of the major 
sources of air pollution in the whole of the Baltic Sea area ($3.4 M).Finland is also involved, 
together with Norway, Switzerland, EBRD, EU-PHARE and NEFCO, in the so-called 
"Municipalities project" by supporting the construction of WWTP in Parnu. Sweden has 
participated in 15 projects, while Denmark and Germany have been represented by 7 and 5 
projects respectively (Berg, 1995: 15-16, 58-60; BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 24). 
In Latvia, grants from Sweden ($7.4 M) and Finland ($2 M) constitute the major part 
of the financing of the World Bank-led project in Liepaja which also includes nature 
conservation. Sweden has also contributed ($0.75 M) to the reconstruction of WWTP in Riga, 
and together with Germany is currently involved in providing technical assistance to solve the 
problem with drinking water pollution in this city (Berg, 1995: 22, 74-75; BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2:  
38). The largest JCP project with external co-financing in Lithuania concerns waste water 
treatment in Klaipeda; it is led by the World Bank, but includes also Sweden (ECU 4 M) and 
Finland (ECU 1.6 M) as bilateral donors. Sweden also supports ($1 M), in cooperation with 
the EBRD and EU-PHARE, the construction of new WWTP and rehabilitation of sewers in 
Kaunas. The hture for the WWTP in Vilnius is still uncertain, but a grant and a soft loan of 
$12.6 M will probably be provided by Denmark and support is also expected from EU-PHARE 
(Berg, 1995: 28; BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 48). 
In North-Western Russia, Finland seems to be the most important bilateral donor. In St. 
Petersburg, three major collaborative projects can be distinguished: the renovation of the 
sewerage system in the Nevski Prospekt area ($0.5 M), hazardous waste treatment plant in 
Sosnovyi Bor and the reconstruction of South-Western WWTP (about $50,000), with more 
investments expected). Denmark is also involved in the St. Petersburg sewerage project; in 
addition, Denmark is supporting several other JCP projects - WWTP construction in St. 
Petersburg suburb, Pushkin ($0.47 M), in Gvardeisk east of Kaliningrad ($1.35 M), in Pskov 
and in Novgorod ($0.9 M) (Berg, 1995: 132-133). The Novgorod project has been chosen by 
the joint Russian-Danish Commission on the environment as a demonstration (pilot) project 
(Gosudarstvennyi Doklad, 1994, No. 3/95). In addition, French government has provided a 
soft loan (first phase, ECU 20 M) for the financing of the new sludge incineration plant at the 
Central WWTP in St. P e t e r ~ b u r g . ~ ~  
Although exact numbers are not available, rough calculations of the amount of bilateral 
and multilateral environmental support (including loans) provided to the Baltic states and 
North-Western Russia (Murmansk Region excluded) seem to indicate that Russia has received 
a significantly smaller part of external environmental assistance compared to the one channeled 
to the Baltic states. Since the fall of the communist regimes, Estonia has received $97.6 M , 
Latvia - $32.9 M, Lithuania - $36.7 M (in addition, loans for about $30 M are at the 
discussion stage), while North-Western Russia - only $24.7 M of foreign environmental 
assistance.62 This fact can probably be explained by a relatively high political and economic 
instability in the Baltic countries compared to Russia, as well as by political considerations.63 
Besides, enterprises and municipal facilities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are somewhat 
better positioned towards buying foreign technology, since their domestic currencies are 
convertible.64 Another factor is a different (compared to the Baltic states) attitude towards the 
use of imported technology prevailing in Russia: Russian officials have in various contexts 
repeatedly emphasized their preference for using Russian technology (generally less expensive 
and even occasionally more effective) to solve domestic environmental problems. Thus the 
condition to use imported technology coupled to foreign assistance has met more criticism in 
Russia than it has in the Baltic states (see Hiltunen, 1996: 100-101). 
Under the terms of most bilateral agreements, the recipient country is generally 
expected to provide counterpart local currency fbnding, which is financed mainly with the 
earnings of the company or plant in question. In many cases barter deals have been used for 
financing foreign currency costs, but also fbnds from governmental and municipal budgets have 
been used. The projects are implemented using mainly local labor. Grant and concessional 
" The credit covers 85% of the signed contract, while the remaining 15% is considered as advanced cash 
payments. The credit line is based on a 8.5 year reimbursement period, with interest corresponding to 1.75% 
pr. month. However, to fulfill the conditions of such a credit line, the buyer also has to pay an insurance on 
political risk; the rate varies, but generally for Russia in the last years it has constituted 10-15% of the total 
amount (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 10). 
62 Calculations are based on project data presented by Berg (1995). The data are incomplete and the amounts of 
foreign contributions to some of the projects are not available. Included is the environmental (both investment 
and technical) assistance to industry, water protection, waste management, agriculture and forestry, nature 
conservation and monitoring, as well as public administration (institutional) support. Support to energy sector, 
to the phasing out of ozone depleting substances and to nuclear safety sector is not included. Calculated figures 
differ from those shown in Annex 2, because the latter refer to investments only and have been compiled by 
HELCOM on the basis of information supplied by countries. 
63 Installing a sewage treatment plant, say, in Riga, which concentrates nearly one-third of Latvia's population 
would have greater positive political implications by attracting favorable publicity, than building a similar plant 
in e.g. Kaliningrad with a population of about 200,000 (see Lofstedt, 1995: 45). 
64 The problems related to financing the Russian share of the projects are especially grave in St. Petersburg, 
where the major part of investments needed for reducing pollution to the Gulf of Finland are municipal; for 
comparison, in Karelia the local enterprises are able to pay for environmental technology with natural 
resources, such as timber (see Hiltunen, 1996: 101). 
financing from bilateral sources is normally conditional on special procurement procedures that 
tie its use to equipment, consultant services and training from sources within the donor country 
itself (HELCOM 1993c: 21, 40). That tends to underestimate the significance of domestic 
resources, and occasionally even leads to concealment of technical information by donors from 
their foreign partners (see Kaminskaite and Liubiniene, 1996: 1 16). 
In addition, the provision of foreign environmental assistance to Russia has been 
hampered by an imposition of custom duties on the imported environmental equipment: 
according to Finnish sources, from one fourth to one third of the total Finnish appropriations 
for environmental assistance to Russia is spent on duties and other taxes, thus reducing the 
hnds  available for environmental investments and threatening to delay or jeopardize the 
implementation of several international programs related to the protection of the Baltic (ZM, 
1995, No. 3, p.2). 
Although the interests of the neighboring Nordic countries and Russia/Baltic states in 
reducing pollution are compatible in the sense that environmental problems affect all of them, 
there are, however, differences in priorities assigned to various environmental issues: for 
instance, in St. Petersburg most decision-makers emphasize the purification of drinking 
water65, while the Finnish companies have generally focused their offers on cooperation in 
sewage treatment systems. The main reason for this is that the Finnish Ministry of Environment 
offered financial support to cooperation projects contributing to the improvement of the Gulf 
of Finland. Thus the interests of Finnish companies in improving the sewage system have not 
always been met with the corresponding enthusiasm in St. Petersburg. The same is also true of 
Estonia, where public attention is focused on the environmental issues caused by the Russian 
military or on groundwater pollution rather than on the pollution of the Baltic (see Hiltunen, 
1994: 18-1 9). Quite often evaluations and conclusions produced by foreign experts did not 
adequately pertain to local conditions, or general background, since many other basic factors, 
including legislative ones, were not accounted for. As has been illustrated by several projects 
(e.g. pre-feasibility study of the Lithuanian coast and Nemunas river basin), conclusions and 
recommendations could become rapidly outdated because of rapid developments in political 
and economic situation, thus requiring new pre-feasibility studies before the implementation 
stage (see Kaminskaite and Liubiniene, 1996). 
While immediately after the collapse of the communist system many donors introduced 
bilateral support programs, coordination with other donors was mostly very limited, and that 
caused problems in the recipient countries, e.g. different standards and technical solutions 
introduced by different donors, or limited capacity of the recipient countries to handle all the 
relations with the donors. Since then, some efforts have been made to develop the direct 
coordination between bilateral donors, and the best example is perhaps the common Finnish- 
Danish sewerage project in St. Petersburg (Berg, 1995: 52). 
The hnds  of international financial institutions are lent at or near market terms, for 
frequently longer maturity with grace periods, than are available from other sources. Their 
effective use is contingent upon the willingness of the borrower to agree to service the 
resulting loans and to provide the state guarantees for repayment that some of these 
65 The St. Petersburg watcr supply and sewerage company Vodokanal has signed a cooperation agreement with 
the French company General des Eaux, creating a new joint venture "Pure water for St. Petersburg" (Hiltunen 
1994. 29). 
institutions require by their statutes. Loans provided by the IFIs are normally restricted to the 
financing of foreign currency elements of a project; however, certain institutions such as the 
EIB are allowed to provide hnding for local currency  expenditure^.^^ The procurement 
procedures of the EBRD and the World Bank are based on the principle of international 
competitive bidding (see HELCOM 1993c: 41). 
The IFIs, above all the World Bank and the EBRD, have recently begun to act as 
coordinators or leaders of certain hot spot projects where investments are too large to be 
financed by one source only and where therefore several donors are engaged. This holds 
particularly true for major municipal projects cited above regarding treatment of mostly 
combined industrial and municipal waste water. A number of projects of this type are now 
under implementation1 preparation (e.g., waste water treatment and sewerage systems in 
Tallinn, Liepaja, Klaipeda and St. Petersburg), and these types of projects will probably 
become more common in the hture (Berg, 1995: 52; Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 1995: 10). 
A major program has been announced in May 1995 by the World Bank to finance seven 
projects, with a total cost of $240 million, to support the JCP. Of these, Lithuania and Latvia 
are undertaking two projects each, and Estonia, Russia, and Poland one each. Five projects 
have been approved by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors as of March 1996: the Liepaja 
project in Latvia (total cost - $21 M, IBRD loan - $4M), the Klaipeda project ($23 M and 
$7 M) and the Siauliai project ($22 M and $6.2 M) in Lithuania, the Haapsalu-Matsalu project 
in Estonia (total cost of $8 M) and environmental mitigation package for St. Petersburg ( total 
cost of $20 M). In all these projects, as has been described above, IBRD has been acting as a 
coordinating agency among several bilateral and multilateral donors involved (World Bank, 
1995; Berg, 1995; ECB, March 1996, Vol. 4, No. 5). 
The World Bank activities in Russia, compared to other countries, have started only 
recently. Its project in St. Petersburg is a part of a larger Housing Project; it is short-term in 
nature and is aimed at strengthening water and waste water services to the northern part of the 
city, including the completion of the Northern WWTP (World Bank, 1995). However, 
currently the World Bank is in the process of finalizing a Sector Study for fresh water and 
waste water in North-Western Russia. Based on this study, a Water and Sanitation Loan is 
being prepared which will preliminary be directed towards four or five cities, including St. 
Petersburg and Kaliningrad, with investments starting in 1997 at earliest (SEPA, 1996: 13). 
The EBRD, which was established with a specific purpose to distribute loans to 
investments in Central and Eastern Europe, has been somewhat less active in the environmental 
field compared to the World Bank. The first, and so far the only one loan to environmental 
infrastructure - the renovation of Tallinn WWTP ($26 M) - was approved in 1994. Like the 
World Bank, the EBRD has been, in some cases, acting as a coordinator of other donor 
activities - e.g., renovation of several municipal WWTPs in Estonian towns (Tartu, Parnu, 
Rackvere, Sillamae and others) (Berg, 1995: 16). Recently, however, the EBRD and the 
Vodokanal of St. Petersburg have entered into negotiations for preparation of the "St. 
Petersburg water sector development program" ($73.5 M) to improve the reliability and quality 
of drinking water in the city (HELCOM News, Jan. 1996, No. 1 : 8). The EBRD is also 
preparing a $82 M Riga Environment project to finance short term priority investments in Riga 
However, all EIB projects in Central and Eastern Europe (in no matter which sector) require the support 
and guarantce of the government of the country concerned (HELCOM 1993d: 108). 
Waterworks (ECB, March 1996, Vol. 4, No. 5), and is involved in negotiations with 
Lithuanian authorities over the preparation of the Kaunas WWTP project.67 
The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) has not supported many projects in Central and 
Eastern Europe because of the credit risks, but to make it possible to provide loans to 
environmental sector in these countries, Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), a 
facility connected to NIB, has been created. NEFCO, according to its charter, should invest its 
funds only in commercially sound projects that have a Nordic counterpart (HELCOM 1993d: 
48). Within the JCP, NIB has been primarily involved in pre-investment and feasibility studies 
for the hot spots of HELCOM PITF, serving as an executing agency since 1990, as well as in 
different forms of technical assistance. In Russia, most of these studies were connected to 
Finnish investment projects and financed through the Finnish Trust Fund in the bank (Berg, 
1995: 41). In some cases, the involvement of foreign consultants has brought about 
considerable savings in project costs compared to initial estimates (see HELCOM 1993d: 98). 
Overall, since the IFIs provide loans at basically market rates, rather than concessional 
funding, very few external commercial loans for JCP implementation (and environmental 
protection in general) have been accepted within the region with the objective of creating as 
little foreign debt as possible. It particularly applies to Russia, where the general opinion 
among the authorities is that they cannot afford to take foreign loans under the current loan 
conditions which are considered to be too strict (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 11). As a result, in 
Russia the IFIs did not render adequate assistance in attracting investments for the Program 
implementation. As has been stated at the 1994 HELCOM session by the Russian Environment 
Minister Danilov-Danilyan, "it is obvious that such a restraint has been caused by recent socio- 
political instability in Russia itself' (HELCOM 1994: 78). 
Several special funding sources, like debt-for-environment swaps and eco-conversion 
programs, have been the focus of much discussion among the Baltic Sea countries, due to their 
ability to convert financial liabilities into resources for environmental activities. In Russia, eco- 
conversion of Russian foreign debt is regarded as one of possible future directions for the 
implementation of some of the JCP projects and is undergoing a thorough examination at 
Minpriroda (7M, 1995, No. 28: 2). Finally, the resources of the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), although currently fully allocated to other projects, could also in the future provide a 
source of grant co-financing for priority environmental projects included into the Program, 
especially the management of Baltic coastal lagoons and wetlands (see HELCOM News, 1996, 
No. 1: 8). 
To sum up, in spite of the good will and high-level political confirmation of the 
preparedness to support the JCP financially since the beginning of the Baltic Sea 
Environmental Initiative, little external financing has actually taken place until about 1994. 
Many investment proposals have been developed and feasibility studies conducted, but few 
have led to investments. The majority of these proposals tended to be oversized and costly, but 
their high costs bore no relation to the ability of municipalities to raise the funds to pay for 
them. In many cases, they did not coincide with the priorities of municipal governments and 
water enterprises. Municipal governments undertaking some of these proposals ran the risk of 
67 The project, potentially envisaging a joint venture with Stockholm Water Company, has been slowed down 
due to a lack of local (state budget) resources which should constitute $45 M out of total of $60 M at the first 
phase, and $1 10 M out of $134 M at the second phase (see Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 1995: 12). 
committing their scarce resources in costly ventures which could be achieved at much less cost 
(Stottmann 1993; HELCOMNews 1993, No. 3: 3). Whatever foreign finding has been 
provided, it has been primarily oriented towards technical assistance, while the role of 
investment projects tended to be minimal. 
More recently, however, the trend has started to change. With recipient countries 
demanding that studies should be followed by investments, the significance of investment 
projects has noticeably increased. Several donors (Finland, Sweden, Norway, EU-PHARE) are 
now turning to a more investment-oriented approach, while some of the big investment 
projects led by the World Bank or the EBRD have now reached the implementation stage 
(Berg, 1995: 49). While the bulk of international environmental assistance is still channeled to 
the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, there is also a distinct, albeit a slow trend 
towards shifting the emphasis in environmental support from the Baltic states to Russia. Still, 
possibilities to mobilize large-scale financial resources for JCP implementation on a multilateral 
basis had so far proved ambiguous. Apart from a few IFI-led projects, virtually the only 
practically available today, albeit an insufficient one, source of external finding for JCP hot 
spots in Russia and the Baltic states is still the financing through bilateral arrangements with 
Western nations. The donor countries are reluctant to commit themselves to large-scale 
projects in the situation of economic and political instability. In fact, for the time being only 
Finland (and to a limited extent Denmark) have provided tangible financial support to Russia 
for the implementation of the projects set up in the Program. 
3. IMPLEMENTATION ON A SOCIETAL LEVEL 
3.1. DISPERSION OF ACTORS AND DECENTRALIZATION OF CONTROL 
One of the important changes that transition has brought into implementation picture in 
Russia and in the Baltic states was a significant increase in number and composition of target 
groups and the ensuing decentralization and dispersion of control powers and finctions. 
Privatization of former state-owned enterprises has, more often than not, resulted in 
their splitting up into smaller independent specialized firms. As a rule, these newly-emerged 
smaller specialized companies do not display any desire to take f i l l  responsibility for the costly 
and capital-intensive environmental infrastructure, like water treatment facilities, sewerage 
systems or waste dumpsites (and moreover to acquire them), nor are they planning any serious 
investments into environmental protection. In many cases, smaller privatized firms are unable 
to cover the costs of water treatment at "new" "private" WWTPs (in fact, mostly former 
smaller municipal ones), which results in huge "accidental" discharges into water bodies 
(Kulibaba, 1996). In the process of privatization itself, the State Committee for the 
Management of State Assets68 does not take into account neither the environmental situation 
at a given enterprise nor the costs of environmental measures, nor does it provide for 
The State Committee for the Management of State Assets of the Russian Federation, together with its 
regional agencies and corresponding committees of all levels, is a federal agency set up to plan, organize and 
oversee the process of privatization. However, the division of responsibilities between the State Committee and 
anothcr agency, the National Assets Fund, is unclear, which leads to continuous struggle over prerogatives 
between the two agencies. 
"environmental rehabilitation" of the enterprises involved. "Thus, enterprises already privatized 
become more and more environmentally dangerous" (Fomin, 1995). 
If previously environmental protection authorities in St. Petersburg had to deal with a 
single, albeit gigantic, industrial association Kirovskiy Zavod which ranked first among the 
country's defense industry enterprises in the volume of polluted wastewaters discharged (and 
accounted for 13 per cent of industrial discharges in St. Petersburg), today they have to control 
about 60 individual companies that emerged after the association formal dissolution. Similarly, 
the former Izhorskiy Zavod association is now represented by 1 1 independent enterprises. 
During the period from 199 1 to July 1993 the number of registered 'environment users' has 
increased in St. Petersburg from 108 1 to 1643, and in 1993 was growing at a rate of 3-4 per 
week (Sorokin, 1993a: 150-1 5 1). 
Furthermore, one of potentially most difficult pollution control problems in Leningrad 
region (suburban) is the one of managing pollution from over 20,000 newly-emerged small 
private farms: environmental control mechanisms basically modeled after pre-existing ones 
(under 'real socialism') are ill-suited for the control of behavior of numerous small-scale 
addressees (Kulibaba, 1995). Similarly, there does not exist any legislative basis for such a 
control, nor there are sufficient resources for exercising it: the total St. Petersburg 
Lenkomekologiya staff numbers about 200 people (of these, only 6 people are involved in 
actual water sampling)G9, most of them grossly underpaid, with the ensuing very high personnel 
mobility and the acute equipment shortages (Sokornova, 1995)70. The mandate of specialized 
marine inspections (also subordinated to Minpriroda) has been limited to the territory of the 
port and to small-sized vessels because of the lack of technical means (the last specialized 
inspection vessel has been sold in 1995) (Kulibaba, 1995). 
Thus, by increasing the number and character of relevant actors participating in the 
implementation process, by introducing instability and uncertainty in ownership rights and by 
reducing at the same time the role of the state (central and local) control authorities, transition 
has dramatically increased regulatory uncertainty and substantially weakened the ability to 
implement environmental policies. 
3.2. PATTERNS OF ACTORS' PARTICIPATION 
3.2.1. Industry 
Regarding the participation of targets, the analysis seems to indicate that at the 
domestic scene in Russia it is virtually non-existent, at least at the policy-making stage. The 
crucial target group in the implementation process in St. Petersburg, the defense industry 
(about 70% of the city's industry is defense-oriented) has played, and is still playing, a very 
69 Reportedly, the maximum amount of water samples possible to be taken and analyzed within one month is 
about ten, since every analysis takes about three days to complete. For comparison, Kirovskiy Zavod association 
alone has about 1600 sources of wastewater discharge. That is why currently only the most toxic sources are 
controlled at random. Previously, these sources were controlled by the industry's own laboratories, but their 
number has reduced more than twice since 1992 (Sorokin, 1995). 
70 In St. Petersburg, there are many privately owned laboratories, but they are, as a rule, far too expensive to be 
utilized by Lenkotnekologiya. In 1995, 700 million rubles ($140,000) has been allocated for this purpose 
(Sorokin, 1995). 
passive role even in the implementation process, not to speak of participation in rule-making. 
Both federal and especially local laws and regulations provide for numerous tax and other 
privileges for enterprises investing in environmental protection: the value of the enterprise's 
pollution abatement facilities is deducted from a tax base for the purposes of estimating the tax 
on property of an enterprise. For all enterprises, up to 30 per cent of the profit tax can be spent 
on the construction of environmental infrastructure, instead of being remitted to the state. 
Similarly, pollution charges can be reduced by an amount spent on environmental protection. 
According to local regulations, the newly-established small enterprises (with fewer than 50 
employees) were exempted from profit tax paid to the local budget for the period of two years, 
provided that they invest in environmental protection. Since 1994, this privilege has been 
substantially extended to cover 4 enterprises investing in water pollution abatement (Sorokin, 
1993a; Sorokin, 1995). 
However, the striking fact is that state-owned or even newly privatized large enterprises 
make very little use of any of these privileges. It is especially true of the defense industry: in 
1994, only three defense enterprises in St. Petersburg have applied for a reduction of pollution 
charges by an amount of hnds spent on environmental protection (Sokornova, 1995)71. The 
explanation is probably a psychological one - the defense industry, which for many years 
operated solely on governmental orders, outside of the sphere of market relations, just cannot 
get accustomed to make the necessary cost-benefit calculations. By comparison, the newly- 
emerged private companies have rapidly learned to make good use of these privileges, by 
establishing e.g. small subsidiary businesses which are exempted from the profit tax paid to 
local budgets for two years, provided that they invest (even if on paper only!) in environmental 
protection (Sorokin, 1995). 
Still, despite the number of deficiencies, the application of tax incentives described 
above, together with the system of pollution charges, had a discernible stimulating effect on 
environmental investments in St. Petersburg and has positively affected the behavior of a key 
target group - industrial polluters. Several industrial WWTPs have been completed in 1994 in 
the St. PetersburgILeningrad area, including the largest one at Kirovskiy Zavod (with 
expenditures totaling $630,000) and several WWTPs at pulp and paper mills at the total 
investment cost of about $700,000 (HELCOM PITF 1995b). As a result, after remaining at 
almost unchanging level for about ten years, in 1994 the share of environmental investments in 
St. Petersburg in the total volume of investments has increased to about 7 per cent, compared 
to the country average of 3.9 per cent and 2 per cent in the Leningrad province (Sorokin, 
1995). 
3.2.2. Courts 
The role of courts in the implementation process has also been minimal: in fact, since 
1994, arbitration courts in St. Petersburg quite often rehsed to accept environmental claims, 
one of the reasons being that they are over-burdened with other, more important, cases. 
Another reason is that the whole process of covering the environmental damages and paying 
fines became almost meaningless in a highly inflationary situation: in 1994, courts in St. 
Petersburg were recovering damages on suits filed in 1989, without any adjustment for 
inflation (which has reduced the real value of payments by a factor of at least 2000) (Kulibaba, 
71 The Frunzenski district authorities in St. Petersburg have even ordered all local enterprises to transfer 30 per 
cent of their tax on profit for the construction of municipal waste water collectors (Sorokin, 1995). 
1995). And even if damages are assessed promptly by court action, they, as a rule, cannot be 
recovered72: most enterprises are officially insolvent (in practice, however, many of them 
operate through numerous subsidiary companies which bring profit, but cannot be held 
responsible for environmental violations). 
The size of administrative fines prescribed by the current law on environmental 
protection of 1992 (which is under revision at the time of writing) for enterprises and 
organizations is laughable, ranging from 50 to 500 thousand rubles (roughly $10 to $100) per 
violation; obviously, fines like these can hardly be even felt by any company. Moreover, 
recovering administrative fines from legal persons is the task which is close to impossible. 
These fines are generally paid almost on a voluntary basis, since no court would accept claims 
to this end made by a local environmental protection committee. On the other hand, a polluter, 
at least theoretically, can appeal against a committee's decision in an arbitration court, and the 
court would consider his claim. Thus, the two sides are clearly unequal from a legal point of 
view (Fomin, 1995). Not surprisingly, fines for violation of the emission limits have little 
effect. 73 
In addition to fining the enterprises, courts can fine officials responsible for the violation 
(from three to twenty months' minimal salary), as well as private persons violating the emission 
limits (from one to ten months' minimal salary). The latter fines have been reported to have far 
greater effect, but are not believed to have any (or at best very little) effect when it comes to 
reduction of load from major polluters, since the size of fines (currently, from about $13 to 
$260) is still insignificant compared to the cost of implementation measures to meet the 
emission standards (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 7). 
Overall, even regardless of an obvious deficiency of a legal system for environmental 
protection in the period of transition74 and the inadequacy of sanctions established by law, 
Russia finds itself in a very specific situation: a growing number of environmental offenses is 
accompanied by an atrophy and imbalance of the state control system and a slackening of court 
and legal reaction. Latent, unregistered environmental crime approaches, by some estimates, 
72 Overall, in Russia in the course of 1994 general courts have assessed environmental damage inflicted on 
water resources at 360.5 billion rubles; at the same time, fines recovered from guilty amounted to only 1.4 
billion rubles, while the sum of damage recovered constituted 12.8 billion (i.e., taken together, they covered less 
than 4 per cent of the total damage). Arbitration courts have sued firms for violations of environmental 
legislation for a total sum of 120 billion rubles, but managed to recover only 27.2 billion (23 per cent) 
(Gosudarstvennyi doklad 1995, ZM 15/96: 10-1 1). 
73 Sanctions envisaged by the still functioning Criminal Code (adopted in 1960!) for pollution of water basins 
are even more obsolete. In fact, the above mentioned fines established by the 1992 law on the protection of 
natural environment are much more stringent compared to Criminal Code penalties (Shirokov, 1994). Not 
surprisingly, criminal law is almost never applied to environmental offenses: 90 per cent of these are punished 
by administrative means (Sukharev, 1996). However, the new Criminal Code, entering into force on January 1, 
1987, envisages tough sanctions for environmental crime if the latter has caused damage to human health or 
animals' death: fines up to 500 minimal wages (currently, over $6,000) or imprisonment up to 3 years. 
74 The 1994 Federal Report on the state of the environment concluded that "the legislative process in the field 
of environmental protection and regulation of the use of natural resources develops without any system.. .Today 
in thc country hardly anybody knows exactly what federal laws and other normative acts of the federal level are 
rcquircd, and what laws are needed for the subjects of Federation and local self-government bodies". The laws 
lhemselves "contain too many provisions which are declaratory, lack addressees and are devoid of any 
regulatory legal significance" (Gosudarstvennyi doklad, 1995, No. 7/96: 8). 
over 90 per cent of the total number of environmental offences, since most efforts are spent on 
countering violent and economic crime. The number of criminal lawsuits for most serious 
environmental offenses (especially air and water pollution) has decreased by 50-70 per cent 
compared to 1987 (see Zhevlakov, 1996; Sukharev, 1996). Every year, procurator's 
inspections reveal over 15,000 environmental offenses all over the country; while only about 
5,000 persons get convicted (Timashova, 1996). Environmental offenses are still regarded as 
"insignificant", presenting little social danger, while the Law on responsibility for 
environmental offenses is still in the early stages of drafting. Such a "tolerance" stimulates 
negligence and irresponsibility among managers and entrepreneurs, reproducing a vicious circle 
of environmental impunity. 
3.2.3. Environmental NGOs and public participation 
Public environmental movements acquired a far greater importance in the former Baltic 
republics than in Russia itself because of a unique linkage that has developed there between 
environmental advocates and national independence movements in late 1980s. What began as 
local level environmentalist actions expanded to become ecologically grounded calls for 
national independen~e~~ .  Following Gorbachev's shift to emphasize environmental issues in the 
wake of the Chernobyl accident, nascent Baltic NGOs concerned with the environment began 
to view these issues in the context of local control over national resources (Canfield, 1993). In 
various international fora, the Baltic Green organizations attempted to focus attention on the 
role played by the Soviet system in the degradation of natural resources. Often, actions were 
strongly oriented towards the Soviet Army and its threats to the environment, notably in 
Estonia and Lithuania (Eckerberg 1994: 468). A marriage of environmental and nationalist 
interests achieved in each of the Baltic states at the time of independence, in fact provided 
much of the reserves of mass support for the successhl independence drives (Canfield, 
1 993)76. 
Within Europe, the Baltic states tend to associate themselves with the Nordic countries 
that lead Europe in environmental protection initiatives. Public participation there has enjoyed 
a strong tradition as an important component of environmental protection - in fact, 
Scandinavia is unparalleled in its public participation tradition. As one would expect, therefore, 
the Baltics are among the most active FSU countries in public participation initiatives, although 
such initiatives are still in the early stages (Stec, 1995). 
75 The so-called "singing revolution" in Estonia began in 1988, with public groups protesting against plans to 
exploit phosphorus mines on the north-eastern coast of the country. The mining was stopped in 199 1 due to the 
public opinion pressure (UNCEDIEstonia, 1992: 15; Merisaar, 1995). The Latvian independence movement 
was born out of the Environmental Protection Club (VAK), which organized the first anti-government 
dcmonstrations in Latvia in 1987-88 to protest against the proposed Daugavpils hydropower station and the 
construction of a subway in Riga (Zilgalvis, 1992). In Lithuania, in late 1980s green organizations succeeded in 
gathering 1.5 million signatures on a petition to halt expansion of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, and 
successfully halted drilling for oil in the Neringa national park and in the Baltic Sea (Stec, 1995). 
76 Why the environmental movement became such an important force for democracy may be explained by its 
firm roots in the traditional culture. Feelings for nature are deeply embedded in the national heritage; in all of 
the Baltic countries, environmental consciousness is therefore connected to the preservation of the natural and 
cultural heritage (Eckerberg 1994: 468). Two other factors also contributed to the growth of the new 
environmental movement. First, the Baltic people disapproved of Moscow being the center for decision- 
making, which affected the management of industry and natural resources. Secondly, there was a growing 
recognition of the impacts of environmental pollution on public health (Wolfson, 1992). 
A wide variety of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) has been formed in the Baltic states 
- in Lithuania alone the number of national ENGOs exceeds 30, in addition to numerous local 
organizations. The majority of national and many of the local NGOs cooperate with foreign 
and international ENGOs, which helps to raise the standards of domestic organizations, 
increasing their professionalism, sophistication and influence. Some national NGOs are 
members of different international networks and international NGOs - Coalition Clean Baltic, 
Friends of the Earth, etc. All of these ENGOs, however, face similar difficulties with financing 
(especially from domestic sources), with development of membership, and decreasing 
popularity (Vainius, 1995; Stec, 1995). Funding for public participation and NGO activities 
mainly comes from foreign NGOs, institutions and foundations, including PHARE programs, 
rather than from national and local funds (Blumberga and Ulme, 1995).77 Since the struggle for 
independence, when environmental protection actions were a major part of a broader political 
movement, cooperation between ENGOs became relatively weaker, with few regular forums 
and joint actions organized nowadays (a notable exception being the open annual meeting of 
the Estonian Green Movement). 
In 1990, green parties were founded in all three Baltic states from members of the 
environmental movement. Although they had only a few hundred formal members in each 
country, they still had a comparatively strong influence through their supporters within the 
parliamentary commissions and good relations with the media. Following independence, Green 
Party deputies were elected into all three countries' first parliaments. 
Because they were formed as a protest against communism, the green parties in the 
Baltic states tend to be more "right-wing" and nationalistic compared to their counterparts in 
the West. They are more concerned with addressing their own national environmental 
problems rather than global environmental issues, and hope that market mechanisms will be 
able to solve these problems. Also, the greens have sought to keep out of political 
controversies other than those related to the environment, in order to avoid a further split. This 
has not been very successhl, however. In 1992-1993 parliamentary elections, no green 
candidates were elected to parliaments in either country, and membership figures are declining 
as the staggering economic crisis puts increasing pressure on the political problems other than 
the environment (see Eckerberg, 1994). 
In general, environmental movement in the Baltics still follows a somewhat traditional 
socialist-era path, with most ENGOs being nature clubs and the like, mainly concerned with 
traditional nature conservation activities, and to a lesser extent with environmental education. 
Only about one third of ENGOs, like Latvian VAK, aim at pollution prevention, development 
of public participation practices, raising public awareness of modern environmental protection 
problems, and tools to solve them. Areas of key importance, such as participation in the 
creation of environmental strategy, reviewing of environmental policy documents, drafting and 
77 International institutions also try to distribute information related to financial support through the various 
organizations with whom they are working. The most successful organization in this respect is the US.-based 
ECOLOGIA, supported by the Moriah Fund, that offers training, funding and technical support to grassroots 
NGOs in FSU, providing them with small ($250 - $750) grants and publicizing its work through the 
independent environmental media. Another of ECOLOGIA's programs is a citizens' water quality monitoring 
network which provides NGOs with the equipment and training necessary to conduct accurate on-site tests for 
major water-bound pollutants, as well as radioactivity, in any river, stream or water body, thus hoping to put an 
end to a long tradition of government monopolization of environmental information (Vainius, 1995; REC 
Bullelin, 1995, Vol. 5 No. 2). 
implementation of legislation, EIA, permitting, licensing process, international environmental 
programs are mainly not within the experience of grassroots NGO influence. A few business 
and consultancy NGOs have access to and are involved in these processes. Such areas as 
projects financed by IFIs, transboundary issues also require from interested NGOs developed 
professional skills, good access to information, constant and more professional work. Many 
NGOs do not have an understanding of and interest for those areas (see Vainius, 1995). 
In all three Baltic countries, environmental protection schemes potentially provide good 
avenues for public participation and provision of information at virtually every stage of the 
environmental protection process (from the establishment of environmental policy to 
permitting and enforcement). Legal instruments for access to environmental information and 
public participation are provided in constitutions, laws on environmental protection and/or 
environmental impact assessment, and to some extent in other laws, such as regulating land use 
or nature conservation. These provisions, however, are so broad, that in many cases they are 
incapable of being translated into practice. The existing legislation provides few 
implementation mechanisms by which the public may influence individual decisions of 
governmental authorities, or take part in the establishment of environmental policy, laws or 
rules (Stec, 1995). 
As an example, access to information and the right to know is one of the constitutional 
rights for public participation that is not adequately realized in practice: environmental laws do 
not clearly define when and how information should be made available to the public (Vainius, 
1995; Blumberga and Ulme, 1995). Citizens can request information on environmental matters 
from the authorities, but procedures for such requests have not been established (Merisaar, 
1995). Although the authorities are under a duty to inform the public about environmental 
problems, local observers claim that this does not routinely occur, and in fact access to 
environmental information depends greatly on the will of the authorities involved (Stec, 1995; 
Merisaar, 1995). 
No laws or rules requiring public participation procedure in the drafting of laws or 
deliberations concerning them exist either at parliamentary or governmental level. 
Parliamentary commissions rarely hold public hearings on environmental laws and regulations; 
NGOs have been occasionally invited as experts in the field, but not representatives of the 
public (Blumberga and Ulme, 1995). Governments create paid, ad hoc committees to draft 
laws, and sometimes NGO representatives have been included, depending on personal 
contacts. There are few cases of public participation in legislation and rule making; hence the 
experience of the representatives of Estonian Green Movement (EGM) that participated in the 
drafting of the Order on EIA Procedure is considered to be very important. Estonian greens 
have also discussed the influence ofjoining the European Union on the environmental 
legislation with the Foreign Ministry (Merisaar, 1995). 
At the local government level, however, public participation is more substantial. In 
Estonia, the public has sometimes been consulted or invited to the decision-making process, 
but only when that was demanded by the foreign finance source which provided loans for a 
particular project (Merisaar, 1995). In Lithuania, several forums for discussion of 
environmental projects have been organized by local authorities in different cities. MPs and 
locally elected officials meet with their electorate regularly, but in practice the public and 
NGOs are too passive to use this opportunity (Vainius, 1995). 
Overall, regular cooperation or dialogue on environmental issues between ENGOs, the 
government and the parliament has not yet hlly developed in any of the Baltic countries. 
Whatever cooperation does exist, it is based mainly on personal contacts. The public and 
NGOs are not involved in discussions at parliamentary and governmental level on international 
environmental programs and projects financed by international assistance programs or IFIs. In 
Lithuania, where relations between the green movement and the government have been 
reportedly the worst, the public has been repeatedly characterized as creating "problems" for 
the government (Stec, 1995; Vainius, 1995). This may be changing, however, as the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Environment has come forward with the initiative of signing "agreements of 
cooperation" with ENGOs, pledging to provide them with access to information, render them 
support in their activities and to examine their proposals and comments (REC Bulletin, 1995, 
Vol. 5, No. 3). 
As regards access to courts, every citizen has a right to participate in court cases 
individually or through NGOs. However, in Estonia, for example, NGOs do not have the right 
to initiate a court case. In case of violations of environmental laws, only state inspectors or 
other state authorities have the right of standing, and only they can sue a person, provided that 
charges for causing the damage have not been paid (Merisaar, 1995). The courts are heavily 
overworked and legal proceedings take up to one year; thus, not only do people not want to 
become involved in proceedings, but the increase in the number of laws and regulations makes 
it too difficult for them to initiate proceedings without the help of a lawyer (Blumberga and 
Ulme, 1995). However, only limited legal assistance is available - lawyers in general are not 
familiar with existing environmental laws and not interested in environmental issues (Vainius, 
1995). Overall, the courts have a low image in comparison to other state institutions, and 
citizens and NGOs do not generally view them as defenders of the average citizen - rather, 
they are perceived as instruments of the policy of the government and are rarely used by NGOs 
as a tool in public participation practice (Stec, 1995). 
Thus, the use by the public of legal and other formal tools at its disposal has only slowly 
been gaining momentum. Many legal mechanisms remain unused or hardly used, perhaps in 
part because the public is more used to extra-legal approaches and has had success with them 
(Stec, 1995).78 Therefore such non-formal tools as writing letters of protest, complaints and 
petitions, lobbying and demonstrations have been gaining in popularity. Some of them have 
been oriented towards the protection of the Baltic Sea and were quite successhl. An example 
of such a successhl public participation practice was the blockade of Sloka Paper Pulp factory 
built about 100 years ago, the greatest polluter of the Lielupe River and Yurmala City, when 
VAK demonstrators managed, after several daily blockades and with the support of the public 
opinion, to close down the factory until the reconstruction of the water treatment systems was 
completed (VAK, 1993). Also, an instance when public participation successhlly influenced 
the decision-making process is the location of the oil terminal in Klaipeda in 1993, when the 
Lithuanian government finally called an "independent" commission to compile a comprehensive 
analysis of the case, including questions raised by NGOs. After a wide campaign in 1988-1990, 
using a variety of non-formal mechanisms and channels, NGOs (Atgaja) forced the central 
78 Also, public involvement in environmental protection activities related to business has become quite 
complicated due to the existing economic and social situation. In practice, it is simply risky to be involved in 
and to act against controversial businesses, because often they are related to Mafia groups, or sometimes 
business representatives defend their interests illegally - through corruption, threats or even violence 
(Vainius, 1995). 
government and the parliament to confirm as areas of national importance the construction of 
biological water treatment plants in five main Lithuanian cities (Vainius, 1995). 
An interesting initiative of Latvian VAK is the Green Tribunal. This project pursues a 
multi-faceted approach to environmental action, by providing information and gathering 
petitions on environmental matters, undertaking grassroots inspections of facilities, and 
organizing mass media campaigns until the operation of the specific source of pollution is 
stopped. On the legal side, the Green Tribunal also makes complaints to governmental officials 
in appropriate cases, and may seek recourse to the courts through the prosecutor or through a 
civil action (VAK, 1993; Stec, 1995). 
Overall, the record of public participation in the Baltic states has been mixed. On the 
one hand, progressive legal mechanisms for public participation in environmental laws have 
been adopted; international cooperation with foreign organizations seems to be stable; ENGO 
representatives are more and more elected into local governments; relatively free access to 
media channels has been assured; discussions between NGOs and government on several 
important policy issues are under way; authorities are taking a more active role in trying to 
stimulate public involvement; several protests and petitions against environmentally harmful 
activities have brought positive results. At the same time, even where the procedures for public 
participation are in place, the public is exerting little pressure towards making use of the 
existing provisions; public participation in environmental law- and decision-making, as well as 
in the enforcement of laws, regulations and permits, is low; a lack of trust between the 
authorities and the public still exists; NGOs are not organized enough and their cooperation is 
insufficient, their interests being to great extent concerned with foreign contacts. In general, 
ongoing economic reforms, social and economic problems which are still dominating the 
agendas of politicians and ordinary citizens, have substantially decreased environmental 
awareness and the pressure for increased public participation on the part of the general public 
compared to the late 1980s. It is only a "small segment of society that continues to push for a 
more active role in decision-making" (Stec, 1995). 
The latter trend is moreover evident in Russia, where economic reforms have 
proceeded with much greater pains, and economic hardships of the populace have been more 
pronounced. In the situation of a persistent economic crisis, core economic and social concerns 
other than the environment, like wages, prices and crime, understandably dominate the political 
agenda. While environmental issues consistently ranked very high - second or third - as 
public concerns in the years of perestroika, they have slipped to a 10th - 13th place in mid- 
1990s (Baiduzhiy, 1995). Letters concerning environmental problems account for less than 1 
per cent of the total amount of letters received by the Russian government and the presidential 
administration (Gosudarstvennyi Doklad 1994, No. 411995: 12). Environmental issues are 
practically missing from the election programs of any of the major political parties or 
presidential candidates. 
The degree of influence and the sheer numbers of environmental NGOs have also 
reduced dramatically compared to the late 1980s. In 1990, the number of environmental 
NGOs in the whole of the North-Western region of Russia has exceeded 130; by March 1992 
it has reduced to 91, and currently most probably does not exceed 30 (Frolov 1995: 325). 
Apart from a decade-long fighting against constructing the dam in the Gulf of Finland, their 
Baltic protection-oriented activities are currently very few and not widely publicized. The 
Coalition Clean Baltic, currently the only collective ENGO member active at HELCOM, 
includes only one NGO from Russia ("Neva River Cleanvater") which is involved in 
environmental education of schoolchildren with the U.S. NGO's financial assistance. 
Lenkomekologiya has no cooperation with NGOs whatsoever (Sorokin, 1995), but is often 
subjected to a severe criticism from the St. Petersburg greens. 
Another example is the Kaliningrad-based "Ecodefense!" group which has been active 
in opposing pulp and paper industry in the region (1991 - 1992), in collecting and publicizing 
information on WW2 chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic, and in collecting garbage from 
the coast and presenting it to the local authorities. It also regularly publishes a widely 
distributed electronic information bulletin "Ecodefense! ". 
In the absence of domestic sources of financial support, environmental NGOs in the 
Russian North-West, as well as in other parts of the country, tend to rely primarily on Western 
grants and financial assistance. Once this assistance stops for one reason or another, an NGO 
usually either drastically limits its activities, or dissolves completely. 
Perhaps even more so than its Baltic neighbors, Russia has almost no experience with 
public involvement in any facet of governance, let alone environmental decision-making, and 
the very concept of public participation is virtually unknown neither among the general public 
nor among the public servants. Similar to the Baltic states, the existing legislation provides 
citizens and NGOs with the basic rights for public participation, including the rights to take 
part, to have access to information, to express opinions and to develop alternative solutions. 
The problem, however, lies with implementation: since legislation provides only general 
principles, but no direct mechanisms to encourage public involvement, the responsibilities of 
the government and the business sector with respect to access to information and moreover to 
decision-making are unclear (Ponizova, 1995). 
One example is the development of the aforementioned (see para. 2.1) Russian National 
Environmental Action Plan. Started in the waning days of the Soviet Union, the Russian NEAP 
is a national environmental policy document that has been renamed and loosely modeled on the 
EAP that was adopted at Lucerne. There has been very little public involvement in the 
development of this document or its updated version. The government developed the first draft 
of the document in relative secrecy and then called public hearings where NGOs and the 
general public could comment. However, there was very limited access to the document itself, 
since only 500 copies were printed and distributed (mostly among the governmental agencies), 
so very few people beyond the government had the chance to read it before the hearings 
(Ponizova, 1995). 
There are practically no instances of private citizens or NGOs using legal actions for 
upholding their right for a clean environment despite the fact that the 1992 Russian Law on the 
Protection of Natural Environment has granted citizens "the right to file lawsuits in court, 
demanding termination of environmentally harmhl activities damaging the health and property 
of citizens, the economy, and the environment." One example, however, has set an historic 
precedent as Russia's first civil lawsuit concerning environmental pollution. The lawsuit filed in 
1993 by the NGO "Russian Center for Environmental Law" from St. Petersburg with the 
assistance of the US. National Resources Defense Council, claimed that Vodokanars lack of 
adequate water and sewage treatment facilities violated key provisions of the Helsinki 
Convention. According to the Director of the Center for Environmental Law, Vodokanal was 
legally required to ensure adequate processing of 70 percent of the untreated water flowing 
through the Neva out into the Baltic Sea (Browning, 1993). Despite the fact that the case was 
lost, it has signaled that Russian public, traditionally passive before government bureaucracy, 
has a growing awareness of such concepts as individual responsibility and "people power". 
Overall, the relations between green NGOs and environmental protection authorities 
remain very strained, and the proper interaction between them is lacking. Despite the existing 
constitutional requirements, refusals to provide or to publish free, timely and authentic 
environmental information remain systematic. Measures are not taken to sanction violations of 
environmental legislation, public environmental control and public EIAs are hampered and 
interfered with by the authorities. NGOs have been continually demanding that citizens' 
constitutional rights to participate in the control of compliance with environmental laws were 
upheld, and the corresponding legal acts on public environmental control and public 
participation in EIAs were developed and adopted (Ecojuris, 1994). 
Meanwhile, as has been recognized in the 1995 Report on the state of human rights in 
Russia, the attempts continue to take all EIAs under the control not only by the state, but, 
what is more dangerous, by the industry itself Even at the All-Russian Congress on Nature 
Protection which was held in June 1995, delegations from many regions have been formed by 
regional administrations and consisted primarily of persons involved in distribution of 
environmental funds and having vested interests in environmentally dangerous enterprises 
(LiveNet-Info, Dec. 12, 1995, No. 209). 
Concerning public participation, perhaps the most challenging task ahead for Russia, for 
the Baltics and for other FSU states is improving the transparency of decision-making and 
inculcating the practice of civil service in public authorities. The lack of transparency in 
decision-making can (and does) extend even within the government itself. The lack of openness 
contributes to a high level of corruption and arbitrary decisions - legacies of the last decade of 
Soviet power that stubbornly persist (Stec, 1995). 
4. ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1. PROBLEM SOLVING 
With regard to environmental problem solving, a lack of reliable comparable data for 
any of the parts of the Baltic, and especially for its Russian coastal waters, prevents making 
any definite conclusions regarding the pollution dynamics. The available data are short-term, 
dating back only to 1988, which prevents careful examination of trends and making any 
definite conclusions regarding environmental quality. Still, the available information indicates 
that no clear-cut improvement trend can be observed in the state of the environment of the 
Neva River, the eastern Gulf of Finland, or the Kursiu Lagoon (Kaliningrad coast). Most 
recent environmental reports have classified the waters of the eastern Gulf of Finland as "dirty" 
or "very dirty" - one of the worst rating in the whole of the country (Danilov-Danilyan et al., 
1994). In 1992, in the Neva estuary average phenol concentrations have increased up to 4-7 
MPC, concentration of copper has reached 19 MPC, while those of lead and manganese have 
exceeded MPC (Gosudarstvennyi doklad 1993, No. 2 1). 
A certain improvement, or at least a stabilization of hydrobiological situation has been 
observed in 1993, and the state of waters in the Neva estuary has been reclassified as "Class 3", 
or "moderately polluted". Still, phenols and copper compounds were detected along the whole 
course of the river, with concentrations frequently exceeding MPCs. Increasing nitrogen 
concentrations have also been observed along the whole of Neva, although they have not 
usually exceeded MPC (Gosudarstvennyi doklad 1994, No. 24)79. The Federal Report on the 
state of the environment warned, however, that it was premature to make conclusions as 
regards the stabilization of pollution levels. Long-term systematic discharges of industrial and 
municipal wastes into Neva estuary have resulted in the accumulation of heavy metals (copper, 
mercury, lead, cadmium) in fish tissues at levels close to MPCs or exceeding the latter 
(Gosudarstvennyi doklad 1994, No. 27). The data for 1994 also indicate elevated average 
concentrations of nitrogen (1.8 MPC), phenols (3 MPC) and copper (4.4 MPC), while average 
concentrations of other heavy metals (manganese, lead and cadmium) have not exceeded the 
national standards (Gosudarstvennyi doklad 1995, No. 3/96). 
At the 1994 anniversary HELCOM meeting, Russian Environment Minister V. Danilov- 
Danilyan has acknowledged that since 1988, the environmental situation and the impact of 
economic activities on the environment in the Russian part of the Baltic Sea have not changed 
significantly. Although a considerable reduction of pollution load has taken place with respect 
to BOD and oil products, discharges of phosphorus and nitrogen have remained practically at 
the same level; heavy metals content in the coastal waters also has not changed appreciably 
during the last years (HELCOM 1994: 76-77). In short, it is not possible to say that in the 
course of 199 1 - 1994, when measures to implement the HELCOM recommendations have been 
undertaken in Russia, any definite improvement of the state of the Baltic coastal waters has 
occurred. 
4.2. TARGET ATTAINMENT 
Since until 1992 no information on any discharges has been published neither in the 
USSR nor in the Baltic republics, it is equally impossible to evaluate to what extent the Soviet 
Union has implemented its commitments, e.g. under the 1988 Ministerial declaration on the 
overall 50 per cent reductionz0 or the 1976 Council of Ministers' Resolution - to end all 
discharges of untreated municipal and industrial sewage by 1985. However, there are clear 
indications that neither of these goals have been reached by far. By mid-1980s, only 70% of the 
Soviet enterprises and cities affected have hlfilled their planned targets envisaged by the 1976 
Council of Ministers' Resolution, although their completion was planned for the year of 1 980g1 
(Ministry of Ecology, 1992). Even more indicative of the grim implementation picture of both 
internationally agreed measures and national goals is the 1990 data on the state of municipal 
and industrial wastewater treatment in the city of Leningrad: about 60% of municipal 
79 In thc Kursiu Lagoon, some improvement of environmental quality has also been obscrved in the course of 
1993. It was manifest in the increase of the dissolved oxygen, normalization of biogenic elements 
concentrations; however, phosphorus content in the waters of the lagoon has still exceeded MPC 
(Gosudarstvennyi doklad, 1994, No. 27). 
z0 The 1988 Ministerial Declaration was regarded by the member countries mainly as a declaration of intent, 
and its significance seemed rather symbolic, since many of the exact pollution levels were not known. For the 
Soviet Union, moreover, its implementation reportedly did not prove to be so "difficult", because very little has 
been known on actual emission levels. Professor Harald Velner, a key player in the Soviet dclegation to 
HELCOM at that time, pointed out that until 1988 scientists simply were not allowed to provide any data on 
sewagc discharges, because the censorship agcncy Glavlit prohibited this (Van der Weij, 1993: 99). 
It should bc noted that the fact that water treatment equipment has been constructed does not mean that this 
cquipment actually operated. As is well known, many enterprises did not put this equipment into operation, 
since it just involved extra work and expenses, and control was generally lacking. 
wastewaters were treated biologically, and the remaining part has been discharged into the 
Gulf of Finland without any treatment. Industries purified about 60% of their wastewaters 
chemically, only 1% biologically, 9% mechanically, and 30% were not treated before discharge 
(HELCOM 1993a: 67, 7 1). As a result, Russian municipal sources (primarily those of 
Leningrad) in 1990 accounted for 74% of the total BOD, (organic matter), 70% of nitrogen, 
and 85% of phosphorus load on the Gulf of Finland (HELCOM 1993a: 68). 
Similar problems existed in other Baltic cities as well. Biological treatment, usually the 
second phase after mechanical treatment, has still not been finished for the city of Tallinn, while 
the construction started in 1968 and was scheduled to be completed by 1980 (Van der Weij, 
1993: 108). By May 199 1 only 5.6 percent of the total sewage of the city of Riga was treated. 
Riga had almost one million of inhabitants, almost one third of the total population of Latvia 
(NOPEF, 199 1). According to a HELCOM report, in Lithuania 25 percent of sewage was not 
treated at all in 1990, of which some 90 percent came from the second largest city, Kaunas 
(NIB, 1992). In all these cases the Soviet Union obviously did not conform by the HELCOM 
recommendations. The implementation of internationally agreed measures was still very weak 
in late 1980s and in the early 1990s. 
Table 6 
Annual loads of major pollutants (tons) in St. Petersburg area controlled under Helsinki 
Convention and 1992 Russian-Finnish Agreement 
Sources: Sorokin 1993a, Sorokin 1993b, HELCOM PITF 61213. 
In Russia under transition, as the available statistics for St. Petersburg area and all of 
priority hot spots indicate, a declining trend in most major pollutants' loads has been observed 
over the course of the past 4-5 years. By 1994, compared to 1990, loads of organic substances 
53543 
2955 
21480 
Total BOD 
Suspended solids 
Surfactants 
P total 
N total 
777 10 
5130.3 
24020.3 
66670 
3556.6 
223 15.4 
57204 
4249.9 
23094.4 
60890 
4879.4 
24860.2 
49520 
5278.5 
2094 1.6 
58567 
6655 
23584 
(BOD total) in the whole of Leningrad province have declined by 12 per cent, those of 
nitrogen - by 14 per cent, the loads of phosphorus - by 39 per cent82, and the loading of 
copper (in St. Petersburg proper) - by 67 per cent (see Table 6). The total volume of polluted 
waste waters has also declined, albeit insignificantly. The overall picture does not change 
substantially when reviewing HELCOM statistics (which include all the priority hot spots in 
Russia), except that BOD decline is larger, which clearly reflects differences in data reported. 
What is more important, however, is the fact that for all three polluting substances (i.e. BOD, 
phosphorus and nitrogen), the 1994 loads and even the planned ones (i.e predicted when the 
planned remedial works are implemented) still several times exceed the loads required to meet 
the HELCOM recommendations (see Annex 3, Fig. 1-3). 
HELCOM data for Latvia and Lithuania (Annex 3, Fig. 4-6) indicate that, at least for 
BOD and especially nitrogen, the decrease of pollution loads from priority hot spots since 
1991 has been even greater than in Russia: indeed, Lithuanian nitrogen loads in 1994 have 
already been lower than required by HELCOM standards. Although no strictly comparable 
data for Estonia are available, statistics of total water polution load in this country reveal the 
same, and even more ponounced, trend: since 1991, BOD loads here have declined almost 
eight-fold, phosphorus loads - 2.5 times, and nitrogen loads - 2.3 times (Ministry of the 
Environment of Estonia, 1995 : 54). 
It has been widely acknowledged that whatever implementation of the Helsinki 
Convention has occurred in Russia (see e.g. HELCOM 1994: 76-77) and in the Baltic states 
(see BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2) since 199 1, it has predominantly been co-incidental, owing mainly to 
a drastic decrease of production levels both in industry (especially in military-related industries) 
and agriculture, the latter being particularly significant from the viewpoint of the markedly 
reduced application of fertilizers and  pesticide^.^^ HELCOM recommendations have already 
been met for the agricultural priority hot spots both in the Baltic republics and in Russia, but 
unfortunately only because of the sharp decline in agricultural activities (BSEP, 1994, Vol 1 : 
5)84. The situation is different for the majority of the municipal and industrial hot spots, where 
already executed and planned abatement measures do not meet the HELCOM 
recommendations. However, improved wastewater treatment has markedly contributed to 
implementation in some cases, such as the completion of new WWTP in Riga in 1992 (BSEP, 
1994, Vol. 2: 39) and the upgrading of Tallinn WWTP (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 2: 25)85. 
82 A sharp increase in the loads of phosphorus in 1993 compared to previous years was explained by a lack of 
funds for the import of floculants used for silt management at WWTPs (HELCOM PITF, 1995b). 
83 The production of chemical fertilizers has dropped in Latvia from 180,000 tons in 1990 to 3 1,000 tons in 
1992, and Soviet imports of fertilizers and pesticides have drastically declined. The Estonian use of mineral 
fertilizers in 1992 has been cut in half since 1985 and the consumption of pesticides decreased to the amounts 
comparable to those found in many Western countries (Kaasik 1994). By 1994, the number of farm animals 
have almost halved compared to 199 1 (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 1 : 6). 
84 The scale of economic collapse has been tremendous: during 1989-1995, GDP in Estonia has declined by 
28.7 per cent, Latvian GDP - by 46 per cent, GDP in Lithuania -by 58.1 per cent, and Russian GDP -by 
50.1 per cent (data from World Bank Database). 
85 The extension of Tallinn WWTP in the period of 1986-92 has resulted in significant reductions of the BOD5, 
nitrogen and phosphorus load to the Baltic Sea. Effluent data from the beginning of 1994 indicates that the 
HELCOM goals are already met as regards BOD5 and phosphorus, while the goal of nitrogen reduction is 
almost met as well (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 3: 9). 
One of the side effects of the current situation is that some of the pollution problems 
which were deemed most important in the process of development of JCP and choosing the 
priority hot spots are now obviously acquiring a much lesser priority. For instance, emuents 
from several pig farms in Leningrad Region which were chosen as priority hot spots have now 
reduced dramatically because the number of pigs has fallen by an order of magnitude - so that 
Lenkomekologiya even informally proposed to delete these from the list of hot spots (similarly 
to how it has been done with the nine pulp and paper mills in Finland and Sweden).86 However, 
the situation in Russia is obviously totally different from the one in Scandinavia, where 
compliance has been caused by technological change (implementing HELCOM 
recommendations), and not by production decline. 
As far as the St. Petersburg industries and municipal sources are concerned, many of 
them have practically achieved the 50 per cent reduction target required by 1988 Ministerial 
Meeting, without complying with virtually any of HELCOM recommendations - partly 
because of production decline, and partly because many industries do not operate at all for a 
good part of the year. It is impossible to estimate at the moment to what extent the decrease of 
pollution loads in St. Petersburg was due to industrial decline, and to what extent can it be 
attributed to pollution abatement efforts within the framework of JCP and bilateral Russian- 
Finnish agreements (increasing WWTP capacity and switching sewage floodgates to the St. 
Petersburg sewage network system). However, the latest data made public by the Russian 
Minister of the Environment V. Danilov-Danilyan indicate that while industrial production in 
the city has declined by about 50 percent over the course of the last five years, the reduction of 
water pollution loads during the same period was in the order of 10 per cent only (TEN, Apr. 
16-30, 1996, Vol. 2, No. 8). Thus, even allowing for a degree of generalization, it can be safely 
assumed that water pollution loads have been declining at a much slower rate compared to 
industrial production, and if it were not for a tremendous production decline, pollution levels 
during the same period would have most probably increased rather than fallen. 
It would be unfair to say, however, that no real progress has been achieved in the 
implementation of Helsinki committments in Russia. In St. Petersburg, reportedly, the 
untreated water discharges today account for about only 20% of the total as compared to 40% 
in 1990. This has been achieved primarily through switching the large part of sewage 
floodgates (about 40 per cent of the total of 490) to the centralized St. Petersburg sewage 
network, and the completion of the second phase of Northern WWTP with the efficient 
capacity of 650 cubic meters daily, financed from the federal budget (Kulibaba, 1995). It can 
be assumed with high probability that without the need to implement international 
commitments these investments would not have occurred, or would have been of a 
substantially lesser scale. 
Still, the progress in overall Russian implementation pattern would depend, apart from 
St. Petersburg, upon the situation in Kaliningrad, which for a number of reasons in the nearest 
hture can become a much "hotter" hot spot compared to St. Petersburg. First, WWTP in 
Kaliningrad, apart from a primitive mechanical treatment, are virtually non-existent. The 
beginning of construction of Kaliningrad combined water treatment facilities, which are now 
completed by about 50 per cent, dates back to 1976; by 1994, none of the 45 facilities under 
construction have been put into operation, and no investments have been planned either. The 
86 See footnote 14 
River Pregola has the worst water quality parameters in the whole of the Baltic catchment 
basin. Second, this is a comparatively rapidly and aggressively developing "special economic 
zone" with two operating pulp and paper mills (supplying 48 per cent of the total pollution 
load) and the largest port at the Russian Baltic coast, currently being expanded. Furthermore, 
the region has an intensive agriculture on low fertile polder lands which for natural reasons are 
lacking geochemical barriers for pollution, like forests. All these factors make the attainment of 
HELCOM requirements in Kaliningrad highly questionable in the foreseeable hture (Kulibaba, 
1995). 
The newly independent Baltic states, especially Estonia and Latvia, seem to have fared 
slightly better compared to Russia, due partly to a better economic situation (and hence better 
mobilization of domestic resources) and partly to a bigger share of external financing received. 
As was mentioned above, both in Latvia and Estonia pollution loads have decreased 
significantly since 1991 due partly to the introduction of the new WWTP in Riga completed in 
1992 and the implementation of the first phase of the upgrading of Tallinn WWTP, and partly 
to reduced industrial and agricultural output. In Lithuania, despite the allocation of about 5% 
of the 1994 state budget expenditures for the expansion of water treatment facilities, 
comparatively little progress in wastewater treatment has been achieved. In all three countries, 
however, plans for concrete measures to reduce pollution loads at virtually all municipal 
priority hot spots are at an advanced stage or under implementation. Consequently, a 
significant reduction of the pollution load can be expected following implementation of these 
plans: BOD, is expected to be reduced by about 75 per cent, while nitrogen and phosphorus 
loads - by approximately 40 and 60 per cent respectively (BSEP, 1994, Vol. 1 : 6). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Baltic Sea environmental protection regime has started by adopting the "technical- 
scientific" strategy which had three major tasks: research and information, formulation of 
principles for emission limitations, and specification of rules and procedures. In the bipolar 
security system which then existed in Europe, this strategy hnctioned well in the sense that 
cooperation was primarily technical and uncontroversial to the member states' security 
concerns. In fact, in the 1980s participation in the regime was more important for the Soviet 
Union than actually achieving environmental goals, moreover that the latter have been 
formulated rather loosely. At that period, a decisive role in determining the Soviet approach 
towards Baltic environmental cooperation has been played by security concerns, which 
generally overruled environmental interests in the hierarchy of Soviet foreign policy goals. This 
approach explained many of the drawbacks of the 1974 Convention, and, most importantly, the 
lack of any binding obligations concerning pollution from land-based sources. Consequently, 
major Soviet implementation efforts were focused on the control of pollution from ships, while 
the so-called "security interests" has been often used as a pretext to classi@, and hence to 
conceal from the public, any environmental data, in order to cover the inadequacy (or 
inexistence) of domestic pollution abatement efforts. 
Massive political changes occurring in Europe and especially in the Soviet Union, 
reconsideration of its national interests and foreign and security policies, increased openness 
and access to environmental data not only changed the overall Soviet approach to the regime, 
but have opened up totally new conditions for cooperation by providing a context for East- 
West hnding and technology transfer. A new "program strategy" of Baltic cooperation has 
largely replaced the previous one, reflected primarily in the development and adoption of JCP, 
with the aim "to restore the Baltic Sea to a sound ecological balance". Based on a joint 
implementation principle, the JCP has adopted an approach of using environmental investments 
where they can produce maximum environmental efficiency with minimal costs, namely in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The central characteristics of JCP were a strong economic component, linkage of 
environmental cooperation to economic reforms, the emphasis on long-term planning and high- 
level political involvement. In addition to enlarged geographical scope, the number of actors 
involved has also increased dramatically with the inclusion of new member countries, 
international financial institutions, environmental NGOs, local-level authorities, and private 
businesses. The adoption of JCP has signaled a dramatic departure, in fact a regime change, 
from the form of cooperation characteristic of the 1980s. 
In spite of the increased possibilities for cooperation and a perceived need to 
demonstrate compliance with international commitments, the priority of Baltic environmental 
issues in the overall Soviet (and later Russian) foreign environmental policy in the early 1990s 
has noticeably decreased, particularly with the Baltic republics acquiring independence and 
Russia losing much of its Baltic facade. For the newly independent Baltic states, however, 
HELCOM activities played an important role in the process of their international recognition, 
providing them with some of their first possibilities to participate in international fora as 
independent entities. 
Already in the waning years of the USSR, the availability of domestic resources and the 
ability to mobilize them became the critical factors limiting the Soviet, and later Russian, 
efforts towards the implementation of the Baltic pollution controls. Staggering economic crisis 
has prevented the allocation of any hnds for this purpose from the federal budget until 1993, 
and enterprises had to rely primarily on their own very limited hnds for financing capital 
investments, including the environmental ones. Periodic allocations from local budgets did not 
significantly alter the general picture. Municipal water and sewerage works still have to rely, at 
least partially, on state subsidies to supplement user fees. Several national plans and programs 
adopted, following a tradition prevailing during the communist period, at best represented 
merely un-coordinated listings of investment needs for a number of specific projects, with 
specification of priorities and hnding sources totally missing. 
Despite the fact that economic incentives to implement environmental policy (pollution 
charges and taxes) were introduced both in Russia and in the Baltic states, the effectiveness of 
this system remained questionable as long as the tax rates, despite their periodic adjustments, 
were lagging behind the inflation rate. In addition, earmarked resources from the 
environmental hnds  have been widely used at local levels for purposes other than 
environmental protection. As a result, pollution charges, accounting in Russia for just 0.1% of 
its consolidated federal budget revenues, have been too low to play an important role in 
stimulating rational environmental management. Some effects, however, have been noticeable: 
at least the polluting enterprises, even the defense industry, have to take environmental 
standards into account when formulating production policies. 
In view of a huge imbalance existing between the investments required for the 
implementation of HELCOM recommendations and the already incurred ones (ECU 30M vs. 
ECU 1,600M for Russia and ECU 11M vs. ECU 335M for the Baltic states), the need for very 
significant resource transfers is paramount for JCP implementation. However, in spite of a 
high-level political confirmation of the preparedness to support the JCP financially, little 
external financing has actually taken place until about 1994. Many investment proposals have 
been developed, but few have led to investments. Whatever foreign finding has been provided, 
it has been primarily oriented towards technical assistance, while the role of investment 
projects tended to be minimal. Moreover, Russia received a significantly smaller part of 
external environmental assistance compared to the one channeled to the Baltic states, the fact 
obviously influenced by a relative political stability of the latter. 
More recently, however, the trend has started to change. With recipient countries 
demanding that studies should be followed by investments, the significance of investment 
projects has noticeably increased, and some of them have reached the implementation stage. 
There is also a distinct, albeit a slow tendency towards shifting the emphasis in environmental 
support from the Baltic states to Russia. The IFIs, above all the World Bank and the EBRD, 
took on the role of coordinators of several hot spot projects where investments are too large to 
be financed by one source only and where therefore several donors are engaged. However, as 
the IFIs provide loans at basically market rates rather than concessional finding, very few 
external commercial loans for JCP implementation have been accepted within the region, and 
especially in Russia, with the objective of creating as little foreign debt as possible. Thus 
possibilities to mobilize large-scale financial resources for JCP implementation on a multilateral 
basis had so far proved ambiguous. Apart from a few IFI-led projects, virtually the only 
practically available today, albeit an insufficient one, source of external finding for JCP hot 
spots in Russia and the Baltic states is still the financing through bilateral arrangements with 
Western nations. At the same time, the donor countries are still reluctant to commit themselves 
to large-scale projects in the situation of economic and political instability. In fact, for the time 
being only Finland (and to a limited extent Denmark) have provided tangible financial support 
to Russia for the implementation of the projects set up in the Program. 
One of the major changes that transformation, both in Russia and the Baltic states, has 
brought into environmental regulatory policies was a decentralizatiorl of authority, a shift of 
implementation responsibilities to regional and local levels. However, in a country where 
"parades of sovereignties" and "wars ofjurisdiction" are commonplace, and the division of 
rights and responsibilities between regulatory subjects, both vertically and horizontally, is far 
from clear, that could not but detrimentally affect the translation of international commitments 
into domestic actions. One of the most graphic examples is the situation in St. Petersburg 
region, where a single control and regulatory environmental agency, Lenkomekologiya, is 
servicing the two subjects of Federation, the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad province, 
who have been fiercely struggling for power, resources and finding between themselves. 
Coordination problems, a lack of a clear line of authority and of well-defined roles and 
responsibilities plague the local environmental bodies' performance in the Baltic states as well. 
By introducing new patterns of private ownership of capital, transformation has also 
resulted in decentralization of addressees of public policy, radically changing their numbers and 
composition. As the current case study demonstrates, privatization has affected implementation 
in at least two ways: first, by preventing the acquisition by the newly-emerged smaller 
specialized companies of costly and capital-intensive environmental infrastructure, like 
WWTPs (and sometimes even the ability to use it), and second, by dramatically increasing the 
number of relevant actors, which, besides other effects, substantially complicated the exercising 
of control and enforcement functions by environmental authorities. The latter problem is 
exacerbated by a lack of resources and legislative basis for the control of a large numbers of 
small actors. 
A critical role in poor enforcement of environmental regulations has been played by 
legal and court action, or rather by its almost total absence. Being over-burdened with other, 
more important, cases, arbitration courts in Russia have refused to accept claims for 
environmental damages. The process of recovering them and paying fines became almost 
meaningless in the inflationary situation. Even when sanctions for environmental offenses were 
applied, they were clearly inadequate to change the behavior of polluting enterprises. Inherited 
from the Soviet system was the attitude towards environmental offenses as "insignificant", 
presenting little social danger, the fact which stimulated negligence and irresponsibility among 
managers. 
As distinct from the Nordic countries, little public pressure exists in Russia for the 
implementation of Baltic environmental controls. Russia has almost no experience with public 
involvement in any facet of governance, let alone environmental decision-making, and the very 
concept of public participation is virtually unknown neither among the general public nor 
public servants. The influence and the numbers of green NGOs have reduced dramatically 
compared to the late 1980s; the relations between them and environmental authorities remain 
very strained, and the proper interaction between them is lacking. Even in the Baltic states, 
where environmental movements are far more important than in Russia because of a unique 
linkage that has developed there between environmental advocates and national independence 
movements in late 1980s, public participation in environmental law- and decision-making is 
practically missing, NGOs are not organized enough, while social and economic problems have 
substantially decreased environmental awareness and the pressure for increased public 
participation on the part of the general public. 
Overall, the impact of state regulatory policies upon the behavior of target groups and 
domestic implementation has been mixed. While a number of tax and other incentives for 
environmental investments have been developed by federal and especially local authorities, they 
have rarely been used by state-owned, especially defense, enterprises; on the other hand, the 
newly-emerged private companies made use of tax privileges without actually making 
environmental investments. Application of pollution charges, paid directly from profit, has 
had, at least in some important cases, a more stimulating effect. By mid 1990s, the proportion 
of environmental investments in St. Petersburg, after remaining practically unchanged for about 
ten years, has grown considerably compared to the country average and even the Leningrad 
province. 
That, however, has not yet been translated into implementation of Helsinki 
commitments. Despite a declining trend in most major pollutants' loads observed over the 
course of the past 4-5 years in St. Petersburg area, compliance with obligations made at the 
1988 Ministerial Conference has been predominantly co-incidental, owing mainly to a drastic 
decrease of production levels both in industry and agriculture. Many of St. Petersburg 
industries and municipal sources have practically achieved the 50 per cent pollution load 
reduction target without complying with virtually any of HELCOM recommendations. While it 
is impossible to estimate at the moment to what extent the decrease of pollution loads in St. 
Petersburg was due to industrial decline, and to what extent can it be attributed to pollution 
abatement efforts within the framework of JCP, it is clear that pollution loads have been 
declining at a much slower rate compared to industrial production, and if it were not for a 
tremendous economic collapse, pollution levels during the first half of the 1990s would have 
most probably increased rather than fallen. 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
EBRD 
ECAT 
ECB 
ECE 
ECU 
EI A 
EIB 
ENGO 
GEF 
HELCOM 
IBRD 
IF1 
NEFCO 
NGO 
NIB 
PHARE 
PITF 
REC 
TAClS 
TEN 
W WTP 
ZM 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
Environmental Center for Administration and Technology 
Environmental Cooperation Bulletin (electronic bulletin published by ISAR) 
Economic Commission for Europe (UN) 
European Currency Unit 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
European Investment Bank (EU) 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organization 
Global Environmental Facility 
Helsinki Commission (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission) 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) 
International Financing Institutions 
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 
Non-Governmental Organization 
Nordic Investment Bank 
Poland and Hungary Assistance to the Reconstruction of the Economy (EU) 
Programme Implementation Task Force (HELCOM) 
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe 
Technical Assistance to the Common\vealth of Independent States (EU) 
Transboundary and Environmental News (electronic bulletin published in St. Petersburg ) 
Waste water treatment plant 
Zelionyr Mir (Russian environmental weekly, Moscow) 
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ANNEX 1 
Major HELCOM recommendations concerning land-based sources of pollution 
No. 
312 
511 
611 
612 
613 
616 
712 
713 
812 
912 
Measures to be taken 
Use and production of DDT and its derivatives to be abandoned, they should 
not be marketed in the Baltic Sea states, transportation and storage with 
caution. Monitoring of DDT in sediments and organisms. 
Oily process, cooling and other waters from plants, service stations, 
workshops etc. need effective pollution control measures before connected to a 
stormwater system. Areas already connected to be investigated and 
appropriate measures to be taken according to the Recommendation. 
PCBs and PCTs not to be produced from 1987; articles containing these 
substances not to be marketed since 1987. Exceptions can be granted for 
research, development and analytical purposes. 
Provisions for new and existing oil refineries concerning cooling waters, 
collection of oily stormwaters and effective treatment. For new refineries oil 
content of the effluent should not exceed 5 mg/l (monthly average) and total 
discharge - more than 3 grams per ton of crude oil, processed. For existing 
refineries, same criteria are applied as from 1990. 
Best technical means to be used in industrial plants constructed after 1986; 
requirements for existing industrial plants in operation. 
Limitation of the use of cadmium in electroplating, pigments, stablizers. 
Development of methods to reduce cadmium content in phosphatic fertilizers 
and discharges from fertilizer production. 
Farming practices with regard to storage facilities, cultivation, animal 
husbandry, establishment of water protection zones and household and farm 
waste waters. Improvement of knowledge on agricultural practices and 
environmental problems as proposed. Information exchange. 
Infiltration and exfiltration to be minimized in sewers, net infiltration not to 
exceed 100% of the dry weather flow (yearly average); separated sewerage 
systems recommended in the future. 
Recommendations on safe use of pesticides, e.g. preventing pesticides run-off 
to water bodies, establishment of protection zones, use of aircraft, handling 
and storage of pesticides, washing of spraying equipment, disposal of 
containers etc. Alternative methods to control agricultural pests and weeds are 
proposed. 
Urban wastewater is to be collected and treated before discharging into water 
bodies. Domestic sewage collected in a central sewerage system and treated in 
WWTPs loaded with more than 10,000 person equivalents should be treated 
by biological methods or equivalent, latest in 1998. Treatment should result 
(as yearly average) in at least 90% reduction of BOD5, its maximum 
concentration in the effluent of 15 mgll and total phosphorus value below 1.5 
mg PI1. 
Reporting 
requirements 
In 1985 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
Every 5 years 
In 1986 and 
every 3 years 
In 1986 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1988 
In 1987 and 
thereafter 
every 5 years 
In 1988 
In 1989 and 
thereafter 
every 5 years 
Year 
1982 
1984 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Subject 
Elimination of 
discharges of DDT 
Limitation of oil in 
stormwater systems 
Elimination of the 
use of PCBs and 
PCTs 
Restriction of oil 
discharges from oil 
refineries 
Mercury from 
chloralkali industry 
Cadmium from land- 
based sources 
Discharges from 
agriculture 
Development of 
sewerage systems 
Pollution by 
pesticides from 
agriculture 
Effective methods in 
urban wastewater 
treatment 
3 
914 
918 
1 112 
1 113 
1 114 
1 115 
1 117 
131 10 
1311 1 
Eff~cient use of nutrients in farming practices. For environmental aspects 
approval is required for farms with livestock production above given size. 
Cultivated areas are to be kept green in autumn and winter where possible. 
Programmes to be developed to control and monitor the effects of the 
measures. 
Lead content in gasoline used as fuel for automobiles to be reduced 
considerably step by step and lead-free gasoline made available as soon as 
possible. 
Application of BAT recommended for industrial discharges where main 
pollution is due to nutrients or organic material; industrial discharges 
containing persistent organic substances or toxic metals are to be reduced and 
measures be evaluated for BAT. 
Prevention of deterioration of stormwater quality by taking measures at source 
of possible pollution. Measures recommended for treatment of stormwater 
collected from high trafic and heavily polluted industrial areas. The amount 
of stormwaters in combined sewer systems to be minimized. In areas with 
combined sewer systems, overflows should be limited to happen not more 
than 10 times a year. 
Measures are recommended not to exceed values of listed determinants in kglt 
ADP (Air Dry Pulp) from 1 January 1995, and re-evaluation of the values for 
further consideration. Methods for analyzing total nitrogen and maximum 
loads to be agreed upon within three years. 
To reduce the load of chlorinated organic substances (AOX) so that not to 
exceed recommended values from I January 1995 (annual mean values of 2 kg 
of AOX per ton of air dry bleached softwood pulp and 1 kg of AOX per ton of 
air dry bleached hardwood pulp, or 1.4 kg of AOX per ton of the country's 
total production of air dry bleached kraft pulp). Oxygen consumption not to 
exceed 65 kg per metric ton of air dry bleached kraft pulp and phosphorus not 
to exceed 60 g per ton of air dry kraft pulp. Target year 2000 for mills in 
operation before 1 January 1989, for others immediately. 
Total discharges from different types of processes not to exceed, after 1995, 
limit values given for SS, oil, zinc, lead, cyanide. Closed system required for 
at least 90% of process water and polluted cooling water. Re-evaluation of 
values in 1994. 
Dust emissions to be avoided or collected and filtered since 1 January 1995; 
fugitive emissions recommended to be avoided, types of filters and values for 
filtered gases are provided. Low emission coke cooling techniques to be used 
for new installations and for existing coke plants from 1995; emission of 
particulate matters in the combustion waste gas not to exceed 25 mglm3; 
waste gases to be captured and emission not to exceed 5 g per ton of coke. 
Total emissions to be monitored, measured or estimated and reported from 
1992. 
Artificial fertilizers and animal manure should be applied according to the 
need of the crop. Proposals for implementation of this principle are given. 
Implementation in 5 years 
Farm animal houses are to be designed in such a way as to minimize pollution 
of groundwater and surface waters. Storages to be constructed to safeguard 
against unintentional spillages. Effluents from preparation and storage of 
silage to be collected to storages for liquid manure. Containers for liquid 
manure and farm waste to be made of material not permeable for moisture. 
Implementation in 5 years. 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1992 
1992 
In 1989 and 
thereafter 
every 5 years 
In 1989 and 
thereafter 
every 5 years 
In 1989 and 
thereafter 
every 5 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
Nutrient discharges 
from agriculture 
Lead from 
combustion of leaded 
gasoline 
Measures to reduce 
discharges from 
industry 
Management of 
stormwater 
Sulfite pulp and 
paper industry 
Kraft pulp and paper 
industry 
Discharges from iron 
and steel industry 
Air emissions from 
iron and steel 
industry 
Phosphorus leaching 
and erosion from 
agriculture 
Farm waste 
discharges 
131 12 
1312 
1315 
1317 
1318 
1319 
1412 
1413 
1414 
1415 
Managing freshwater 
ecosystems for 
retention of nutrients 
Industrial 
connections and point 
sources other than 
households 
Principles for permits 
for wastewater 
discharges from 
industry 
Ammonia 
volatilization from 
farm storages 
Ammonia 
volatilization from 
field application of 
manure 
Nitrogen leaching 
from agricultural 
land 
Discharges and 
emissions from 
production and 
formulation of 
pesticides 
Discharges and 
emissions from glass 
industry 
Ammonia 
volatilization from 
animal housing 
Batteries containing 
heavy metals 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
Measures for improved retention of nutrients in freshwaters through programs 
for re-establishing wetlands and smaller lakes, plugging of drainage pipes in 
abandoned meadows, introduction of environmentally sound practices for 
weed mowing and maintenance of watercourses. 
Harm for municipal WWTPs caused by persistent, toxic or bioaccumulating 
substances must be avoided by pretreatment of such waste water using BAT; 
connections to be authorized and supervised. 
Procedures leading to issuance of permit and establishment of inspection and 
monitoring are recommended; data to be included in the application. 
Storage capacity must be sufficient, slurry storages are to be covered, 
ammonia volatilization from storages is to be prevented; programmes to be 
developed. Implementation in 5 years. 
Slurry applied on bare soil or to growing crops should be treated as 
recommended, urine to be applied using efficient equipment and solid manure 
is to be incorporated shortly after application. Implementation in 5 years. 
Application of mineral fertilizers and animal manure recommended according 
to the need of the crop. Utilization efficiency of animal manure is to be 
enhanced by measures recommended. Utilization efficiency of mineral 
fertilizers is to be promoted by integrated plant production. Green fields to 
cover 50% of the agricultural land, or the highest possible percentage with 
respect to climate and soil conditions. Implementation in 5 years. 
For plants producing or formulating more than 5 t/a of active substances, limit 
values and test advice are provided for waste waters discharged after 
treatment. Pretreatment of waste waters required if introduced to a joint 
biological WWTP. Dust emissions to atmosphere not to exceed mass 
concentrations of 5 mg/m3 if the mass flow is 25 g/h or more. Measures are to 
be implemented by 1994 for new plants and by 1997 for existing plants. 
BAT to be applied and processes and techniques to be developed to collect 
and treat emissions; hazardous substances to be substituted. Using of filters as 
agreed; limit values for dust concentrations, lead , arsenic and NOx in air 
emissions are provided. Recirculation of process waters required and limit 
values of Pb, As, Sn and F are given for discharges to water bodies or to 
municipal WWTPs. Measures to be implemented by 1994 for new plants and 
by 1998 for existing plants. 
Overall excretion of nitrogen by livestock is to be reduced by the use of high 
quality and well-composed fodder and advanced feeding systems, by 
developing feeding tables and systems (to be applied in 5 years). Emitting 
surfaces are to be reduced by removing the manure from the stables to an 
outside storage as quickly as possible. Standards to be set for drying of poultry 
manure as quickly as possible after excretion in housing systems (where it is 
feasible, within 5 years). 
Substitution by less hazardous batteries; recovery or safe disposal of used 
batteries. Legislation needed regulating labeling according to international 
standards and collection of used batteries. Safe disposal and legislation to be 
implemented in 1994. 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1994 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
Source: HELCOM World Wide Web home page 
16/10 
1611 1 
1614 
1615 
1616 
1617 
1618 
1619 
Discharges and 
emissions from 
production of textiles 
Pesticides from 
agriculture, forestry 
and horticulture 
Emissions into the 
atmosphere from 
pulp and paper 
industry 
Requirements for 
discharging of waste 
water from chemical 
industry 
Discharges and 
emissions from metal 
surface treatment 
Waste water 
management in the 
leather industry 
Emissions into 
atmosphere and 
discharges into water 
from incineration of 
household waste 
Nitrogen removal at 
municipal sewage 
water treatment 
plants 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
Measures to reduce pollution load, including BAT, limit values for discharges 
into water bodies and municipal WWTPs, toxicity tests, limit values for 
emissions into the atmosphere and analytical methods. Implementation by 
1998 for new plants and by 2000 for existing plants. 
Use of pesticides in agriculture, forestry and horticulture as recommended and 
agreed by FA0 in 1985. Recommended actions include application 
technology, establishment of protection zones, handling and storage of 
pesticides, exchange of information, BEP, education, and development of 
alternative methods. 
The emissions of NOx, as a yearly average for each Party's emissions from 
recovery boilers and lime kilns not to exceed the listed values agreed. 
Emissions of gaseous sulfuric compounds not to exceed 1.0 kg Slt of pulp 
produced for kraft pulp and 1.5 kg Slt for sulfite pulp. Emission limits to be 
re-evaluated in two years. 
Requirements as agreed (related to volume of effluent, COD, AOX, heavy 
metals, toxicity of the effluent and analyzing methods) to be applied to 
chemical industries producing waste water discharged into waters or 
municipal sewerage systems. The requirements and limit values are to be 
implemented for new plants by 1996 and for existing plants by 2000. 
Reconsideration of the requirements in 1998, especially nutrients and TOC. 
Measures as agreed to be taken to reduce the volume of waste water 
discharged from metal surface treatment, to control and minimize noxious 
substances in waste waters. The use of chlorinated solvents is to be avoided as 
far as possible, and if not possible, the agreed requirements are to be met. Re- 
evaluation of limit values in three years. 
Basic principles (BAT, water treatment, limit values for chromium, chemical 
oxygen demand and total nitrogen) to be applied to leather industry plants 
discharging into water bodies or municipal sewerage systems. The limit 
values are to be implemented for production units newly constructed or 
reconstructed by 1996, and for existing units by 2000. Re-examination of limit 
values in 1998. 
Agreed actions of BEP and BAT to be applied in waste minimization, 
handling and incineration. The actions refer to waste minimization and 
recycling, dangerous materials, waste collection and separation, open-air 
incineration and waste incineration processes. Re-examination of the 
requirements and limit values in 1999. 
Municipal WWTPs located in areas sensitive to nitrogen should be equipped 
with nitrogen removal according to the agreed stipulations, where values for 
concentration or for percentage of reduction are applied. Results of 
assessments which have evaluated areas as being sensitive or non-sensitive 
should be reported every three years. 
In 2000 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 1997 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 2000 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
In 2000 and 
thereafter 
every 3 years 
ANNEX 2 
Baltic Sea Environmental Action Programme: Status of Activities at and Preliminary Costs of Hot Spots in Russia and the Baltic States 
1991 HELCOM Estimated 
Investment Cost, M ~ l l ~ o n  
ECU 
rlh8 hot 
RUSSIA 
spots 
(XI 
Renovat~on of the exlst~ng WWTP 
AllocatedResewed 
Resources, M ~ l l ~ o n  ECU 
lat aluminium plant 
SIX I St Petersbure I To connect munlcloal dlscharae 
Local I For I Total Local I For I Total 
I I sewers to ~ ~ ~ ~ . c o n s t r u c t i ~ n  and 
Inctmed 
Invest- 
ments, 
M ~ l l ~ o n  
E c U * ~  
renovation of collectors 
Loc % I For % I Total 
91X St Petersburg Munlc~pal WWTP 
(Urban) (3) n 
Planned Investments, Mlll~on 
ECU* 
ECU* 
!O/X St Petersburg Development of suburban munlclpal 
(Suburban) WWTP (b~ologlcal treatment) 
load of WWTP from metal plating 
HEL- 
COM 
Invest 
(1 994). 
mln 
1 industry 
23 1 St Petersburg I lnclnerat~on, treatment and 
Add11 
Invest 
(mln 
ECU)* 
transportation of hazardous waste, 
upgrading the exlstlng landfill 
24lX St. Petersburg Livestock farms water treatment 
Reg~on actlon program, ~ntroduct~on of dry 
manure wastes farmlng technolog~es 
ScheduleICommentslStatus 
cost estimates* 
C - Already constructed*, 
P - Planned Investments*, 
F - Flnanclng Sources 
1993-1997, technical asslstance underway 
I I 1993-1997, no techn~cal asslstance 
. . Ip connections C Approx 50% of mterceptors and sewer connectlorn I ~molemented 
P Feas~bllity study prepared by OTV, France (1994) 
F Flnland, Lenvodokanal, Federal Ecolopcal Fund 
? 
Ilmrluded m I991 C B~olopcal capaclty at approx 50% of needs. 
IP Feas~blllty nu* prepared by OTV (1994) 
F Internat~onalllocal French loan for sludge lnclneratlon 
d l R e a s o n  unknown (1991.1998 
C B~olog~cal capaclty at approx 70% of needs 
P Feas~bll~ty stud~es camed out by OTV (1991) and Kruger 
(1993) 
. . I F .  Federal and local govt , WB, Flnland (detalls tbd) 
1993-1997 
II IF, Local-Clty Admln~strat~on, Federal Ecolog~cal Fund 1 1993-1997, techn~cal assistance underway 
60 0 Load reduct~on 1993-1997 
C Mlnor treatment facl l~t~es constructed Regresston In l~vestock 
farming 
P. Feas~blllty study IS belng prepared by Plancenter and NlKA 
F Internat Local To be clarified 
49'X Sovetsk Constmct~on of a unified WWTP fo 1 0 2 5 
pulp and paper m ~ l l  
Constmct~on of WWTP for a pulp 
and paper mill 
II II II prlces due to hlgher P Ollic~al plan Compl of oversized b~ol  W T P  Assumpt~on In local ~nput Ipresent study Compl of mech UWTP Beas~bilty study I required. F No financing sources identified. Identification process not 
1993-1997 
C 60°a of civll works for new b~ol  V W T P  completed 
7 7 
local ~nput  study Compl ofmech WU'TP Feasibilty study required 
F No financing sources identified. Ident~fication process not 
initiated. dMMCower WWTP ca- I 1993.1997 
20 0 
73lX 1 Vlstula Lagoon I Management Programme u 1 5 0  1 5 0  1 2 0 0  1 1 11 1 1 I F  EU-PHARE, WWF, deta~ls tbd 
12 j 
paclty, lower un~t  
prlces due to hlgher 
local Input Excl 
renovation of paper 
mill ~n I994 
Estonia 
Lower capac~ty of 
\t?I'TP, lower unlt 
C 70% of clv~l  works for new b~ol  WWTP completed 
P Official plan Compl ofovers~zed b~ol  WWTP h s u m p t ~ o n  Ir
present study Compl sfrnech WWTP Feas~bilty study 
required. 
F No f inanc~ng sources identified Iden t~f ica t~on  process not 
25lX N w a  Reduct~on of SO2 and dust 
emissions of the 011 shale power local) 
95 0 
Load reduct~on C B~olog~cal treatment of major pan of wastewater 
P- Several stud~es carr~ed out by EBRD, PHARE and Flnland 
F EBRD loan, budget ofTalllnn, Fmland, EU-PHARE, financing 
I 
C Slgn~ficant decrease In energ  product~on Pilot project 
implemented supponed by Flnland 
P Refurb~shment f e a s ~ b ~ l ~ t y  study by IVO Intemat~onal (1994) 
F MOE Flnland. A Ahlstrorn, Eest~ Energla Co 
Phase 1 1992, Phase 11 7 
7 No techn~cal ass~stance  95 0 
I I I 
Operat~onal costs not 
included Into 1994 
costs 
I--t--HHt--H+HHI Iplan prepared 11 29 ITallinn l~eductlon ofpollution ~n pulp & 11 1 I I 1 8 1 2 9 7 11 
30 Gulfof Finland 
. . 
paper Industry 
Reduct~on of agncultwal runoff and 
ammonia emissions 
60 0 5 0 65 0 0 17 0 17 7 
F Nord~c Investment Bank 
-
development of a management plan C Management plan for wetlands completed In 1991, 
, EU-PHARE, F~nland, WE 
Eston~aILatv~a 
stamable agr~cult development based on 
Lithuania 
10 0 15 0 25 0 
2103 2070 4173 
5 1 lX 
52 
53 
54 
11 59lX 1 Vllnlusl Gnk1skes Construct~on of b~ologcal WWTP 1- 
Construct~on of h W T P  wlth 
brolog~cal treatment 
Complet~on of the construction of 
the second stage of WWTP 
46lX 
48lX 
1 5 0  Construct~on of WWTP and 
sewerage system 
41lX 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Daugavplls 
L~epaja WWTP 
SUBTOTAL 
S ~ a u l ~ a ~  W P  
Kaunas WWTP 
Amalg Azotaz 
Keda~n~a i  
K e d a ~ n ~ a ~  
Changed load 
rehabll~tat~on 
1 0 0  
Constmct~on of W P  and
sewerage system 
To construct statlon for trapplng 
contammated subterranean water 
and W P  at fertlllzer plant 
Modern~zat~on f crude 011 
Reconstruct~on ofmunrc~pal WWTP 3 6 
(~ndustr~al) 
Panevezys 
(rnun~cipal) 
Panevezys 
(food Industry) 
Manjampole 
(municipal) 
Alytus 
60lX 
62 
63lX 
1996-2000 
C Mechan~cal WWTP w~thout sludge processing 
P PHARE-funded f e a s ~ b ~ l ~ t y  study to be canled out In 1994-95 
F F~nanclng poss~b l l~ t~es  to be evaluated 
1995-1999 
C B~ol  WWTP for approx 75% of connected urban areas 
P Extens~on of WWTP, renewal of sewers etc Included In 
feas~blllty study (PHARE 1994) 
F NEFCO, WB, EU-PHARE. W, Sweden, F~nland, local 
250  
combust~on process 
Reduct~on of pollut~on load to the 
Balt~c Sea 
Introduction of new technolog~cal 
schemes 
Reduct~on of pollut~on load 150  1 0 0  250  
Reconstruction of mun~c~pal  WWTP 13 0 
Agr~culturel 
Livestock 
M a z e ~ k ~ a ~  
Kla~peda 
Demonstrat~on programs to reduce 
non-polnt agr~cultural m o f f  
1) Reconstruct~on of 011 refinery; 2) 
WWTP constructlon 
Complet~on o fmun~c~pa l  WUTP 
constructlon 
16 0 11 0 27 0 
Belarus 
Ukraine 
300  
tbd 
4970 
64 
65 
028  
1 2 
5176 
L~thuan~alRuss~a  
66lX Kurslu Lagoon Development of a coastal 
management program 
I Total (~ncomplete) I 1 2,683 9 1 1,4624 1 4,146.3 302 97 1 302.88 1 605 85 1) 39 8 11 1 40224 11 1890 1 11 1521 1 )I 
47 
61 
93 
- Updated information received by February 12, 1995 
N.A. - data not available 
tbd - to be determined 
Only for priority Hot Spots, based on 1994 Hot Spot Review 
a All incurred investments are 100% local, except where otherwise indicated 
Planned appropriations for 1995 from the Federal budget (HELCOM PITF 61213, 3 1 May 1995) 
Figures and comments refer to the sum of Hot Spots No. 67-69 
Sources: HELCOM PITF 1995a, BSEP 1994, Vol. 1 
4774 69 65 
Cardboard factory 
Palanga 
SUBTOTAL 
7 
1992-2000 
F Poss~bly state budget, forelp Investments 
? 
tbd 
tbd 
20 0 
0 05 
5068 
1 1  0 
tbd 
3262 120 33 
Reduction of polluuon load 
Construct~on of b~ologlcal WWTP 
200 
Daugava Rlver 
bas~n (tbd) 
Grodno 
Brest 
133 0 94lX 
7 
1993-95 
F L~thuanla State Budget 
190  
tbd 
1708 
0 28 
1 2  
995 
300  100  
tbd 
tbd 
11 0 
35 45 
Reduction of mun~c~pal pollut~on 
load 
Establishment ofa  control system 
for water supply and sewage 
Reductron of munlclpal pollut~on 
load 
81 0 
- 
105 
tbd 
tbd 
3 1 0 
35 5 
214 0 Lvov 4 0 Reduct~on ofmun~c~pal pollut~on 
load by 30% 
1995.1998 
F EU-LIFE, EU-PHARE, WB, WWF, EUCC, Mln Env Prot , 
local govt 
0 9 6  
0 9  4 0  
096  
56 0 
N A  
151 0 95 0 Scaling down of 
or~g~nal WWTP 
reconst~uctron plans 
7 
C Two mech hlol WWTPs In bad need of marntenance 
P No feas~b~l~ty  study, no fixed plans Sludge 1s top prror~ty + 
maintenance 
F Practrcally no locallnat~onal funds ava~lable 
I 11 OOO'Z 1 000'06 1 V'N 1) 000'Z 1 000'06 1 V'N 11 000'E 1 000'06 1 'V'N OOS'E 1 000'051 1 000'SL a m S o ~ d  mama8eueml r * r e a ! ~ ~ O ~ ~ n ~ I  LE 
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Latvia 
Lithuania 
66 IKursiu Lagoon*** ]Management programme 11 160,000 1 25,000 1 4,000 11 140,000 1 30,000 1 3,000 11 120,000 1 30,000 1 2,500 1 120.000 1 25,000 1 2,500 11 I 
Ukraine 
94 1 Lvov l~eduction of pollution load by 30% (1 71,000 ( 8,300 1 1,680 1 64,000 1 7,700 1 1,550 1 64,000 1 7,700 1 1,550 11 2,700 1 2,100 ) 270 U~ludged~sposal 1 
I l ~ o t a l  (incomplete) 1 561,756 1 398.296 1 22,029 11 356,290 1 224309 1 21,823 11 277,648 1 211,524 1 21.254 1 162,440 I 215,679 I 11,411 11 
* Predicted load when planned remedial works are implemented 
** Predicted load when HELCOM recommendations are met 
***Load received from the catchment area 
a Excluding Narva Power Plant 
Source: BSEP 1994, Vol. 1. 
Fig. 1. Current and planned loads of 
BOD5 at priority hot spots in Russia 
(t/y)* 
Load 199 1 Load 1994 Planned HELCOM 
load load 
'Excludmg the Cursiu Lagoon Program 
Fig. 2. Current and planned loads of 
nitrogen at priority hot spots in Russia 
(t/y I* 
Load 199 1 Load 1994 Planned HELCOM 
load load 
*Excludmg the Clus~u Lagoon Program 
Fig. 3. Current and planned loads of 
phosphorus at priority hot spots in 
Russia (t/y)* 
Load 1991 Load 1994 Planned HELCOM 
load load 
' Exclud~ng the Curslu Lagoon Program 
Fig. 4. Current and planned loads of 
BOD5 at priority hot spots in Latvia and 
Lithuania* (tly) 
Planned 1991 
load 
Excluhg the Gulf of Rga and 
Curs111 Lagmn Managemmt Programs 
Fig. 5. Current and planned loads of 
nitrogen at priority hot spots in Latvia 
and Lithuania* (tly) 
1991 Planned I 
load 
Excluhg the Gulf of Rga and 
Curslu Lagmn h l m g e m m t  Prcgrams 
Fig. 6. Current and planned loads of 
phosphorus at priority hot spots in 
Latvia and Lithuania* (tly) 
load 
Excluhg the Gulf of &a and 
Curs~u Lagoon Management Prqgram 
